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Rising inequality has brought redistribution back on the political agenda. In theory, inequality aversion drives people’s support for redistribution. People can dislike both advantageous inequality (comparison relative to those worse off) and disadvantageous inequality (comparison relative to those better off). Existing experimental evidence reveals substantial variation across people in these preferences. However, evidence is scarce on the broader role of these two distinct forms of inequality aversion for redistribution in society. We provide evidence by exploiting a unique combination of data. We use an incentivized experiment to measure inequality aversion in a large population sample (≈9,000 among 20- to 64-y-old Danes). We link the elicited inequality aversion to survey information on individuals’ support for public redistribution (policies that reduce income differences) and administrative records revealing their private redistribution (real-life donations to charity). In addition, the link to administrative data enables us to include a large battery of controls in the empirical analysis. Theory predicts that support for public redistribution increases with both types of inequality aversion, while private redistribution should increase with advantageous inequality aversion, but decrease with disadvantageous inequality aversion. A strong dislike for disadvantageous inequality makes people willing to sacrifice own income to reduce the income of people who are better off, thereby reducing the distance to people with more income than themselves. Public redistribution schemes achieve this but private donations to charity do not. Our empirical results provide strong support for these predictions and with quantitatively large effects compared to other predictors.

Transitivity is perhaps the most fundamental axiom in economic models of choice. The empirical literature has regularly documented violations of transitivity, but these violations pose little problem if they are simply a result of somewhat-noisy decision making and not a reflection of the deterministic part of individuals’ preferences. However, what if transitivity violations reflect genuinely nontransitive preferences? And how can we separate nontransitive preferences from noise-generated transitivity violations–a problem that so far appears unresolved? To tackle these fundamental questions, we develop a theoretical framework which allows for nontransitive choices and behavioral noise. We then derive a non-parametric method which uses response times and choice frequencies to distinguish genuine (and potentially nontransitive) preferences from noise. We apply this method to two different datasets, demonstrating that a substantial proportion of transitivity violations reflect genuinely nontransitive preferences. These violations cannot be accounted for by any model using transitive preferences and noisy choices.

Research on the personality of creative scientists is revisited using the Neo-Socioanalytic model of personality psychology as an organizing framework. Past research shows that creative scientists, largely from the 20th century, were distinguished by high levels of openness to experience, dominance, ambition, intelligence, and low levels of agreeableness. Contradictory findings for environmental influences highlighted the potential importance of both supportive and adverse diversifying experiences. Developmental trends also run contrary to the likelihood of scientific creativity occurring later in life, which is consistent with the life span models of creativity. Based on this review, we highlight much needed updating to the basic science of scientific creativity, including the need to test these findings in populations other than older white men, and the testing of both environmental experiences and individual differences simultaneously. An agenda for identifying and developing the 21st century creative scientist is provided.

Do beliefs about inequality depend on distributive preferences? What is the joint role of preferences and beliefs about inequality for support for redistribution? We study these questions in a staggered experiment with a representative sample of the Swiss population conducted in the context of a vote on a highly redistributive policy proposal. Our sample comprises a majority of inequality averse subjects, a sizeable group of altruistic subjects, and a minority of predominantly selfish subjects. Irrespective of preference types, individuals vastly overestimate the extent of income inequality. An information intervention successfully corrects these large misperceptions for all types, but essentially does not affect aggregate support for redistribution. These results hide, however, important heterogeneity because the effects of beliefs about inequality for demand for redistribution are preference-dependent: only affluent inequality averse individuals, but not the selfish and altruistic ones, significantly reduce their support for redistribution. These findings cast a new light on the seemingly puzzling result that, in the aggregate, large changes in beliefs about inequality often do not translate into changes in demand for redistribution.

Rising inequality has brought redistribution back on the political agenda. In theory, inequality aversion drives people’s support for redistribution. People can dislike both advantageous inequality (comparison relative to those worse off) and disadvantageous inequality (comparison relative to those better off). Existing experimental evidence reveals substantial variation across people in these preferences. However, evidence is scarce on the broader role of these two distinct forms of inequality aversion for redistribution in society. We provide evidence by exploiting a unique combination of data. We use an incentivized experiment to measure inequality aversion in a large population sample (≈9,000 among 20- to 64-y-old Danes). We link the elicited inequality aversion to survey information on individuals’ support for public redistribution (policies that reduce income differences) and administrative records revealing their private redistribution (real-life donations to charity). In addition, the link to administrative data enables us to include a large battery of controls in the empirical analysis. Theory predicts that support for public redistribution increases with both types of inequality aversion, while private redistribution should increase with advantageous inequality aversion, but decrease with disadvantageous inequality aversion. A strong dislike for disadvantageous inequality makes people willing to sacrifice own income to reduce the income of people who are better off, thereby reducing the distance to people with more income than themselves. Public redistribution schemes achieve this but private donations to charity do not. Our empirical results provide strong support for these predictions and with quantitatively large effects compared to other predictors.

Recent contributions suggest that the empirical evidence for the common ratio effect could be explained as noise instead of underlying preferences under “common assumptions.” We revisit this argument using a more general method which allows to unambiguously distinguish noise from preferences nonparametrically and with less stringent assumptions. The results are independent of the assumed behavioral model or how noise affects choices. Applying this method to new experimental data we show that there is a systematic preference for the common ratio and the common consequence effects which cannot be explained by noise.

Ambiguous prospects are ubiquitous in social and economic life, but the psychological foundations of behavior under ambiguity are still not well understood. One of the most robust empirical regularities is the strong correlation between attitudes towards ambiguity and compound risk which suggests that compound risk aversion may provide a psychological foundation for ambiguity aversion. However, compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion may also be independent psychological phenomena, but what would then explain their strong correlation? We tackle these questions by training a treatment group’s ability to reduce compound to simple risks, and analyzing how this affects their compound risk and ambiguity attitudes in comparison to a control group who is taught something unrelated to reducing compound risk. We find that aversion to compound risk disappears almost entirely in the treatment group, while the aversion towards both artificial and natural sources of ambiguity remain high and are basically unaffected by the teaching of how to reduce compound lotteries. Moreover, similar to previous studies, we observe a strong correlation between compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, but this correlation only exists in the control group while in the treatment group it is rather low and insignificant. These findings suggest that ambiguity attitudes are not a psychological relative, and derived from, attitudes towards compound risk, i.e., compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion do not share the same psychological foundations. While compound risk aversion is primarily driven by a form of bounded rationality – the inability to reduce compound lotteries – ambiguity aversion is unrelated to this inability, suggesting that ambiguity aversion may be a genuine preference in its own right.

Repeated interactions provide an evolutionary explanation for one-shot human cooperation that is counterintuitive but orthodox. Intergroup competition provides an explanation that is intuitive but heterodox. Here, using models and a behavioural experiment, we show that neither mechanism reliably supports cooperation. Ambiguous reciprocity, a class of strategies that is generally ignored in models of reciprocal altruism, undermines cooperation under repeated interactions. This finding challenges repeated interactions as an evolutionary explanation for cooperation in general, which further challenges the claim that repeated interactions in the past can explain one-shot cooperation in the present. Intergroup competitions also do not reliably support cooperation because groups quickly become extremely similar, which limits scope for group selection. Moreover, even if groups vary, group competitions may generate little group selection for multiple reasons. Cooperative groups, for example, may tend to compete against each other. Whereas repeated interactions and group competitions do not support cooperation by themselves, combining them triggers powerful synergies because group competitions constrain the corrosive effect of ambiguous reciprocity. Evolved strategies often consist of cooperative reciprocity with ingroup partners and uncooperative reciprocity with outgroup partners. Results from a behavioural experiment in Papua New Guinea fit exactly this pattern. They thus suggest neither an evolutionary history of repeated interactions without group competition nor a history of group competition without repeated interactions. Instead, our results suggest social motives that evolved under the joint influence of both mechanisms.

Do beliefs about inequality depend on distributive preferences? What is the joint role of preferences and beliefs about inequality for support for redistribution? We study these questions in a staggered experiment with a representative sample of the Swiss population conducted in the context of a vote on a highly redistributive policy proposal. Our sample comprises a majority of inequality averse subjects, a sizeable group of altruistic subjects, and a minority of predominantly selfish subjects. Irrespective of preference types, individuals vastly overestimate the extent of income inequality. An information intervention successfully corrects these large misperceptions for all types, but essentially does not affect aggregate support for redistribution. These results hide, however, important heterogeneity because the effects of beliefs about inequality for demand for redistribution are preference-dependent: only affluent inequality averse individuals, but not the selfish and altruistic ones, significantly reduce their support for redistribution. These findings cast a new light on the seemingly puzzling result that, in the aggregate, large changes in beliefs about inequality often do not translate into changes in demand for redistribution.

Parsimony is a desirable feature of economic models but almost all human behaviors are characterized by vast individual variation that appears to defy parsimony. How much parsimony do we need to give up to capture the fundamental aspects of a population’s distributional preferences and to maintain high predictive ability? Using a Bayesian nonparametric clustering method that makes the trade-off between parsimony and descriptive accuracy explicit, we show that three preference types—an inequality averse, an altruistic and a predominantly selfish type—capture the essence of behavioral heterogeneity. These types independently emerge in four different data sets and are strikingly stable over time. They predict out-of-sample behavior equally well as a model that permits all individuals to differ and substantially better than a representative agent model and a state-of-the-art machine learning algorithm. Thus, a parsimonious model with three stable types captures key characteristics of distributional preferences and has excellent predictive power.

Increasing inequality and associated egalitarian sentiments have put redistribution on the political agenda. In this paper, we take advantage of Swiss direct democracy, where people voted several times on strongly redistributive policies in national plebiscites, to study the link between social preferences and a behaviorally validated measure of support for redistribution in a broad sample of the Swiss population. Using a novel nonparametric Bayesian clustering algorithm, we uncover the existence of three fundamentally distinct preference types in the population: predominantly selfish, inequality averse and altruistic individuals. We show that inequality averse and altruistic individuals display a much stronger support for redistribution, particularly if they are more affluent. In addition, we show that previously identified key motives underlying opposition to redistribution – such as the belief that effort is an important driver of individual success – play no role for selfish individuals but are highly relevant for other-regarding individuals. Finally, while inequality averse individuals display strong support for policies that primarily aim to reduce the incomes of the rich, altruistic individuals are considerably less supportive of these policies. Thus, knowledge about the qualitative properties of social preferences and their distribution in the population also provides insights into which preference type supports specific redistributive policies, which has implications for how policy makers may design redistributive packages to maximize political support for them.

The empirical evidence on the existence of social preferences—or lack thereof—is predominantly based on student samples. Yet, knowledge about whether these findings can be extended to the general population is still scarce. In this paper, we compare the distribution of social preferences in a student and in a representative general population sample. Using descriptive analysis and a rigorous clustering approach, we show that the distribution of the general population’s social preferences fundamentally differs from the students’ distribution. In the general population, three types emerge: an inequality averse, an altruistic, and a selfish type. In contrast, only the altruistic and the selfish types emerge in the student population. We show that differences in age and education are likely to explain these results. Younger and more educated individuals—which typically characterize students—not only tend to have lower degrees of other-regardingness but this reduction in other-regardingness radically reduces the share of inequality aversion among students. Differences in income, however, do not seem to affect social preferences. We corroborate our findings by examining nine further data sets that lead to a similar conclusion: students are far less inequality averse than the general population. These findings are important in view of the fact that almost all applications of social preference ideas involve the general population.

We review the vast literature on social preferences by assessing what is known about their fundamental properties, their distribution in the broader population, and their consequences for important economic and political behaviors. We provide, in particular, an overview of the empirically identified characteristics of distributional preferences and how they are affected by merit, luck, and risk considerations as well as by concerns for equality of opportunity. In addition, we identify what is known about belief-dependent social preferences such as reciprocity and guilt aversion. The evidence indicates that the big majority of individuals have some sort of social preference while purely self-interested subjects are a minority. Our review also shows how the findings from laboratory experiments involving social preferences provide a deeper understanding of important field phenomena such as the consequences of wage inequality on work morale, employees’ resistance to wage cuts, individuals’ self-selection into occupations and sectors that are more or less prone to morally problematic behaviors, as well as issues of distributive politics. However, although a lot has been learned in recent decades about social preferences, there are still many important, unresolved, yet exciting, questions waiting to be tackled.

Parsimony is a desirable feature of economic models but almost all human behaviors are characterized by vast individual variation that appears to defy parsimony. How much parsimony do we need to give up to capture the fundamental aspects of a population’s distributional preferences and to maintain high predictive ability? Using a Bayesian nonparametric clustering method that makes the trade-off between parsimony and descriptive accuracy explicit, we show that three preference types—an inequality averse, an altruistic and a predominantly selfish type—capture the essence of behavioral heterogeneity. These types independently emerge in four different data sets and are strikingly stable over time. They predict out-of-sample behavior equally well as a model that permits all individuals to differ and substantially better than a representative agent model and a state-of-the-art machine learning algorithm. Thus, a parsimonious model with three stable types captures key characteristics of distributional preferences and has excellent predictive power.

The potential benefits and mechanistic effects of working memory training (WMT) in children are the subject of much research and debate. We show that after five weeks of school-based, adaptive WMT 6–9 year-old primary school children had greater activity in prefrontal and striatal brain regions, higher task accuracy, and reduced intra-individual variability in response times compared to controls. Using a sequential sampling decision model, we demonstrate that this reduction in intra-individual variability can be explained by changes to the evidence accumulation rates and thresholds. Critically, intra-individual variability is useful in quantifying the immediate impact of cognitive training interventions, being a better predictor of academic skills and well-being 6–12 months after the end of training than task accuracy. Taken together, our results suggest that attention control is the initial mechanism that leads to the long-run benefits from adaptive WMT. Selective and sustained attention abilities may serve as a scaffold for subsequent changes in higher cognitive processes, academic skills, and general well-being. Furthermore, these results highlight that the selection of outcome measures and the timing of the assessments play a crucial role in detecting training efficacy. Thus, evaluating intra-individual variability, during or directly after training could allow for the early tailoring of training interventions in terms of duration or content to maximise their impact.