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: Latin American Cooperative Law lacks a specialized legal regulation on the fiduciary duties of the special subjects of Cooperative Law, specifically designed according to the philosophical precepts and values of cooperativism. In some jurisdictions there is even the practice of resorting to the use of behavioral archetypes developed in other contexts of Business Law, whose application within Cooperative Law is contrary to its philosophical essence. We maintain that the development and consolidation of Cooperative Law would require the elaboration of legal behavioral standards specifically designed to govern the particular subjects of Cooperative Law. On the basis of the broad philosophical literature examined, we propose the incorporation within the normative bodies of Latin American Cooperative Law of a fiduciary standard specially constructed to govern the conduct of such subjects, namely: the archetype of good, educated and committed cooperative persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Virtual assistants (VAs), like Amazon’s Alexa, Google’s Assistant, and Apple’s Siri, are on the rise. However, despite allegedly being ‘assistants’ to users, they ultimately help firms to maximise profits. With more and more tasks and leeway bestowed upon VAs, the severity as well as the extent of conflicts of interest between firms and users increase. This article builds on the common law field of fiduciary law to argue why and how regulators should address this phenomenon. First, the functions of VAs resemble established fiduciaries, namely mandataries when they perform tasks on behalf of users, and increasingly advisors whenever they provide recommendations or suggestions. Second, users grant firms deploying VAs ever more discretion over their economic, and more and more significant non-economic interests, such as their health or finances. This delegation of power renders users vulnerable to abuse of power and inadequate performance by firms deploying VAs. Moreover, neither specification or monitoring nor market forces are alternatives that can sufficiently protect users. Thus, regulation is needed, departing from the recognition of the relationship between firms deploying VAs and users as a fiduciary relationship. In the EU, this could be realised through fiduciary requirements for VAs. First and foremost, to adequately protect users from abuse of power by firms deploying VAs, the core fiduciary duty of loyalty should be converted into corresponding fiduciary requirements for VAs, obliging firms to align VAs with their users. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), fiduciaries have a strict duty of loyalty--to act 'solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries' and 'for the exclusive […]

Objective: to clarify the concept of “conflict of interest”, to identify the peculiarities of conflict of interest resolution in group proceedings, and to develop practical recommendations to prevent conflict of interest in judicial and advocacy activities.Methods: dialectical approach to cognition of social phenomena, allowing to analyze them in historical development and functioning in the context of the totality of objective and subjective factors, which predetermined the following research methods: formal-logical and comparative-legal.Results: the objective impossibility of legislatively stipulating all possible variants of conflicts of interest makes it necessary to resolve both “real” and “seeming” conflicts of interest directly by the law enforcer. The lack of appropriate rules and recommendations causes uncertainty regarding the presence (absence) of a judge’s conflict of interest. The article formulates the main signs of a conflict of interest: a) a contradiction between the personal (private) interests of a judge and the principles of justice; b) personal interest of a judge; c) financial interest of a judge; d) the existence of a legal fact confirming the conflict of interest; e) the need to inform the persons involved in the case about the conflict of interest; f) the burden of proving the grounds for recusal lies with the applicant. In addition, the author provides a legal assessment of the measures of settling a conflict of interest in judicial activity, outlines approaches and proposals to improve the institute of conflict of interest settlement in judicial and advocacy activities, and reveals the peculiarities of conflict of interest settlement in group proceedings.Scientific novelty: the article presents a comprehensive study of the institute of conflict of interest in judicial and advocacy activities, in which the main features of conflict of interest in judicial and advocacy activities are identified, the peculiarities of conflict of interest settlement in proceedings for the protection of rights and legitimate interests of a group of persons are determined, a comparative legal analysis of foreign and Russian law enforcement practice on the conflicts of interest settlement is carried out.Practical significance: the main conclusions of the article can be used in law-making activities to improve the legal regulation of the conflict of interest institute. The formulated provisions and conclusions can be used in lectures, seminars, preparation of methodological materials on legal disciplines.

Corporations wield power in today's economies, and political theories of the corporation argue about the legitimacy conditions of corporate power. This paper argues in favour of a double-fiduciary theory for corporations. Based on a concession theory of markets, it sees all markets as authorized by states (in the name of society), for the purpose of creating economic value, or wealth. Hence corporations, as much as non-incorporated firms, have a fiduciary duty to the state/society to create wealth, in the competitive structure of the market. However, their pursuit of wealth often creates unbalanced relations of power between corporations and their stakeholders, which can at some point be classified as instances of domination. Therefore, corporations need to be subjected to a second fiduciary duty, i.e. not to dominate others in the economy. This duty is also, in the final instance, owed to the state/society. In an era when everyone can incorporate their business, states/societies can be interpreted as having, through corporate law, mandated shareholders as 'proximate beneficiaries', to incentivize corporations to create wealth. Now states/societies need to think about how to prevent corporations from dominating others. New mechanisms of accountability towards stakeholders and/or citizens as proximate beneficiaries are needed. Only in this way can corporations be effectively held to account for both of the fiduciary duties which characterize their normative status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most legal systems recognize trusteeship functions of individuals or institutions to act on behalf and in the interest of those who cannot legally act for themselves. They can be advanced for the effective protection of future generations and the Earth. Guidance for Earth Trusteeship exist in the form of two agreements created by global civil society, the 2000 Earth Charter and the 2018 Hague Principles. Current opportunities include the UN Secretary General's call for "repurposing the Trusteeship Council", the UN Summit of the Future and ongoing developments in many countries towards implementing ecological integrity and rights of nature into their legal systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of chairman of the board of directors of a contemporary company has evolved from procedural and ceremonial to complex and demanding. This article examines the appointment, tenure, functions, and liabilities of this position, as regulated by the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the JSE Limited Listings Requirements, and the King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2016. The aim is to ascertain whether the guidance provided to chairmen on their appointment, tenure, functions, and liabilities is clear and adequate to guide them on what is expected of them in contemporary companies. Company law in the United Kingdom and Australia is compared because this area of law has been extensively developed in these jurisdictions and may offer guidance on the regulation of the office of the chairman of South African companies. The article contends that the guidance provided to a chairman by South African legal instruments is neither clear nor adequate. It identifies several shortcomings in the regulation of the chairman and makes recommendations to enhance the South African statutory and corporate governance provisions regulating the chairman. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on corporate governance of business companies and the discussions on the concept of corporate purpose intensified. Looking at the role of law in ensuring that businesses profit from creating benefits and not from creating detriments, it is worth distinguishing between interventions designed to incentivise the former (e.g., mandatory rules on sustainability disclosure or new dual‐purpose companies) and disincentivise the latter (tort or recent supply chain due diligence laws). Nevertheless, the existence of a grey area for activities that do not materialise in tort, or the violation of other mandatory rules cannot be denied and is probably where the reconceptualisation of fiduciary duties can mediate. New legal trends in these areas are mapped with a special focus on the European context and some comparative law considerations with respect to the United Kingdom and the United States. Finally, a suggestion for the future of European harmonisation on dual‐purpose companies will be offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]