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As a vast literature on political disaffection, populism, 'pitchfork politics,' and the emergence of an 'age of anger' testifies, the nature of democratic politics and the socio-political context in which it operates appear to have shifted sharply during the last decade. This is reflected in the rise of challenger parties, the election of unorthodox politicians, and widespread concern regarding the 'crisis,' 'death,' or 'end' of democracy. Existing analyses have, however, understandably adopted a conventional model of party-based representative politics as their main interpretive lens or reference point to make sense of these changes. This article adopts a far bolder position. It suggests that a new form of 'grievance politics' has emerged that constitutes a distinct and novel species of representative democracy. Grievance politics is defined by the fuelling and funneling of negative emotions and various blame-based political strategies which explicitly challenge and confound many of the core principles and values that have traditionally underpinned conventional conceptions of party politics. It is the tension between party politics and grievance politics-and their contemporary co-existence as competing modes of political representation-which this article seeks to underline and through this, to develop a clearer understanding of possible futures for representative democracy., Author(s): Matthew Flinders [sup.1] , Markus Hinterleitner [sup.2] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.11835.3e, 0000 0004 1936 9262, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, , Sheffield, UK (2) grid.5252.0, 0000 0004 1936 [...]

On 10 March 2024 the Commission on the Centre of Government published its final report: Power with Purpose. The aim of the commission had been to explore why Number Ten, the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury do not always work as well as they should and to explore what could be done to improve the centre of government radically. Perennial concerns about the existence of a ‘hollow crown’ at the centre of British government were, the final report recommended, to be resolved through the implementation of a ‘radical’ reform agenda. This article interrogates the commission's proposals from a critical perspective and builds upon existing concerns as to the viability of further centralising power in Whitehall. It achieves this by reflecting on an understanding of why history, criticality, governance, evidence and relationships matter when seeking to cope with complexity or when designing genuinely ‘radical’ new governance capabilities. It is argued that a full appreciation of these factors is essential to any project to strengthen the core executive and offers a more balanced, relational and systemic approach to nurturing strategic capacity in government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops and applies the concept of accountability styles for analyzing and comparing accountability practices in different countries. This is relevant as there is considerable scholarship on public sector accountability but only very few comparative studies. Extant studies have shown that national styles of accountability are both marked by convergence as well as the resilience of national differences. The concept of accountability style is adopted to describe and interpret how and why accountability practices differ between administrative systems. It does so by analyzing practices of accountability of public sector agencies in four European democracies with different state traditions: the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. These countries vary with regards to state strength (interventionist propensity) and administrative concentration (high or low centralization). The analysis focuses on the accountability of arms' length agencies which lends itself for comparisons across counties. The paper shows that the national political-administrative context crucially shapes practices of accountability and accountability regimes of agencies. The Norwegian accountability style is characterized as 'centralized and convenient'. The UK-style is equally centralized yet not so convenient as it incurs high accountability-process costs on agencies. Switzerland is marked by limited hierarchical accountability. And the Dutch accountability style is comparatively 'broad and informal'. State strength and administrative concentration explain some of the variance while historical legacies explain additional national variations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]