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This article considers the contribution of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology to the scientific realism debate by thematizing the problem of dubitability. After first considering the rigorous standards for apodictic evidence in phenomenology, particularly in terms of the intuitive givenness of evidence, I consider how scientific theory is open, in principle, to doubt. I argue that phenomenology has both a critical and descriptive function for scientific theory: it clarifies what scientific theory can or cannot tell us about the world, both possibly and necessarily; and it describes the meaningfulness that scientific theory can have for us in our experience of the world—that is, in the living flow of conscious experience that is indubitably real. As such, I explain how phenomenology can take scientific theory as a serious field of investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenological philosophy, developed the concept of the so-called pure transcendental consciousness. The author of the article asks whether the concept of consciousness understood this way can constitute a model for AI consciousness. It should be remembered that transcendental consciousness is the result of the use of the phenomenological method, the essence of which is referring to experience ("back to things themselves"). Therefore, one can legitimately ask whether the consciousness that AI can achieve can possess the characteristics attributed by Husserl to pure transcendental consciousness. The answer to such questions seems to be negative because AI, as created by humans, can only operate in the field of phenomena. Human intelligence, however, is capable of operating at the ontological level. In the face of difficulties in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness on a scientific basis, the question arises about the possibility of using the phenomenological concept of consciousness developed by Husserl as a starting point in analyzes aimed at answering the question about AI consciousness (The aim of the article is not to discuss in detail the contemporary state of research on consciousness. Therefore, many results currently achieved mainly in the field of neuroscience are omitted. It is just about indicating the possible application of Husserl's transcendental concept of consciousness in research on AI consciousness). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I will use Husserlian tools in order to elaborate a phenomenology of ludic experience. Following Fink, my aim here is to present what Husserl could have elaborated in a more systematic manner concerning the specificity of what he calls the ludic praxis (Spielpraxis) and the ludic construct (Spielgebilde). Firstly, I analyze the temporality of ludic experience. Play has a dilative temporal structure: it involves a momentary captivation in the present and a momentary suspension of the architectonic goals of the agent. Secondly, play has its own artifacts. I begin by analyzing what I call the impermanent construct, i.e., the object whose elaboration is motivated by a self-referential interest of the poietic subject. Thirdly, play does not only erect singular entities, but also ludic worlds as a whole. My objective is to scrutinize the mode of being of these normative spaces. I conclude with a description of the ludic object par excellence, namely the toy (Spielzeug). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we attempt to explore Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and its relation to the world. Our focus is on the question of whether Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity can be seen as transcendental ‘being-in-the-world,’ in response to critical examinations made by philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Patočka, and Biemel. While their critiques have complex implications and are subject to debate, they contribute to our understanding of the intricate relationship between transcendental subjectivity and the world. It is important to clarify that this article aims to defend Husserl’s perspective rather than provide an exhaustive analysis of the critiques. We argue that, according to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, transcendental subjectivity is, in fact, integrated within the world’s transcendental structure. This argument is supported by three main points. Firstly, Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and its internal consciousness are not secluded but remain open and intentionally related to the external world. Secondly, Husserl clarifies the sense of transcendental ‘being-in-the-world,’ with subjective constitution revealing its sense. Lastly, Husserl proposes the notion of transcendental person as an attempt to address how transcendental subjectivity exists concretely in the life-world. This holistic perspective sought to provide a comprehensive understanding of transcendentally grounded subjectivity and its embodied existence in the world with the essential state of ‘being-in-the world.’ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a framework for a phenomenology based on pure transcendental phenomenology that examines the nature of both the experience of viewing and creating animation. The technological innovation of film and cinema in general is based upon two overarching principles. The first is the phenomenon of the captured frame and the second is the spectator's phenomenological experience of sequences of such captured frames. It is argued among animation and film theorists alike that the insights offered by the consideration of the phenomenon of the cinematic frame should form the nexus of all film theories. This paper argues that a complete theory of film and cinema should start by explaining this fundamental conceptual bedrock, and that the 'already-created' frame of film restricts insight into the phenomenology of cinema spectatorship. The article also shows how the practice of animation is instrumental to the proposition and elaboration of a phenomenology of animation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Lotze’s crucial role in the dispute around psychologism was by no means limited solely to introducing the concept of validity, as is commonly assumed or simply presumed. While it is conceivable to view the opposition between psychologism and antipsychologism as a contrast between blending versus separating psychology and logic, the prevailing approach in the dispute around psychologism has led to a misconception that antipsychologism entails a disregard for questions of subjectivity. Yet, by moving away from superficial generalizations and examining the dispute closer, the opposite conclusion emerges: antipsychologism propelled a profound reevaluation of subjectivity as an indispensable correlational element for justifying the possibility of objective knowledge. From Herbart to Husserl, antipsychologism progressed by formulating a conception of subjectivity that is appropriate to its aims. Lotze represents an intermediate phase in this process, by both decisively departing from Herbart to overcome the naturalistic notion of subjectivity, which enabled the notion of spontaneous evaluation, while still retaining Herbart’s unconditional endorsement of the principle of immanence - a principle that Frege and Husserl explicitly criticize. It is in the latter thinkers that the overcoming of psychologism takes place as the definitive overcoming of naturalism.

Mi ensayo reconstruye el curso universitario de Edmund Husserl que la joven Arendt escuchó en el semestre de invierno 1926/27 en la ciudad de Friburgo. Estas lecciones de “Introducción a la fenomenología” no han merecido atención ni de la literatura secundaria en torno a Husserl, dado que sólo disponemos de fragmentos del curso, ni de aquella en torno a Arendt, que da por descontado el que fueron irrelevantes para su trayectoria filosófica. El curso ofreció, sin embargo, una inmersión profunda en la configuración madura de la fenomenología e incluyó una discusión avanzada de la problemática de la corporalidad y la intersubjetividad. Lo cual permite una nueva mirada sobre la posible latencia de motivos husserlianos en temas importantes del pensamiento arendtiano. Esta posibilidad se comenta aquí en cinco hipótesis finales, que culminan en la meditación de La vida del espíritu sobre la naturaleza fenoménica del mundo.

In discussion with Kant, neo-Kantianism, and contemporary transcendental philosophy on the one hand and Hegel’s speculative idealism on the other, Krijnen discusses the philosophical form in which post neo-Kantian idealism has a future. First, he determines the type of Kantian transcendental idealism that constitutes its most advanced form. Here, Krijnen distinguishes intersubjectivity-theoretical forms of transcendental philosophy from phenomenology and neo-Kantianism and focusses on phenomenology and neo-Kantianism. In Krijnen’s analysis, a programmatic foundational deficit of phenomenology appears. In terms of a theory of principles, phenomenology falls behind Kant’s conception of philosophical foundations, whereas neo-Kantianism and the contemporary transcendental philosophers discussed continue the relevant programmatic line of Kant’s reasoning. Krijnen subsequently shows that even in its most advanced form, transcendental idealism suffers from formalism. This is due to the fact that transcendental philosophy misses the methodical moment of the ‘realization of the concept’ in the sense Hegel’s speculative idealism. For this reason, ‘form’ and ‘content’ remain opposed to each other externally. Hegel’s reproach of formalism does not state that Kant’s forms are merely empty shells, neglecting the content-logical character of principles in the sense of transcendental idealism. In contrast, Hegel’s reproach concerns a methodical problem that hinders transcendental idealism to actualize its own ambitions. Finally, Krijnen makes clear in what sense a Hegelian sublation of transcendental idealism into speculative idealism is of the essence for the future of post-neo-Kantian idealism.

In this analysis, I employ Husserl's three-part description of intentionality to show how a player/play act/play object model for consciousness helps us see play more clearly. I review Suits' logic-based attempts to amend Huizinga's overly inclusive characterization of play. However, I do so on what I see as stronger phenomenological grounds by describing four kinds of experience embedded in Suits' work-play dichotomy. I analyze two species of play-fortified work – namely, work that requires intrinsic enhancement and work that does not. I also describe two species of play – namely, play that is compromised and play that is unfettered. I conclude by summarizing advantages of phenomenological analyses and underlining the important distinctions this philosophic method uncovers within traditional work and play categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the concept of the phenomenon in the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl, arguing for the intricate connections and divergences between their philosophical frameworks. Kant’s transcendental idealism, rooted in the a priori knowledge and the conditions for human cognition, marks a pivotal shift from previous rationalist beliefs in non-empirical knowledge. By emphasizing phenomena as the ultimate objects of human cognition and asserting that the conditions for experience are inherent in the human mind, Kant lays the groundwork for a critical analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. In contrast, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology introduces a methodical approach to uncovering the essence of consciousness and phenomena. Central to Husserl’s transcendental idealism is the concept of intentionality, which serves as a bridge between consciousness and objects of knowledge. Unlike metaphysical idealism, Husserl’s transcendental idealism focuses on the correlation between phenomena and consciousness rather than solely on internal cognitive operations. The article navigates the evolution from Kant’s critical idealism to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, highlighting their shared emphasis on phenomena as the focal point of human cognition.

Affects and all its variants (affection, allure, affective force, etc.) represent our via regia to be alive and connected with our life-world. It is not the ego that constitutes the world we live in but the affections that allow us to become respectively objects of our life and subjects of our own choices. Affects are in fact main triggers of lower and higher feelings through which we become subjects and experience empathy with other people, intersubjectively connecting with them and making ethical choices that are hopefully considerate of ourselves and our community. Yet it might happen that our feelings are not capable of truly feeling what we are affected by. When this happens, what affects us remains with us but cannot be felt and accordingly processed. In this paper, I will first work on the term affect and its variants. I will then describe how this connects with feelings. To finally analyze what happens when we are not capable of feeling our affects as in the case of alexithymia; or when we feel our affects too much as in the case of BPD; or when we do not want to feel certain affects as in the case of NPD. The main conceptual reference of this analysis will be Husserl and his static and genetic phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I offer an intellectual-historical reading of Foucault's unpublished master's thesis. In contrast with other recent scholarship on the pre-1961 period of Foucault's career, the purpose of this paper is to grapple with the philosophical content of this thesis on its own terms, distinguishing it as far as possible from his mature work. This allows forgotten concepts to re-emerge in the course of reading the text and for a novel engagement with such neglected facets of Foucault's oeuvre. Indeed, the key concept which I argue emerges from Foucault's early thesis is that of language as the être-la of thought. By closely following Foucault's Husserlian reading of Hegel, and his response to Eugen Fink's paradoxes of phenomenology, it is possible to see how Foucault briefly lands upon a novel kind of scepticism about the reality of history and minds. In the same way, I will also show why Foucault was unable to fully develop or commit to these sceptical positions during this part of his career. The article concludes by briefly suggesting contrasts between my reading of this early text and the way Foucault's oeuvre is more generally understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The way in which Foucault confronts Husserl helps to highlight the instance that drives Foucauldian research and its current legacy. Foucault inscribes his work through Husserl within a broader tradition, namely, that of the critical thinking that has crossed all of modernity from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment and up to phenomenology. His main legacy can be identified precisely in the way he relaunches and radicalises this tradition by intensifying its critical gaze. We will follow the steps of The Crisis of European Sciences to evoke the underlying purposes of Husserl's work, showing how his genealogical analysis of scientific knowledge, as a mix of historically determined practices, is guided by the ethical aim of self-determination. Later we will show how Foucault takes up this instance in a completely original way, and we will analyse which analogies and differences can be traced between the two authors' approaches to the problem of an individual's self-determination in his relationship with the network of knowledge-power in which he is immersed. In fact, both authors consider that there can be no emancipation and self-determination of the individual without a preliminary historical-critical retrospective on knowledge and on the ways in which its contents have been constituted. But this retrospective, which we could define generically as genealogical (genetic-phenomenological in Husserl's terms), is played out differently by the two authors and implemented by Foucault with a greater degree of radicalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article intervenes in the debate over the noetic structure of empirical beliefs required for epistemic justification, focusing on the choice between internalist foundationalism and coherentism. Analysing the link between noetic structure and the introspective accessibility of essential justifiers, I argue that coherentism has greater doxastic plausibility than foundationalism. To deepen my account, I constructively develop ideas from the late-period Edmund Husserl to propose a first-order epistemological theory that I term 'Lifeworld Coherentism'. I argue that, especially through the idea of the epistemic agent's 'doxic horizon', this theory can overcome some of the worries surrounding the introspective awareness of belief coherence. Finally, in order to extend the second-order dimension of the debate, I introduce 'Tradition-Based Perspectivalism', a meta-epistemological theory that Erik Baldwin uses to address concerns about the social grounding of epistemic theorising. Though supportive of Baldwin's reading of Alasdair MacIntyre on this point, I argue that Tradition-Based Perspectivalism is a better fit to Lifeworld Coherentism as a first-order theory than to his own preferred Proper Functionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reconstructs Merleau-Ponty's philosophical project in terms of a phenomenology of sensible transcendence. According to this framework, (i) any given data are correlative to a subjective apprehension, (ii) but they cannot be fully captured by this same experience. Therefore, subjective apprehension must remain open to a type of absence or radical indeterminacy. This notion of transcendence must be grounded in bodily experience, and the challenge is to develop a notion of logos that can account for its sensible donation. We describe that the critical apparatus mobilized to achieve this goal, primarily through the notions of "field of presence" and "presentation", restores a logic of consciousness in these analyses that focus on the body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present article, I address the issue of categorial representative contents, which, according to Husserl's phenomenological theory, make knowledge possible by providing fullness to intuitive categorial acts. First, I discuss Husserl's assertion that he no longer approves of his theory of categorial representation developed in Logical Investigations. I argue that the influential interpretation of Husserl's self-criticism advanced by Dieter Lohmar is unfortunately misleading, as Husserl does not actually claim that categorial representatives are contents of reflection belonging to the realm of inner sensibility, as Lohmar contends. After offering an alternative view of Husserl's authentic position in Logical Investigations, I examine other possible reasons for his later dissatisfaction. These reasons relate to Husserl's changing views on the role of categorial representatives in empty thinking acts—necessarily involved in cognition—and the necessity of spontaneously repeating the passive synthesis between the intentional matters that function as categorial representatives in the predicative activity yielding knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the fact that Husserl did not write a book on aesthetics, it is widely accepted that a Husserlian aesthetics can be developed from his writings. In this article, I describe and analyze a feature of Husserlian aesthetics which I call the "radical individuality of the aesthetic object." This radical individuality stems from Husserl's interpretation of aesthetic consciousness in terms of the neutrality modification. I make the case for a radical reading of the neutrality modification by contrasting it with the inactuality modification and the notion of foundation and I argue that the neutrality modification must be kept distinct from these concepts. I further describe the concept of the radical individuality of the aesthetic object by reference to Ingarden's notion of the aesthetic object as monosubjective. The thesis of the radical individuality of the aesthetic object prima facie leads Husserlian aesthetics close to axiological relativism expressed in the adage that de gustibus non est disputandum. I explain that despite such proximity, Husserlian aesthetics does not entail an axiological relativism and does not preclude discussions concerning aesthetic values. On the contrary, Husserlian aesthetics ultimately shows that such discussions are necessary for keeping the possibility of aesthetic perception itself alive, and thereby encourages such discussions. I conclude with a practical demonstration of the results of my Husserlian analyses by critically engaging some aspects of Proust's theory of art in À la recherche du temps perdu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As is well known, Deleuze reproaches Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and other classical phenomenologists for having burdened their descriptions of experience with structures derived from the empirical (in which the world is differentiated into objects of consciousness). His transcendental empiricism, by contrast, investigates the very genesis of the empirical within the immediate flow of an asubjective transcendental field. However, both Deleuze in his texts and Deleuzian literature dealing with his relationship with phenomenology almost completely ignore contemporary French phenomenology focusing, similarly to Deleuze, on the dynamic or eventful dimension of reality. This article examines some of the intersections between contemporary phenomenology in France (Maldiney, Richir, Marion) and Deleuze's metaphysics with regard to the question common both to phenomenology and Deleuze: that of the crisis of humanity, especially with regard to its social aspect. The article's main thesis is that the only possible solution to the crisis is an ethics of events, which includes a description of the deepest existential basis of social bonds, that is, the 'common presence' or 'transcendental interfacticity'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue for an account of grasping, or understanding that, on which we grasp via a higher‐order mental act of Husserlian fulfillment. Fulfillment is the act of matching up the objects of our phenomenally presentational experiences with those of our phenomenally representational thought. Grasping‐by‐fulfilling is importantly different from standard epistemic aims, in part because it is phenomenal rather than inferential. (I endorse Bourget's (2017) arguments to that effect.) I show that grasping‐by‐fulfilling cannot be a species of propositional knowledge or belief, and that it is not essentially connected to justification. I motivate a revisionary epistemology on which achieving propositional knowledge and coming to grasp are dual epistemic aims. My account makes sense of a common occurrence—that we are often unmoved to act on our beliefs until we come to phenomenally experience them in some way. It also explains puzzling features of human inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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El objetivo de este artículo es presentar y conectar el panorama intelectual inmediato, especialmente en el ámbito matemático, que Husserl se apropió durante sus primeros años de formación, centrándonos en las investigaciones de B. Riemann, R. Dedekind y G. Cantor. Se busca, en particular, evidenciar cómo Husserl reinterpreta filosóficamente los conceptos matemáticos que estos autores utilizaron. Partimos de la hipótesis de que, en el horizonte intelectual del joven Husserl, existen puntos de convergencia con el surgimiento de la moderna teoría de conjuntos. Reconocer estos antecedentes justifica plenamente el trabajo que aquí presentaré. Comenzaré, por tanto, revisando las obras de Riemann, Dedekind y Cantor, al tiempo que mostraré su influencia en la obra de Husserl, y concluiré con las reflexiones pertinentes.

O presente artigo pretende discutir a defesa que Husserl faz da fenomenologia transcendental diante da atitude de materialização e da naturalização da consciência, que domina na atitude que está na base da formação das ciências naturais. Herdando certos elementos da Filosofia Clássica Alemã, Husserl compreende que é somente por meio do a priori que a filosofia pode ser efetivada como ciência rigorosa. A análise se desenvolverá, inicialmente, por meio da discussão crítica do problema que Husserl indica haver nas ciências baseadas na atitude natural, ou seja, a materialização da consciência. Em seguida, mostraremos como diante do projeto de construção de uma filosofia como ciência rigorosa, o naturalismo, ingênuo em sua fundamentação, é o principal obstáculo a ser superado por conta das consequências que dele podem surgir, implicando em correntes como o psicologismo, materialismo e positivismo. Por fim, apontaremos a maneira como Husserl faz uma defesa da fenomenologia transcendental contra a ingenuidade da ciência natural que permanece presa nos fatos empíricos e faz destes o critério último de atestação da verdade.

Husserl’s concept of instincts transformed the concept of intentionality, supplemented the concept of teleology of consciousness, and shed new light on the problem of the relationship between irrationality and rationality. This article analyses Husserl’s phenomenology of instincts through the prism of the concept of sedimentation. I argue that instincts can be understood as sedimentation, as a pattern of the transformation of consciousness into unconsciousness, and the transformation of unconsciousness into consciousness. The concept of instincts as sedimentation helps to understand how skills are preserved and transmitted from generation to generation, and how unconscious instincts work in our conscious experience.

This paper develops a particular Florentine perspective through which the contemporary debate on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap's philosophy and Edmund Husserl's phenomenology can be approached. The Florentine perspective combines transformative attitude and explicative method in philosophy. More specifically, the paper highlights the distinguishing features according to which Paolo Parrini's position on the relationship between Carnap's and Husserl's philosophies can be identified within Carnap scholarship. For this purpose, a phenomenology free of ontological-metaphysical presuppositions is elaborated by establishing its necessary conditions in revisiting material a priori statements. The paper reinterprets material a priori statements as those of neutral monism’s ideal umbrella theory and proposes Machian anti-metaphysics as a third way between the philosophies of Carnap and Husserl.

El artículo inicia reflexionando sobre el lugar que comparten el fenomenólogo, el artista y el diarista, a saber, la omisión de una postura existencial frente a la realidad. El recorrido teórico continúa estableciendo algunas consideraciones de carácter general sobre el diario y la atención, entendida esta última a la luz de los planteos fenomenológicos de Edmund Husserl y sus precursores. Luego, vinculamos la facultad de la atención al quehacer del diarista en dos aspectos fundamentales. Por una parte, la focalización de la atención le ofrece al diarista temas sobre los cuales escribir. Por otro lado, la escritura representa un segundo momento atencional, donde la atención se posa reflexivamente sobre los actos atentos de la conciencia y sobre el acto de escritura. La simultaneidad de este volverse de la atención posibilita la escritura del diario, que representa una mirada estética sobre el mundo circundante e interior del sujeto. Los objetos intencionales son aprehendidos sobre la base de un placer que irradia de ellos. El interés considera a los objetos como algo más y algo diferente de lo que son, se vuelven objetos de sentimiento. Este mirar es equiparable a una forma de contemplación, es decir, a una consideración estética del mundo. Finalizamos comentando la función del mentar y sus vínculos lingüísticos. Esta reflexión nos permite desarrollar cómo el diarista nombra de nuevo aquello que menciona y concluir que este nombrar nuevo y segundo resulta un acto poético.

This article examines relationships between the absolute being of the universal ego (Ātman-self) according to the Indian religious philosophy of Vedanta (V) and the phenomenological, irreal being of the transcendental ego in Husserl’s phenomenology (P). Both Ātman and the transcendental ego are accessed in the first-person perspective by onto-phenomenological reductions. Such reductions, as stated by Husserl, have absolute freedom of positing and, thus, can reveal or conceal states of being. In contrast with P-reduction, which renders the being of the ego-pole invisible, V-reduction penetrates into the being of the ego-pole and opens a horizon of unique, non-intentional mental states. Following the dialectics in pre- and post-reduction givenness of being, there emerges a picture of connection between the intentional phenomenological being of the transcendental ego and the non-intentional being of the pure ego of Vedanta (Ātman-self). The pure ego of Vedanta manifests as a substrate for the transcendental ego of phenomenology. From this, we can conclude that reductions function as the loci of dialectical syntheses of being, whereby the unity of being has a fuller, more complex and multi-sided sense than the one intended in the natural attitude. In their breaking of theoretical habits conditioned by the substance metaphysical tradition, reductions are truly indispensable in the revelation of being that grounds the theory of knowledge.

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Current research on second-person relations has often overlooked that this is not a new topic. Addressed mostly under the heading of the "I–thou relation," second-person relations were discussed by central figures of the phenomenological tradition, including Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, but also quite extensively by much lesser-known authors, such as Karl Löwith, Ludwig Binswanger, and Semyon L. Frank, whose work has been undeservedly neglected in current research. This paper starts off by arguing that, in spite of the rightly acknowledged differences between the Husserlian and the Heideggerian approaches to the investigation of the social world, both approaches converge in the claim that the I–thou relation is founded on more basic forms of sociality. In a second step, against the background of Frank's and Binswanger's challenges to that claim, I argue that Löwith's proposal that the I–thou relation is a primordial form of sociality can be vindicated by conceptualizing I–thou relations as close personal relationships (paradigmatically exemplified by companion friendships and romantic partnerships). After assessing how Löwith's approach to the I–thou relation stands vis-à-vis Heidegger's and Husserl's views, I conclude by suggesting how Löwith's approach can contribute to current research on second-person relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl’s theory of fulfilment conceives of empty acts, such as symbolic thought, and fulfilling acts, such as sensory perceptions, in a strict parallel. This parallelism is the basis for Husserl’s semantics, epistemology, and conception of truth. It also entails that any true proposition can be known in principle, which Church and Fitch have shown to explode into the claim that every proposition is actually known. I assess this logical challenge and discuss a recent response by James Kinkaid. While Kinkaid’s proposal saves one direction of the parallel for semantics, it gives up the parallelism for truth. I spell out a different response which meshes naturally with Husserl’s account of meaning. If the parallelism is restricted to a class of basic propositions, the truth of non-basic propositions can be defined inductively, without leading to the paradox. I then discuss objections that have been raised against a similar proposal by Dummett. The result is that exegetically plausible and popular interpretations of Husserl’s correlationism are indeed challenged by Church and Fitch. But when taking into account the ‘logical adumbration’ of propositional blindspots, truth and possible fulfilment can be connected without paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl's early phenomenology, whose greatest expression is the work Logical Investigations, from 1900/1901, intends to be a theory of knowledge that operates according to the principle of "metaphysical neutrality". This metaphysical neutrality is usually interpreted as the delimitation of the thematic horizon of phenomenology to the domain of lived-experiences, thus excluding the transcendent thing from its field of investigation. This early phenomenology would be, therefore, a kind of "intentional psychology". Against this interpretation, we intend to show, on the basis of Husserl's texts from this same period, that the phenomenological theory of knowledge of the Logical Investigations is first philosophy, that is, metaphysics. The "metaphysical neutrality" is not, then, a prohibition of the talk of transcendencies, but a methodological principle so that such talk can be legitimated. With this, we intend to show that pre-transcendental phenomenology is not mere "intentional psychology", but first philosophy (metaphysics) in the sense that Husserl understands it: ultimate science of reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]