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Lattice cryptography schemes based on the learning with errors (LWE) hardness assumption have been standardized by NIST for use as post-quantum cryptosystems, and by HomomorphicEncryption.org for encrypted compute on sensitive data. Thus, understanding their concrete security is critical. Most work on LWE security focuses on theoretical estimates of attack performance, which is important but may overlook attack nuances arising in real-world implementations. The sole existing concrete benchmarking effort, the Darmstadt Lattice Challenge, does not include benchmarks relevant to the standardized LWE parameter choices - such as small secret and small error distributions, and Ring-LWE (RLWE) and Module-LWE (MLWE) variants. To improve our understanding of concrete LWE security, we provide the first benchmarks for LWE secret recovery on standardized parameters, for small and low-weight (sparse) secrets. We evaluate four LWE attacks in these settings to serve as a baseline: the Search-LWE attacks uSVP, SALSA, and Cool & Cruel, and the Decision-LWE attack: Dual Hybrid Meet-in-the-Middle (MitM). We extend the SALSA and Cool & Cruel attacks in significant ways, and implement and scale up MitM attacks for the first time. For example, we recover hamming weight $9-11$ binomial secrets for KYBER ($\kappa=2$) parameters in $28-36$ hours with SALSA and Cool\&Cruel, while we find that MitM can solve Decision-LWE instances for hamming weights up to $4$ in under an hour for Kyber parameters, while uSVP attacks do not recover any secrets after running for more than $1100$ hours. We also compare concrete performance against theoretical estimates. Finally, we open source the code to enable future research.

Sparse binary LWE secrets are under consideration for standardization for Homomorphic Encryption and its applications to private computation. Known attacks on sparse binary LWE secrets include the sparse dual attack and the hybrid sparse dual-meet in the middle attack which requires significant memory. In this paper, we provide a new statistical attack with low memory requirement. The attack relies on some initial lattice reduction. The key observation is that, after lattice reduction is applied to the rows of a q-ary-like embedded random matrix $\mathbf A$, the entries with high variance are concentrated in the early columns of the extracted matrix. This allows us to separate out the "hard part" of the LWE secret. We can first solve the sub-problem of finding the "cruel" bits of the secret in the early columns, and then find the remaining "cool" bits in linear time. We use statistical techniques to distinguish distributions to identify both the cruel and the cool bits of the secret. We provide concrete attack timings for recovering secrets in dimensions $n=256$, $512$, and $768$. For the lattice reduction stage, we leverage recent improvements in lattice reduction (e.g. flatter) applied in parallel. We also apply our new attack in the RLWE setting for $2$-power cyclotomic rings, showing that these RLWE instances are much more vulnerable to this attack than LWE.

Motivated by cryptographic applications, we investigate two machine learning approaches to modular multiplication: namely circular regression and a sequence-to-sequence transformer model. The limited success of both methods demonstrated in our results gives evidence for the hardness of tasks involving modular multiplication upon which cryptosystems are based., Comment: 14 pages, 12 figures. Comments welcome!

Learning with Errors (LWE) is a hard math problem underlying recently standardized post-quantum cryptography (PQC) systems for key exchange and digital signatures. Prior work proposed new machine learning (ML)-based attacks on LWE problems with small, sparse secrets, but these attacks require millions of LWE samples to train on and take days to recover secrets. We propose three key methods -- better preprocessing, angular embeddings and model pre-training -- to improve these attacks, speeding up preprocessing by $25\times$ and improving model sample efficiency by $10\times$. We demonstrate for the first time that pre-training improves and reduces the cost of ML attacks on LWE. Our architecture improvements enable scaling to larger-dimension LWE problems: this work is the first instance of ML attacks recovering sparse binary secrets in dimension $n=1024$, the smallest dimension used in practice for homomorphic encryption applications of LWE where sparse binary secrets are proposed., Comment: 8 pages (main text)

Learning with Errors (LWE) is a hard math problem used in post-quantum cryptography. Homomorphic Encryption (HE) schemes rely on the hardness of the LWE problem for their security, and two LWE-based cryptosystems were recently standardized by NIST for digital signatures and key exchange (KEM). Thus, it is critical to continue assessing the security of LWE and specific parameter choices. For example, HE uses secrets with small entries, and the HE community has considered standardizing small sparse secrets to improve efficiency and functionality. However, prior work, SALSA and PICANTE, showed that ML attacks can recover sparse binary secrets. Building on these, we propose VERDE, an improved ML attack that can recover sparse binary, ternary, and narrow Gaussian secrets. Using improved preprocessing and secret recovery techniques, VERDE can attack LWE with larger dimensions ($n=512$) and smaller moduli ($\log_2 q=12$ for $n=256$), using less time and power. We propose novel architectures for scaling. Finally, we develop a theory that explains the success of ML LWE attacks., Comment: 18 pages, accepted to NeurIPS 2023

Learning with Errors (LWE) is a hard math problem underpinning many proposed post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) systems. The only PQC Key Exchange Mechanism (KEM) standardized by NIST is based on module~LWE, and current publicly available PQ Homomorphic Encryption (HE) libraries are based on ring LWE. The security of LWE-based PQ cryptosystems is critical, but certain implementation choices could weaken them. One such choice is sparse binary secrets, desirable for PQ HE schemes for efficiency reasons. Prior work, SALSA, demonstrated a machine learning-based attack on LWE with sparse binary secrets in small dimensions ($n \le 128$) and low Hamming weights ($h \le 4$). However, this attack assumes access to millions of eavesdropped LWE samples and fails at higher Hamming weights or dimensions. We present PICANTE, an enhanced machine learning attack on LWE with sparse binary secrets, which recovers secrets in much larger dimensions (up to $n=350$) and with larger Hamming weights (roughly $n/10$, and up to $h=60$ for $n=350$). We achieve this dramatic improvement via a novel preprocessing step, which allows us to generate training data from a linear number of eavesdropped LWE samples ($4n$) and changes the distribution of the data to improve transformer training. We also improve the secret recovery methods of SALSA and introduce a novel cross-attention recovery mechanism allowing us to read off the secret directly from the trained models. While PICANTE does not threaten NIST's proposed LWE standards, it demonstrates significant improvement over SALSA and could scale further, highlighting the need for future investigation into machine learning attacks on LWE with sparse binary secrets., Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures, 17 tables; accepted to CCS 2023

A lattice of integers is the collection of all linear combinations of a set of vectors for which all entries of the vectors are integers and all coefficients in the linear combinations are also integers. Lattice reduction refers to the problem of finding a set of vectors in a given lattice such that the collection of all integer linear combinations of this subset is still the entire original lattice and so that the Euclidean norms of the subset are reduced. The present paper proposes simple, efficient iterations for lattice reduction which are guaranteed to reduce the Euclidean norms of the basis vectors (the vectors in the subset) monotonically during every iteration. Each iteration selects the basis vector for which projecting off (with integer coefficients) the components of the other basis vectors along the selected vector minimizes the Euclidean norms of the reduced basis vectors. Each iteration projects off the components along the selected basis vector and efficiently updates all information required for the next iteration to select its best basis vector and perform the associated projections., Comment: 29 pages, 20 figures

In this paper we introduce a new problem called the Isogenous Embedding Problem (IEP). The existence of solutions to this problem is related to the primes of bad reduction of CM curves of genus $3$ and we can detect potentially good reduction in absence of solutions. We propose an algorithm for computing the solutions to the IEP and run the algorithm through different families of curves. We were able to prove the reduction type of some particular curves at certain primes that were open cases in [LLLR21].

Currently deployed public-key cryptosystems will be vulnerable to attacks by full-scale quantum computers. Consequently, "quantum resistant" cryptosystems are in high demand, and lattice-based cryptosystems, based on a hard problem known as Learning With Errors (LWE), have emerged as strong contenders for standardization. In this work, we train transformers to perform modular arithmetic and combine half-trained models with statistical cryptanalysis techniques to propose SALSA: a machine learning attack on LWE-based cryptographic schemes. SALSA can fully recover secrets for small-to-mid size LWE instances with sparse binary secrets, and may scale to attack real-world LWE-based cryptosystems., Comment: Extended version of work published at NeurIPS 2022

The paper concerns several theoretical aspects of oriented supersingular $\ell$-isogeny volcanoes and their relationship to closed walks in the supersingular $\ell$-isogeny graph. Our main result is a bijection between the rims of the union of all oriented supersingular $\ell$-isogeny volcanoes over $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ (up to conjugation of the orientations), and isogeny cycles (non-backtracking closed walks which are not powers of smaller walks) of the supersingular $\ell$-isogeny graph over $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$. The exact proof and statement of this bijection are made more intricate by special behaviours arising from extra automorphisms and the ramification of $p$ in certain quadratic orders. We use the bijection to count isogeny cycles of given length in the supersingular $\ell$-isogeny graph exactly as a sum of class numbers of these orders, and also give an explicit upper bound by estimating the class numbers., Comment: 41 pages, 7 figures

We give a novel procedure for approximating general single-qubit unitaries from a finite universal gate set by reducing the problem to a novel magnitude approximation problem, achieving an immediate improvement in sequence length by a factor of 7/9. Extending the works arXiv:1612.01011 and arXiv:1612.02689, we show that taking probabilistic mixtures of channels to solve fallback (arXiv:1409.3552) and magnitude approximation problems saves factor of two in approximation costs. In particular, over the Clifford+$\sqrt{\mathrm{T}}$ gate set we achieve an average non-Clifford gate count of $0.23\log_2(1/\varepsilon)+2.13$ and T-count $0.56\log_2(1/\varepsilon)+5.3$ with mixed fallback approximations for diamond norm accuracy $\varepsilon$. This paper provides a holistic overview of gate approximation, in addition to these new insights. We give an end-to-end procedure for gate approximation for general gate sets related to some quaternion algebras, providing pedagogical examples using common fault-tolerant gate sets (V, Clifford+T and Clifford+$\sqrt{\mathrm{T}}$). We also provide detailed numerical results for Clifford+T and Clifford+$\sqrt{\mathrm{T}}$ gate sets. In an effort to keep the paper self-contained, we include an overview of the relevant algorithms for integer point enumeration and relative norm equation solving. We provide a number of further applications of the magnitude approximation problems, as well as improved algorithms for exact synthesis, in the Appendices., Comment: 88 pages

In supersingular isogeny-based cryptography, the path-finding problem reduces to the endomorphism ring problem. Can path-finding be reduced to knowing just one endomorphism? It is known that a small endomorphism enables polynomial-time path-finding and endomorphism ring computation (Love-Boneh [36]). An endomorphism gives an explicit orientation of a supersingular elliptic curve. In this paper, we use the volcano structure of the oriented supersingular isogeny graph to take ascending/descending/horizontal steps on the graph and deduce path-finding algorithms to an initial curve. Each altitude of the volcano corresponds to a unique quadratic order, called the primitive order. We introduce a new hard problem of computing the primitive order given an arbitrary endomorphism on the curve, and we also provide a sub-exponential quantum algorithm for solving it. In concurrent work (Wesolowski [54]), it was shown that the endomorphism ring problem in the presence of one endomorphism with known primitive order reduces to a vectorization problem, implying path-finding algorithms. Our path-finding algorithms are more general in the sense that we don't assume the knowledge of the primitive order associated with the endomorphism., Comment: 40 pages, 1 figure; 3rd revision implements small corrections and expositional improvements