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Mind uploading—the transference of mind from a biological brain to a computer—offers the alluring possibility of immortality. This paper provides a novel challenge to mind uploading, focusing on the distinction between abstract objects and concrete individuals. Uploads are abstract objects, while currently, persons are concrete individuals. This presents a dilemma: if the mind is concrete, uploading it to a computer is impossible. Alternatively, if mind uploading is feasible, the resulting abstract upload cannot be numerically identical to the original person. Furthermore, by differentiating survival from persistence, this paper argues that concrete persons might survive as abstract uploads, but only in a highly restricted sense, without preserving their numerical identity. Despite these philosophical hurdles, practical reasons for considering mind uploading as life nears its end still need to be acknowledged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The digital transfer of the mind to a computer system (i.e., mind uploading) requires representing the mind as a finite sequence of bits (1s and 0s). The classic "stored-program computer" paradigm, in turn, implies the equivalence between program and data, so that the sequence of bits themselves can be interpreted as a program, which will be algorithmically executed in the receiving device. Now, according to a previous proof, on which this paper is based, a computational or algorithmic machine, however complex, cannot be free (in the sense of 'self-determined'). Consequently, a finite sequence of bits cannot adequately represent a free mind and, therefore, a free mind cannot be digitally transferred, quod erat demonstrandum. The impossibility of making this transfer, as demonstrated here, should be a concern especially for those who wish to achieve it. Since we intend this to be a rigorous demonstration, we must give precise definitions and conditions of validity. The most important part of the paper is devoted to explaining the meaning and reasonableness of these definitions and conditions (for example that being truly free means being self-determined). Special attention is paid, also, to the philosophical implications of the demonstration. Finally, this thesis is distinguished from other closely related issues (such as other possible technological difficulties to "discretize" the mind; or, whether it is possible to transfer the mind from one material support to another one in a non-digital way). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Literature wields a profound influence on our cognitive processes, shaping not only how we think but also what we think about. Aesthetic experiences, in particular, seem to foster a positive impact on our ability to comprehend complexity. This influence underscores the significant role of literature in the exploration of value learning and ethics research, because evaluating any decision-making requires seeking the widest possible frame of reference. Furthermore, literature plays a pivotal role in enriching our perception of both the external world and our inner selves, thereby fostering a heightened sense of ethical discernment. In this paper, I explore this last idea by examining Kazuo Ishiguro's Klara and the Sun. In this enquiry, I reveal connections between two crucial controversies surrounding mind uploading: the epistemological debate centered on the theory of moral perception and the ontological inquiry into personal identity. Researching the intersection of these two big issues guide my decision to employ conceptual synthesis as the methodological framework. Besides, I will argue that the ideas of moral perception and personal identity that emerges in Ishiguro's dystopia are in tune with the narrativist hypothesis of Charles Taylor. In my conclusions, I defend that prospect of replacing a human being with a robot hinges on the challenge of instilling the machine with a unique moral perception. This remains an elusive goal, perhaps perpetually so, due to the inherent impossibility of objectifying a machine capable of apprehending and processing the non-objective qualities of matter. Furthermore, even if we were able to create such a machine, it would likely resist assuming a substitutive role, as it would quickly discover and appreciate its own existence. Finally, I ponder the implications of mistaking a simulation of human for an authentic replica, namely, an unsuccessful and unnoticed attempt at mind uploading—loneliness.

In recent years and, in light of the latest developments in the field of neurotechnology, some critics have claimed that mind uploading could become technically feasible in a not-too-distant future. While transhumanist critics embrace this procedure and dream of a postbiological future in which human beings possess greater cognitive, emotional, and sensorial abilities, the critical posthumanists warn of the risks inherent to the idea of leaving biology behind to lead a virtual life in cyberspace. Significantly, these warnings reverberate in some twenty-first century cultural productions such as Mark McClelland’s Upload (2012), a novel that is also representative of an emerging trend of SF novels written by tech professionals. Although the novel may seem to be at first a defense of simulated life, this work aims to prove that McClelland’s narrative choices ultimately uncover a critical posthumanist view of embodiment as an essential part of human identity.