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Governments use metrics made possible by new data technologies to allocate budgets, manage pandemics, valorize ecosystems, and demonstrate how these actions are legitimate. Big data is pointed to as providing objective answers that emerge untampered from observations of the world as it is – a view from nowhere. While data is more valued than ever in environmental governance, so too are arrangements that seek stakeholders' input and otherwise address their subjective interests – a view from everywhere. Different kinds of metrics perform state actors as accountable in both registers: metrics that are responsive to dynamic conditions; that account for specific stakeholders; that can be prioritized against one another in interactive data visualization tools. Louisiana, USA's Coastal Master Plan is an attempt to stem wetlands loss through fine-scale modeling of large volumes of data and calculation of these kinds of social and environmental metrics. State actors there make accountability claims that appear contradictory: their decisions are legitimate because they are driven by the best available coastal science and technology, while their data tools 'didn't make decisions for us.' As state actors deploy environmental big data and metrics to make sense of it, we should be able to explain these apparently contradictory stances and the controversies that result. STS theory on metrics in environmental governance benefits from characterizing how 'modes of authorized seeing' are given expression by different metrical forms and what brings modes into contact and conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Those concerned with climate governance will want to keep watching what is happening in AI governance. Far from unrelated, the two parallel one another in terms of how fractions of capital—whether within fossil fuel or tech sectors—call for legislating in the face of crisis or for voluntary pledges. In truth, both may be said to be forms of self‐governance. Climate and AI intersect firstly in how they are imagined: dominant climate and AI discourses are both symptoms of Anthropocene thinking and 'capitalist realism'. They also intersect in as much as 'AI for Good' initiatives propose that AI is ethical because it can help to address climate change. What seems missing, however, is any consideration of this climate AI as a procedure—is its knowledge valid, what knowledges does it displace or exclude, what biases are reproduced?—and consideration for its consequences, including harms. Does it actually result in climate mitigation and/or adaptation in a given context? What 'maladaptive' outcomes might it drive? What alternatives does it foreclose? These sorts of questions are ones where geographers will continue to have a lot to say. Those concerned with climate governance will want to keep watching what is happening in AI governance. Far from unrelated, the two parallel one another in terms of how fractions of capital—whether within fossil fuel or tech sectors—call for legislating in the face of crisis or for voluntary pledges. They also intersect in as much as 'AI for Good' initiatives propose that AI is ethical because it can help to address climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The number and variety of technologies used for environmental surveillance is expanding rapidly, making constant data collection and near 'real time' analyses possible. 'Smart Earth' describes networked infrastructures comprised of devices and equipment and signals to the human dimensions inherent to developing, deploying and putting technology and large datasets to use. In this paper, we situate Smart Earth in terms of technological products and human practices and consider the relationship between Smart Earth and global environmental governance. Specifically, we review emerging literature and present a case study of an organization founded by environmental non-profit, SkyTruth, tech industry behemoth, Google and marine conservation NGO, Oceana. Called 'Global Fishing Watch' (GFW), this organization builds geospatial datasets, hosts an online mapping platform where anyone with internet access can surveil various types of ocean-going vessels and shares data and map products with scientists and practitioners. Two critical points emerge through the case. First, we show that GFW expands its surveillance capacity by pursuing 'data sharing' partnerships with sovereign states, many in the Global South. Second, the maps and datasets produced by GFW link vessels to a 'flag state' while the firms, subsidiaries and financiers that may own and/or operate these vessels remain obscure – and hence so too does the political economy of oceans fisheries. GFW maps and datasets offer new approaches to tracking fishing and are advancing fisheries science. At the same time, they rely on and are only legible through hegemonic geopolitical and political–economic orders deeply implicated in industrial (over)fishing. The norms and domains of global environmental governance are expanding, but Smart Earth 'solutions' risk leaving the structural drivers of environmental change unaddressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Conservationists, governments, and corporations see promise in digital technologies to provide holistic, rapid, and objective information to inform policy, shape investments, and monitor ecosystems. But it is increasingly clear that environmental data does more than simply offer a better view of the planet. This special issue makes a single overarching argument: that we cannot fully understand the current conjuncture in global environmental governance without understanding the platforms, devices, and institutions that comprise environmental data infrastructures. The papers draw together scholarship from political ecology and science and technology studies to demonstrate how data has become a significant site in which contemporary environmental politics are waged and socionatures are materialized. We address: (1) the contested practices of utilizing and maintaining data infrastructures; (2) the ways they are governed and the territorial statecraft they enable; (3) the socionatural materiality they arise within but also produce. The papers in this special issue show that, against its dominant representation, data is material, governed, practiced, and requires praxis. Political ecologists could adopt such an approach to make sense of the emerging ways in which data technologies shape environments and their politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conservationists around the world advocate for "data-driven" environmental governance, expecting data infrastructures to make all relevant and actionable information readily available. But how exactly is data to be infrastructured and to what political effect? I show how putting together and maintaining environmental data for decision-making is not a straightforward technical task, but a practice shaped by and shaping politico-economic context. Drawing from the US state of Louisiana's coastal restoration planning process, I detail two ways ecosystem modelers manage fiscal and institutional "frictions" to "infrastructuring" data as a resource for decision-making. First, these experts work with the data they have. They leverage, tweak, and maintain existing datasets and tools, spending time and money to gather additional data only to the extent it fits existing goals. The assumption is that these goals will continue to be important, but building coastal data infrastructure around current research needs, plans, and austerity arguably limits what can be said in and done with the future. Second, modelers acquire the data they made to need. Coastal communities have protested the state's primary restoration tool: diversions of sediment from the Mississippi River. Planners reacted by relaxing institutional constraints and modelers brought together new data to highlight possible winners and losers from ecological restoration. Fishers and other coastal residents leveraged greater dissent in the planning process. Political ecologists show that technocentric environmental governance tends to foreclose dissent from hegemonic socioecological futures. I argue we can clarify the conditions in which this tends to happen by following how experts manage data frictions. As some conservationists and planners double down on driving with data in a "post-truth" world, I find that data's politicizing effects stem from what is asked of it, not whether it is "big" or "drives." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Algorithms – instructions for acting on data, executed by code – are increasingly being enrolled into climate policy governance via the prediction of policy outcomes, the evaluation of climate mitigation and adaptation strategies, and the design of practitioner actions. Yet the political implications of these technological changes in environmental governance are only just beginning to be theorised. In this paper, we examine one particular facet of this emerging politics: the relationship between thinking algorithmically and hegemonic power. Drawing from Laclau and Mouffe's theorisation of hegemony we argue that algorithmic forms of reasoning lend themselves towards producing hegemonising knowledge regimes, with important implications for a democratic politics of climate change. Recognising that algorithms stand for wider socio‐technical assemblages that structure and create knowledge, we call for greater attention to the reliance on algorithms within climate governance – less for the algorithms themselves than for their particular epistemic commitments that create algorithmic ways of thinking, with associated claims to power. Through a critical review of scholarship at the intersection of critical digital studies and environmental governance, we first identify three key epistemic commitments involved in thinking algorithmically: induction, abstraction, and optimisation. We then examine the correspondence between these key features of algorithmic thinking and the conditions that Laclau and Mouffe propose form the grounds for hegemony: objectivity, universality, and necessity. Better understanding what "thinking algorithmically" entails, and the forms of knowing and acting that it affords and excludes, is vital, we argue, to begin naming the political implications and transformative potential of new forms of climate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]