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Copyright of ASBU Law Journal is the property of Social Sciences University of Ankara and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

16 Nisan 2017’de yapılan halk oylaması ile getirilen en önemli hukuksal araçlardan biri Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamesidir. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnameleri ile Anayasa değişikliği kapsamında yeni hükümet sistemi ile yapılan değişikliklerle en çok öne çıkanlardan biri Cumhurbaşkanına verilen bir yetki olarak TBMM’den bir yetki kanununa dayanmaksızın kararname çıkarılabilmesidir. Kararname çıkarma yetkisi ise genel, soyut ve bir kez kullanmakla etkisi tükenmeyen norm koyma gücünü anlatmaktadır. 16 Nisan 2017’de yapılan değişiklik öncesinde yani Parlamenter hükümet siteminde, kuvvetler ayrılığının bir zorunluluğu olarak norm koyma yetkisi TBMM’ye aittir. Ancak 16 Nisan 2017’de yapılan değişiklik sonrasında Cumhurbaşkanına verilen Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamesi çıkarma yetkisi bu hususa ayrıksı bir düzenleme getirmektedir.Çalışmada yeni anayasal düzen içerisinde ve hukuki rejim çerçevesinde yürütmenin düzenleyici işlemleri olarak nitelenen Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnameleri, diğer düzenleyici işlemler ile karşılaştırmalı olarak, yeni düzenleme sınırları gözetilerek irdelenmiştir. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnameleri hem olağan dönem hem de olağan üstü dönem olmak üzere iki farklı hukuki rejimde Anayasa Mahkemesi kararları ışığında tartışılarak normlar hiyerarşisindeki statüleri doktrindeki karşılaştırmalı görüşler etrafında ele alınmaya çalışılmıştır. Özellikle Cumhurbaşkanlığı hükümet sistemi modeli içinde normun irdelenmesi yeni sistemin işlevselliği açısından da önem arz etmektedir.

Copyright of Selcuk Law Review / Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Selcuk Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Kırıkkale Law Journal (KLJ) is the property of Kirikkale Law Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With the Constitutional amendment dated April 16, 2017, the President, who is the sole executive organ, was given the authority to issue a Presidential decree, which includes the primary and first-hand regulatory authority, similar to the legislative power. Unlike other administrative regulations, the Constitutional Court has the authority and duty to examine the claims of unconstitutionality of presidential decrees. The Constitutional Court has the authority to audit Presidential decrees both in terms of form and substance within the scope of an abstract review of norms, but only in terms of substance within the scope of concrete norm control. Starting from its first decision on January 23, 2020, the Constitutional Court has reviewed 153 separate provisions in 43 decisions and has annulled approximately 40% of them. Another point that draws attention in the decisions given by the court is that the unanimous decisions are less in number than the decisions made by the majority of the votes. In the study, the subjects discussed such as the legal nature and scope of the Presidential decrees, whether they create a protected area, their place in the hierarchy of norms, and the forms and types of supervision by the Constitutional Court, the statistical data of the decisions made by the Court and the important decisions determined are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluation of the use of glyphosate and legumes in valencia orange (Citrus sinensis L. Osbeck), in the north of Veracruz: case study. The objective of the case study was to contribute to the knowledge of herbicides (mainly glyphosate) and legumes of valencia orange producers in northern Veracruz. The study was carried out in the year 2021, with producers from three municipalities located in the north of Veracruz: Papantla, Álamo Temapache and Ixhuatlan de Madero. A total of 55 interviews were carried out. The interview that was conducted was structured around three sections: personal information of the interview respondent, information about herbicides, and information about legumes. The characteristics found in this study indicate that the majority of producers continue to use herbicides, 80% do not know the term glyphosate even though it turns out to be the main active ingredient of several of the herbicides that they apply and despite knowing that these can be very dangerous due to various reasons, they continue to use them without any protective equipment, due to how easy, fast and cheap their application is. However, regardless of everything, the producers are in the best disposition to know and cultivate leguminous plants in their plots to observe their characteristics, benefits and advantages in weed control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Türkiye Adalet Akademisi Dergisi is the property of Justice Academy of Turkey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Optimum: Journal of Economics & Management Sciences / Ekonomi ve Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi is the property of Optimum: Journal of Economics & Management Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Inonu University Law Review / İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Inonu University Law Review (IULR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The new government system of Turkey can be described as hyper-presidentialism, this is because the president then becomes the arbiter of all powers. In another word, the power to enact decrees, appoint bureaucrats and judicial officials into offices, and the power to dissolve a parliament belongs solely to the president. As strong presidency fuse with disciplined party system as well as concurrent elections and 10 percent electoral threshold, the president possibly poses a great danger to the separation of powers. Additionally, with regards to the presidential term, the president constitutionally holds the power to be elected only for two terms in Turkey. However, Erdoğan and his supporters believe that the 2017 constitutional amendments that changed the system of government has reset the agenda. Thus, the 2017 amendments offered Erdoğan a secret opportunity to join the presidential election race for a third, and even a fourth term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Türkologiya is the property of Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)