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Despite promising performance at ambient temperature, the development of aqueous zinc batteries is jeopardized by the freeze of aqueous electrolytes and deteriorative electrode‐electrolyte interphase at low temperatures. Herein, inspired by the cryoprotective mechanism of extracellular polysaccharides in biological organisms, a quaternized galactomannan polysaccharide (q‐GPA) is proposed as a cryoprotective additive for improving low‐temperature performance of aqueous zinc batteries. Mechanistic studies revealed that a multi‐hydroxyl galactomannan backbone can substantially attenuate the activity of water molecules through the reconfiguration of the hydrogen bond network, which inhibits ice crystal formation at subzero temperatures and thus depress the freezing point of the electrolyte. Meanwhile, the quaternary ammonium groups tethered on the q‐GPA skeleton are intended to neutralize the interfacial electric field through electrostatic repulsion, thereby accelerating Zn2+ deposition kinetics and prohibiting zinc dendrite growth. Impressively, the q‐GPA–modified electrolyte enables an extended lifespan of over 1700 h in Zn||Zn symmetric battery at a high current density of 3 mA cm−2 and an ultralong cycle life of 5000 cycles with a capacity retention of 99.2% in the Zn||Na2V6O16·1.5H2O (NVO) full battery at −30 °C. This work provides unprecedented possibilities for optimizing the electrolyte formulation of low‐temperature aqueous batteries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quantity discount is a frequently adopted scheme that has not been explicitly investigated in logistics service procurement auctions. This paper focuses on a revised winner determination problem under quantity discounts and demand uncertainty for a fourth-party logistics (4PL) provider in a combinatorial reverse auction. To characterize our research problem, a two-stage stochastic nonlinear programming model is constructed. Inspired by the idea of sample average approximation (SAA), the nonlinear model is reformulated as a deterministic mixed integer linear programming model by using a linearization technique with superior expressions. Since the reformulation has a large number of decision variables and constraints, we integrate SAA with a dual decomposition Lagrangian relaxation technique (DDLR) to develop a solution method called SAA-DDLR. Numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness and applicability of our model and method. Sensitivity analysis reveals that both the 4PL and 3PLs can benefit from the quantity discount scheme. Managerial insights are drawn for the 4PL to run a cost-effective logistics system in the presence of quantity discounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The competitive preference of a retailer is an important factor for closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs), which have not been explicitly investigated by existing studies. This paper specifically considers the retailer's competitive preference and examines decisions with regard to three CLSC channel structures—the manufacturer recycling channel (M-channel), the retailer recycling channel (R-channel), and the third-party recycling channel (T-channel). To mitigate the negative impact of the retailer's competitive preference, revenue-cost sharing (RCS) contracts can be developed. An interesting result is that the manufacturer will choose the T-channel when the degree of the retailer's competitive preference is higher than a specified threshold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the fast growing of the waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), the business values of closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) have been well recognized. In this paper, we investigate the performance of the CLSCs under different combinations of the recycling channel and the channel leadership when the recycling price is determined by the recycling party. Specially, we consider a CLSC consisting of two channel members, i.e., a manufacturer and a retailer. Each member acting as the channel leader has three different channels to collect the used products, and they are (ⅰ) the manufacturer (M-channel), (ⅱ) the retailer (R-channel) and (ⅲ) the third-party (T-channel). Given the recycling party determines the recycling price, mathematical models are developed to investigate the performance of the CLSC under different combinations of the channel leadership and the recycling channel. Through a comparison analysis, we find that M-channel is the most effective recycling channel. Moreover, once the M-channel be adopted, the retailer-led structure is as good as manufacture-led structure. We find that the recycling channel structure could be more important than the channel leadership in the CLSC. Finally, we illustrate that the CLSC can be coordinated by a two-part tariff contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]