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This article examines the origins of the shorter commutes typically observed for women, a phenomenon that contributes to the poorer work outcomes they typically suffer. The analysis extends previous research on the gender gap in commuting by using econometric decomposition techniques that are novel in this field which, combined with a Spanish nationally representative survey that allows for an exhaustive control of the different elements identified in the literature as possible determinants of gender differences in commuting to work, allows quantifying the specific influence of a wide range of individual, family, territorial and work-related elements. The evidence obtained shows that the gender gap in commuting is not the result of the relative characteristics of women, but of the presence of a systematic pattern of lower mobility that emerges when women are compared with observationally similar men. Yet, this pattern of lower mobility is not observed for certain groups of women whose behavior in the labor market is generally more egalitarian, such as women with higher education, without family responsibilities or without a partner, which is consistent with the presence of cultural or social constraints that tend to limit women's mobility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the increase in inequalities following the Great Recession, studies on wage bargaining systems have increasingly focused on wage inequality. This research examines wage inequality associated with collective bargaining levels in Spain, based on matched employer–employee microdata and quantile regression methods. These methods are applied across the wage distribution, following the method proposed by Firpo et al. (2011), to estimate wage premiums associated with agreement levels and to decompose the wage differentials observed at different points of the wage distribution. From the evidence obtained it can be concluded that, although the higher wages found in firm-level agreements are explained by the better observed characteristics of firms and workers covered by these collective agreements, there remains a positive wage premium. Although this premium is seen throughout the wage distribution, it favours mostly workers in the middle and upper-middle end. This slightly increases wage inequality in comparison with sectoral agreements. In contrast, workers without collective bargaining coverage generally suffer a wage penalty. This penalty is only observed on the left of the wage distribution. It becomes a significant wage premium in the upper end of the distribution, which implies a significant increase in wage inequality. In short, the evidence of this research suggests that reducing the coverage of collective bargaining could be associated with a significant increase in wage inequality. A better policy option for countries with a predominant sectoral model, such as Spain, would be to move towards an organized decentralization model. This would cause significant gains in employment as suggested by OECD (2019) and only a slight increase in wage inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]