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Binary decision frameworks are widely used in the social sciences, including management and economics, to understand collective behavior. In group decision-making, opinions evolve through social influence, shaping outcomes that lead to either consensus or polarization. The $q$ voter model, also known as the non-linear voter model, has been extensively studied in this context. However, the impact of an individual's current opinion on their future stance has been largely overlooked. To fill this gap, we introduce a generalized model in which an agent's opinion depends not only on its neighbors but also on its own state. As in the original $q$-voter model, a unanimous influence group of size $q$ causes the agent to adopt the group's opinion. However, if the group is not unanimous, the agent will change its opinion with a probability influenced by its current state. This introduces a bias toward a choice that reflects external factors such as politics or advertising. Our model generalizes previous $q$-voter models, including the original one, while allowing for a wider range of scenarios. We analyze the model on a complete graph, deriving the phase diagram and the exit probability for finite systems. We support our analytical approach with Monte Carlo simulations and show that they overlap even for small systems of size $N=64$. Our results show that the exit probability depends on $q$. For $q \geq 3$, the exit probability exhibits a shape that was not observed in previous models, which implies that increasing initial support for a decision does not necessarily change the final collective outcome., Comment: 10 pages, 5 figures

Engaging with dissenting views, fostering productive disagreements or strategic anticonformity can benefit organizations as it challenges the status quo. The question arises, however, whether such strategic anticonformity ultimately leads to social polarization, which is not a desirable phenomenon. We address this question within an agent-based model of discrete choices. Using the way of modeling social responses in continuous opinion models, we propose a three-state $q$-voter model with anticonformity and bounded confidence. We analyze the model on a complete graph using the mean-field approach and Monte Carlo simulations. We show that strong polarization appears only for a small probability of anticonformity, which means that conformity combined with homophily enhances polarization. Our findings agree with results obtained previously in the group discussion experiment and within various continuous opinion models., Comment: 27 pages, 10 figures