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Decentralized finance (DeFi) borrowing and lending platforms are crucial to the decentralized economy, involving two main participants: lenders who provide assets for interest and borrowers who offer collateral exceeding their debt and pay interest. Collateral volatility necessitates over-collateralization to protect lenders and ensure competitive returns. Traditional DeFi platforms use a fixed interest rate curve based on the utilization rate (the fraction of available assets borrowed) and determine over-collateralization offline through simulations to manage risk. This method doesn't adapt well to dynamic market changes, such as price fluctuations and evolving user needs, often resulting in losses for lenders or borrowers. In this paper, we introduce an adaptive, data-driven protocol for DeFi borrowing and lending. Our approach includes a high-frequency controller that dynamically adjusts interest rates to maintain market stability and competitiveness with external markets. Unlike traditional protocols, which rely on user reactions and often adjust slowly, our controller uses a learning-based algorithm to quickly find optimal interest rates, reducing the opportunity cost for users during periods of misalignment with external rates. Additionally, we use a low-frequency planner that analyzes user behavior to set an optimal over-collateralization ratio, balancing risk reduction with profit maximization over the long term. This dual approach is essential for adaptive markets: the short-term component maintains market stability, preventing exploitation, while the long-term planner optimizes market parameters to enhance profitability and reduce risks. We provide theoretical guarantees on the convergence rates and adversarial robustness of the short-term component and the long-term effectiveness of our protocol. Empirical validation confirms our protocol's theoretical benefits.

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are essential in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) as they match liquidity supply with demand. They function through liquidity providers (LPs) who deposit assets into liquidity pools. However, the asset trading prices in these pools often trail behind those in more dynamic, centralized exchanges, leading to potential arbitrage losses for LPs. This issue is tackled by adapting market maker bonding curves to trader behavior, based on the classical market microstructure model of Glosten and Milgrom. Our approach ensures a zero-profit condition for the market maker's prices. We derive the differential equation that an optimal adaptive curve should follow to minimize arbitrage losses while remaining competitive. Solutions to this optimality equation are obtained for standard Gaussian and Lognormal price models using Kalman filtering. A key feature of our method is its ability to estimate the external market price without relying on price or loss oracles. We also provide an equivalent differential equation for the implied dynamics of canonical static bonding curves and establish conditions for their optimality. Our algorithms demonstrate robustness to changing market conditions and adversarial perturbations, and we offer an on-chain implementation using Uniswap v4 alongside off-chain AI co-processors.

Blockchain applications often rely on lightweight clients to access and verify on-chain data efficiently without the need to run a resource-intensive full node. These light clients must maintain robust security to protect the blockchain's integrity for users of applications built upon it, achieving this with minimal resources and without significant latency. Moreover, different applications have varying security needs. This work focuses on addressing these two key requirements in the context of Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains and identifying the fundamental cost-latency trade-offs to achieve tailored, optimal security for each light client. The key security guarantee of PoS blockchains is economic (implied by the "stake"). In this paper we formalize this cryptoeconomic security to light clients, ensuring that the cost of corrupting the data provided to light clients must outweigh the potential profit, thereby economically deterring malicious actors. We further introduce "insured" cryptoeconomic security to light clients, providing unconditional protection via the attribution of adversarial actions and the consequent slashing of stakes. The divisible and fungible nature of stake facilitates programmable security, allowing for customization of the security level and insurance amount according to the specific needs of different applications. We implemented the protocols in less than 1000 lines of Solidity and TypeScript code and evaluated their gas cost, latency, and the computational overhead. For example, for a transaction with value of \$32k, the light client can choose between zero cost with a latency of 5 hours or instant confirmation with an insurance cost of \$7.45. Thus, the client can select the optimal point on the latency-cost trade-off spectrum that best aligns with its needs. Light clients require negligible storage and face minimal computational costs,...

Internet platforms depend on accurately determining the geographical locations of online users to deliver targeted services (e.g., advertising). The advent of decentralized platforms (blockchains) emphasizes the importance of geographically distributed nodes, making the validation of locations more crucial. In these decentralized settings, mutually non-trusting participants need to {\em prove} their locations to each other. The incentives for claiming desired location include decentralization properties (validators of a blockchain), explicit rewards for improving coverage (physical infrastructure blockchains) and regulatory compliance -- and entice participants towards prevaricating their true location malicious via VPNs, tampering with internet delays, or compromising other parties (challengers) to misrepresent their location. Traditional delay-based geolocation methods focus on reducing the noise in measurements and are very vulnerable to wilful divergences from prescribed protocol. In this paper we use Internet delay measurements to securely prove the location of IP addresses while being immune to a large fraction of Byzantine actions. Our core methods are to endow Internet telemetry tools (e.g., ping) with cryptographic primitives (signatures and hash functions) together with Byzantine resistant data inferences subject to Euclidean geometric constraints. We introduce two new networking protocols, robust against Byzantine actions: Proof of Internet Geometry (PoIG) converts delay measurements into precise distance estimates across the Internet; Proof of Location (PoLoc) enables accurate and efficient multilateration of a specific IP address. The key algorithmic innovations are in conducting ``Byzantine fortified trigonometry" (BFT) inferences of data, endowing low rank matrix completion methods with Byzantine resistance.

Progress in designing channel codes has been driven by human ingenuity and, fittingly, has been sporadic. Polar codes, developed on the foundation of Arikan's polarization kernel, represent the latest breakthrough in coding theory and have emerged as the state-of-the-art error-correction code for short-to-medium block length regimes. In an effort to automate the invention of good channel codes, especially in this regime, we explore a novel, non-linear generalization of Polar codes, which we call DeepPolar codes. DeepPolar codes extend the conventional Polar coding framework by utilizing a larger kernel size and parameterizing these kernels and matched decoders through neural networks. Our results demonstrate that these data-driven codes effectively leverage the benefits of a larger kernel size, resulting in enhanced reliability when compared to both existing neural codes and conventional Polar codes., Comment: 22 pages, 24 figures

Layer 1 (L1) blockchains such as Ethereum are secured under an "honest supermajority of stake" assumption for a large pool of validators who verify each and every transaction on it. This high security comes at a scalability cost which not only effects the throughput of the blockchain but also results in high gas fees for executing transactions on chain. The most successful solution for this problem is provided by optimistic rollups, Layer 2 (L2) blockchains that execute transactions outside L1 but post the transaction data on L1. The security for such L2 chains is argued, informally, under the assumption that a set of nodes will check the transaction data posted on L1 and raise an alarm (a fraud proof) if faulty transactions are detected. However, all current deployments lack a proper incentive mechanism for ensuring that these nodes will do their job ``diligently'', and simply rely on a cursory incentive alignment argument for security. We solve this problem by introducing an incentivized watchtower network designed to serve as the first line of defense for rollups. Our main contribution is a ``Proof of Diligence'' protocol that requires watchtowers to continuously provide a proof that they have verified L2 assertions and get rewarded for the same. Proof of Diligence protocol includes a carefully-designed incentive mechanism that is provably secure when watchtowers are rational actors, under a mild rational independence assumption.

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are major centers of matching liquidity supply and demand in Decentralized Finance. Their functioning relies primarily on the presence of liquidity providers (LPs) incentivized to invest their assets into a liquidity pool. However, the prices at which a pooled asset is traded is often more stale than the prices on centralized and more liquid exchanges. This leads to the LPs suffering losses to arbitrage. This problem is addressed by adapting market prices to trader behavior, captured via the classical market microstructure model of Glosten and Milgrom. In this paper, we propose the first optimal Bayesian and the first model-free data-driven algorithm to optimally track the external price of the asset. The notion of optimality that we use enforces a zero-profit condition on the prices of the market maker, hence the name ZeroSwap. This ensures that the market maker balances losses to informed traders with profits from noise traders. The key property of our approach is the ability to estimate the external market price without the need for price oracles or loss oracles. Our theoretical guarantees on the performance of both these algorithms, ensuring the stability and convergence of their price recommendations, are of independent interest in the theory of reinforcement learning. We empirically demonstrate the robustness of our algorithms to changing market conditions.

Large AI models (e.g., Dall-E, GPT4) have electrified the scientific, technological and societal landscape through their superhuman capabilities. These services are offered largely in a traditional web2.0 format (e.g., OpenAI's GPT4 service). As more large AI models proliferate (personalizing and specializing to a variety of domains), there is a tremendous need to have a neutral trust-free platform that allows the hosting of AI models, clients receiving AI services efficiently, yet in a trust-free, incentive compatible, Byzantine behavior resistant manner. In this paper we propose SAKSHI, a trust-free decentralized platform specifically suited for AI services. The key design principles of SAKSHI are the separation of the data path (where AI query and service is managed) and the control path (where routers and compute and storage hosts are managed) from the transaction path (where the metering and billing of services are managed over a blockchain). This separation is enabled by a "proof of inference" layer which provides cryptographic resistance against a variety of misbehaviors, including poor AI service, nonpayment for service, copying of AI models. This is joint work between multiple universities (Princeton University, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Tsinghua University, HKUST) and two startup companies (Witness Chain and Eigen Layer)., Comment: 23 pages, 9 figures

Crash fault tolerant (CFT) consensus algorithms are commonly used in scenarios where system components are trusted -- e.g., enterprise settings and government infrastructure. However, CFT consensus can be broken by even a single corrupt node. A desirable property in the face of such potential Byzantine faults is \emph{accountability}: if a corrupt node breaks protocol and affects consensus safety, it should be possible to identify the culpable components with cryptographic integrity from the node states. Today, the best-known protocol for providing accountability to CFT protocols is called PeerReview; it essentially records a signed transcript of all messages sent during the CFT protocol. Because PeerReview is agnostic to the underlying CFT protocol, it incurs high communication and storage overhead. We propose CFT-Forensics, an accountability framework for CFT protocols. We show that for a special family of \emph{forensics-compliant} CFT protocols (which includes widely-used CFT protocols like Raft and multi-Paxos), CFT-Forensics gives provable accountability guarantees. Under realistic deployment settings, we show theoretically that CFT-Forensics operates at a fraction of the cost of PeerReview. We subsequently instantiate CFT-Forensics for Raft, and implement Raft-Forensics as an extension to the popular nuRaft library. In extensive experiments, we demonstrate that Raft-Forensics adds low overhead to vanilla Raft. With 256 byte messages, Raft-Forensics achieves a peak throughput 87.8\% of vanilla Raft at 46\% higher latency ($+44$ ms). We finally integrate Raft-Forensics into the open-source central bank digital currency OpenCBDC, and show that in wide-area network experiments, Raft-Forensics achieves 97.8\% of the throughput of Raft, with 14.5\% higher latency ($+326$ ms).

In modern communication systems with feedback, there are increasingly more scenarios where the transmitter has much less power than the receiver (e.g., medical implant devices), which we refer to as noise-asymmetric channels. For such channels, the feedback link is of higher quality than the forward link. However, feedback schemes for cellular communications, such as hybrid ARQ, do not fully utilize the high-quality feedback link. To this end, we introduce Compressed Error Hybrid ARQ, a generalization of hybrid ARQ tailored for noise-asymmetric channels; the receiver sends its estimated message to the transmitter, and the transmitter harmoniously switches between hybrid ARQ and compressed error retransmission. We show that our proposed method significantly improves reliability, latency, and spectral efficiency compared to the conventional hybrid ARQ in various practical scenarios where the transmitter is resource-constrained.

Reed-Muller (RM) codes achieve the capacity of general binary-input memoryless symmetric channels and are conjectured to have a comparable performance to that of random codes in terms of scaling laws. However, such results are established assuming maximum-likelihood decoders for general code parameters. Also, RM codes only admit limited sets of rates. Efficient decoders such as successive cancellation list (SCL) decoder and recently-introduced recursive projection-aggregation (RPA) decoders are available for RM codes at finite lengths. In this paper, we focus on subcodes of RM codes with flexible rates. We first extend the RPA decoding algorithm to RM subcodes. To lower the complexity of our decoding algorithm, referred to as subRPA, we investigate different approaches to prune the projections. Next, we derive the soft-decision based version of our algorithm, called soft-subRPA, that not only improves upon the performance of subRPA but also enables a differentiable decoding algorithm. Building upon the soft-subRPA algorithm, we then provide a framework for training a machine learning (ML) model to search for \textit{good} sets of projections that minimize the decoding error rate. Training our ML model enables achieving very close to the performance of full-projection decoding with a significantly smaller number of projections. We also show that the choice of the projections in decoding RM subcodes matters significantly, and our ML-aided projection pruning scheme is able to find a \textit{good} selection, i.e., with negligible performance degradation compared to the full-projection case, given a reasonable number of projections., Comment: Accepted for publication in the Journal on Selected Areas in Information Theory. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2102.01671

Currently there exist many blockchains with weak trust guarantees, limiting applications and participation. Existing solutions to boost the trust using a stronger blockchain, e.g., via checkpointing, requires the weaker blockchain to give up sovereignty. In this paper, we propose a family of protocols in which multiple blockchains interact to create a combined ledger with boosted trust. We show that even if several of the interacting blockchains cease to provide security guarantees, the combined ledger continues to be secure - our TrustBoost protocols achieve the optimal threshold of tolerating the insecure blockchains. This optimality, along with the necessity of blockchain interactions, is formally shown within the classic shared memory model, tackling the long standing open challenge of solving consensus in the presence of both Byzantine objects and processes. Furthermore, our proposed construction of TrustBoost simply operates via smart contracts and require no change to the underlying consensus protocols of the participating blockchains, a form of ``consensus on top of consensus''. The protocols are lightweight and can be used on specific (e.g., high value) transactions; we demonstrate the practicality by implementing and deploying TrustBoost as cross-chain smart contracts in the Cosmos ecosystem using approximately 3,000 lines of Rust code, made available as open source. Our evaluation shows that using 10 Cosmos chains in a local testnet, TrustBoost has a gas cost of roughly $2 with a latency of 2 minutes per request, which is in line with the cost on a high security chain such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, Comment: Forthcoming in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) 2023

Recent years have seen the emergence of decentralized wireless networks consisting of nodes hosted by many individuals and small enterprises, reawakening the decades-old dream of open networking. These networks have been deployed in an organic, distributed manner and are driven by new economic models resting on tokenized incentives. A critical requirement for the incentives to scale is the ability to prove network performance in a decentralized trustfree manner, i.e., a Byzantine fault tolerant network telemetry system. In this paper, we present a Proof of Backhaul (PoB) protocol which measures the bandwidth of the (broadband) backhaul link of a wireless access point, termed prover, in a decentralized and trustfree manner. In particular, our proposed protocol is the first one to satisfy the following two properties: (1) Trustfree. Bandwidth measurement is secure against Byzantine attacks by collaborations of challenge servers and the prover. (2) Open. The barrier-to-entry for being a challenge server is low; there is no requirement of having a low latency and high throughput path to the measured link. At a high-level, our protocol aggregates the challenge traffic from multiple challenge servers and uses cryptographic primitives to ensure that a subset of challengers or, even challengers and provers, cannot maliciously modify results in their favor. A formal security model allows us to establish guarantees of accurate bandwidth measurement as a function of the fraction of malicious actors. Our evaluation shows that our PoB protocol can verify backhaul bandwidth of up to 1000 Mbps with less than 8% error using measurements lasting only 100 ms. The measurement accuracy is not affected in the presence of corrupted challengers. Importantly, the basic verification protocol lends itself to a minor modification that can measure available bandwidth even in the presence of cross-traffic.

Polar codes are widely used state-of-the-art codes for reliable communication that have recently been included in the 5th generation wireless standards (5G). However, there remains room for the design of polar decoders that are both efficient and reliable in the short blocklength regime. Motivated by recent successes of data-driven channel decoders, we introduce a novel $\textbf{C}$ur$\textbf{RI}$culum based $\textbf{S}$equential neural decoder for $\textbf{P}$olar codes (CRISP). We design a principled curriculum, guided by information-theoretic insights, to train CRISP and show that it outperforms the successive-cancellation (SC) decoder and attains near-optimal reliability performance on the Polar(32,16) and Polar(64,22) codes. The choice of the proposed curriculum is critical in achieving the accuracy gains of CRISP, as we show by comparing against other curricula. More notably, CRISP can be readily extended to Polarization-Adjusted-Convolutional (PAC) codes, where existing SC decoders are significantly less reliable. To the best of our knowledge, CRISP constructs the first data-driven decoder for PAC codes and attains near-optimal performance on the PAC(32,16) code., Comment: 23 pages, 23 figures. ICML 2023

In this paper, we introduce a neural-augmented decoder for Turbo codes called TINYTURBO . TINYTURBO has complexity comparable to the classical max-log-MAP algorithm but has much better reliability than the max-log-MAP baseline and performs close to the MAP algorithm. We show that TINYTURBO exhibits strong robustness on a variety of practical channels of interest, such as EPA and EVA channels, which are included in the LTE standards. We also show that TINYTURBO strongly generalizes across different rate, blocklengths, and trellises. We verify the reliability and efficiency of TINYTURBO via over-the-air experiments., Comment: 10 pages, 6 figures. Published at the 2022 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

Proof of Work (PoW) blockchains are susceptible to adversarial majority mining attacks in the early stages due to incipient participation and corresponding low net hash power. Bootstrapping ensures safety and liveness during the transient stage by protecting against a majority mining attack, allowing a PoW chain to grow the participation base and corresponding mining hash power. Liveness is especially important since a loss of liveness will lead to loss of honest mining rewards, decreasing honest participation, hence creating an undesired spiral; indeed existing bootstrapping mechanisms offer especially weak liveness guarantees. In this paper, we propose Advocate, a new bootstrapping methodology, which achieves two main results: (a) optimal liveness and low latency under a super-majority adversary for the Nakamoto longest chain protocol and (b) immediate black-box generalization to a variety of parallel-chain based scaling architectures, including OHIE and Prism. We demonstrate via a full-stack implementation the robustness of Advocate under a 90% adversarial majority.

Resource-based consensus is the backbone of permissionless distributed ledger systems. The security of such protocols relies fundamentally on the level of resources actively engaged in the system. The variety of different resources (and related proof protocols, some times referred to as PoX in the literature) raises the fundamental question whether it is possible to utilize many of them in tandem and build multi-resource consensus protocols. The challenge in combining different resources is to achieve fungibility between them, in the sense that security would hold as long as the cumulative adversarial power across all resources is bounded. In this work, we put forth Minotaur, a multi-resource blockchain consensus protocol that combines proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS), and we prove it optimally fungible. At the core of our design, Minotaur operates in epochs while continuously sampling the active computational power to provide a fair exchange between the two resources, work and stake. Further, we demonstrate the ability of Minotaur to handle a higher degree of work fluctuation as compared to the Bitcoin blockchain; we also generalize Minotaur to any number of resources. We demonstrate the simplicity of Minotaur via implementing a full stack client in Rust (available open source). We use the client to test the robustness of Minotaur to variable mining power and combined work/stake attacks and demonstrate concrete empirical evidence towards the suitability of Minotaur to serve as the consensus layer of a real-world blockchain., Comment: To appear in ACM CCS 2022