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Privatization reform originated in Western countries and was translated across political regimes. While extensive literature discusses the practices of privatization in liberal democracies, little has been written on its implementation in authoritarian contexts, where the logic of privatization is incompatible with the logic of authoritarianism. This study explores the adoption of a specific administrative model promoted by the privatization reform: nonprofit board governance in Shenzhen, China. We find that, although the nonprofit board is the formal governing structure, regulatory agencies constrain the autonomy of boards, decoupling governance practices from board governance. Two organizational‐level contingency factors—institutional origins and political risks—help explain the balance of the competing logics and the degree of decoupling from board governance. These findings suggest that, within the global privatization movement, the seemingly converging administrative structures embody divergent practices when adapting to local contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The coping behaviors of street-level bureaucrats have received increasing attention in the past decade. Although recent literature has explored the classification of coping behaviors and their antecedents, little is known about how coping behaviors connect street-level bureaucrats' mission attachment, their enforcement effectiveness, and psychological commitment to the organization. In this study, we developed a conceptual framework examining the mediating effects of "moving against regulatees," a coping behavior characterized by rigid enforcement of rules. Using survey data collected from frontline environmental law enforcement officers in China, we found that a strong attachment to the mission was positively related to the coping behavior of moving against regulatees. This behavior was also associated with increased enforcement effectiveness but decreased organizational commitment. The results highlight that, although moving against regulatees is positively associated with immediate enforcement outcomes, it may have a negative association with enforcement performance in the long run by eroding organizational commitment among street-level bureaucrats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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