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The execution of deep neural network (DNN) algorithms suffers from significant bottlenecks due to the separation of the processing and memory units in traditional computer systems. Emerging memristive computing systems introduce an in situ approach that overcomes this bottleneck. The non-volatility of memristive devices, however, may expose the DNN weights stored in memristive crossbars to potential theft attacks. Therefore, this paper proposes a two-dimensional permutation-based protection (TDPP) method that thwarts such attacks. We first introduce the underlying concept that motivates the TDPP method: permuting both the rows and columns of the DNN weight matrices. This contrasts with previous methods, which focused solely on permuting a single dimension of the weight matrices, either the rows or columns. While it's possible for an adversary to access the matrix values, the original arrangement of rows and columns in the matrices remains concealed. As a result, the extracted DNN model from the accessed matrix values would fail to operate correctly. We consider two different memristive computing systems (designed for layer-by-layer and layer-parallel processing, respectively) and demonstrate the design of the TDPP method that could be embedded into the two systems. Finally, we present a security analysis. Our experiments demonstrate that TDPP can achieve comparable effectiveness to prior approaches, with a high level of security when appropriately parameterized. In addition, TDPP is more scalable than previous methods and results in reduced area and power overheads. The area and power are reduced by, respectively, 1218$\times$ and 2815$\times$ for the layer-by-layer system and by 178$\times$ and 203$\times$ for the layer-parallel system compared to prior works., Comment: 14 pages, 11 figures

Neural network (NN) algorithms have become the dominant tool in visual object recognition, natural language processing, and robotics. To enhance the computational efficiency of these algorithms, in comparison to the traditional von Neuman computing architectures, researchers have been focusing on memristor computing systems. A major drawback when using memristor computing systems today is that, in the artificial intelligence (AI) era, well-trained NN models are intellectual property and, when loaded in the memristor computing systems, face theft threats, especially when running in edge devices. An adversary may steal the well-trained NN models through advanced attacks such as learning attacks and side-channel analysis. In this paper, we review different security techniques for protecting memristor computing systems. Two threat models are described based on their assumptions regarding the adversary's capabilities: a black-box (BB) model and a white-box (WB) model. We categorize the existing security techniques into five classes in the context of these threat models: thwarting learning attacks (BB), thwarting side-channel attacks (BB), NN model encryption (WB), NN weight transformation (WB), and fingerprint embedding (WB). We also present a cross-comparison of the limitations of the security techniques. This paper could serve as an aid when designing secure memristor computing systems., Comment: 15 pages, 5 figures

Emerging memristor computing systems have demonstrated great promise in improving the energy efficiency of neural network (NN) algorithms. The NN weights stored in memristor crossbars, however, may face potential theft attacks due to the nonvolatility of the memristor devices. In this paper, we propose to protect the NN weights by mapping selected columns of them in the form of 1's complements and leaving the other columns in their original form, preventing the adversary from knowing the exact representation of each weight. The results show that compared with prior work, our method achieves effectiveness comparable to the best of them and reduces the hardware overhead by more than 18X., Comment: 6 pages, 4 figures, accepted by IEEE ISVLSI 2022

The tunability of conductance states of various emerging non-volatile memristive devices emulates the plasticity of biological synapses, making it promising in the hardware realization of large-scale neuromorphic systems. The inference of the neural network can be greatly accelerated by the vector-matrix multiplication (VMM) performed within a crossbar array of memristive devices in one step. Nevertheless, the implementation of the VMM needs complex peripheral circuits and the complexity further increases since non-idealities of memristive devices prevent precise conductance tuning (especially for the online training) and largely degrade the performance of the deep neural networks (DNNs). Here, we present an efficient online training method of the memristive deep belief net (DBN). The proposed memristive DBN uses stochastically binarized activations, reducing the complexity of peripheral circuits, and uses the contrastive divergence (CD) based gradient descent learning algorithm. The analog VMM and digital CD are performed separately in a mixed-signal hardware arrangement, making the memristive DBN high immune to non-idealities of synaptic devices. The number of write operations on memristive devices is reduced by two orders of magnitude. The recognition accuracy of 95%~97% can be achieved for the MNIST dataset using pulsed synaptic behaviors of various memristive synaptic devices.