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Human respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) is a major cause of acute respiratory infection. In 2020, RSV was eliminated from New Zealand due to non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) used to control the spread of SARS-CoV-2. However, in 2021, following a brief quarantine-free travel agreement with Australia, there was a large-scale nationwide outbreak of RSV that led to reported cases more than five-times higher than typical seasonal patterns. We generated 1470 viral genomes of both RSV-A and RSV-B sampled between 2015-2022 from across New Zealand. Using a phylodynamics approach, we used these data to better understand RSV transmission patterns in New Zealand prior to 2020, and how RSV became re-established in the community following the relaxation of COVID-19 restrictions. We found that in 2021, there was a large epidemic of RSV due to an increase in importations, leading to several large genomic clusters of both RSV-A ON1 and RSV-B BA9 genotypes. However, while a number of viral importations were detected, there was also a major reduction in RSV genetic diversity compared to pre-pandemic years. These data reveal the impact of NPI used during the COVID-19 pandemic on other respiratory infections and highlight the important insights that can be gained from viral genomes., Competing Interests: Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Pangenome graphs can represent all variation between multiple reference genomes, but current approaches to build them exclude complex sequences or are based upon a single reference. In response, we developed the PanGenome Graph Builder, a pipeline for constructing pangenome graphs without bias or exclusion. The PanGenome Graph Builder uses all-to-all alignments to build a variation graph in which we can identify variation, measure conservation, detect recombination events and infer phylogenetic relationships., (© 2024. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature America, Inc.)

Delivering large-scale routine pathogen genomics surveillance for public health is of considerable interest, although translational research models that promote national-level implementation are not well defined. We describe the development and deployment of the Australian Pathogen Genomics Program (AusPathoGen), a comprehensive national partnership between academia, public health laboratories, and public health agencies that commenced in January, 2021. Successfully establishing and delivering a national programme requires inclusive and transparent collaboration between stakeholders, defined and clear focus on public health priorities, and support for strengthening national genomics capacity. Major enablers for delivering such a programme include technical solutions for data integration and analysis, such as the genomics surveillance platform AusTrakka, standard bioinformatic analysis methods, and national ethics and data sharing agreements that promote nationally integrated surveillance systems. Training of public health officials to interpret and act on genomic data is crucial, and evaluation and cost-effectiveness programmes will provide a benchmark and evidence for sustainable investment in genomics nationally and globally., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests We declare no competing interests., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Background: New Zealand's (NZ) complete absence of community transmission of influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) after May 2020, likely due to COVID-19 elimination measures, provided a rare opportunity to assess the impact of border restrictions on common respiratory viral infections over the ensuing 2 years., Methods: We collected the data from multiple surveillance systems, including hospital-based severe acute respiratory infection surveillance, SHIVERS-II, -III and -IV community cohorts for acute respiratory infection (ARI) surveillance, HealthStat sentinel general practice (GP) based influenza-like illness surveillance and SHIVERS-V sentinel GP-based ARI surveillance, SHIVERS-V traveller ARI surveillance and laboratory-based surveillance. We described the data on influenza, RSV and other respiratory viral infections in NZ before, during and after various stages of the COVID related border restrictions., Results: We observed that border closure to most people, and mandatory government-managed isolation and quarantine on arrival for those allowed to enter, appeared to be effective in keeping influenza and RSV infections out of the NZ community. Border restrictions did not affect community transmission of other respiratory viruses such as rhinovirus and parainfluenza virus type-1. Partial border relaxations through quarantine-free travel with Australia and other countries were quickly followed by importation of RSV in 2021 and influenza in 2022., Conclusion: Our findings inform future pandemic preparedness and strategies to model and manage the impact of influenza and other respiratory viral threats., (© 2024 The Authors. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Background: The Global Typhoid Genomics Consortium was established to bring together the typhoid research community to aggregate and analyse Salmonella enterica serovar Typhi (Typhi) genomic data to inform public health action. This analysis, which marks 22 years since the publication of the first Typhi genome, represents the largest Typhi genome sequence collection to date (n=13,000)., Methods: This is a meta-analysis of global genotype and antimicrobial resistance (AMR) determinants extracted from previously sequenced genome data and analysed using consistent methods implemented in open analysis platforms GenoTyphi and Pathogenwatch., Results: Compared with previous global snapshots, the data highlight that genotype 4.3.1 (H58) has not spread beyond Asia and Eastern/Southern Africa; in other regions, distinct genotypes dominate and have independently evolved AMR. Data gaps remain in many parts of the world, and we show the potential of travel-associated sequences to provide informal 'sentinel' surveillance for such locations. The data indicate that ciprofloxacin non-susceptibility (>1 resistance determinant) is widespread across geographies and genotypes, with high-level ciprofloxacin resistance (≥3 determinants) reaching 20% prevalence in South Asia. Extensively drug-resistant (XDR) typhoid has become dominant in Pakistan (70% in 2020) but has not yet become established elsewhere. Ceftriaxone resistance has emerged in eight non-XDR genotypes, including a ciprofloxacin-resistant lineage (4.3.1.2.1) in India. Azithromycin resistance mutations were detected at low prevalence in South Asia, including in two common ciprofloxacin-resistant genotypes., Conclusions: The consortium's aim is to encourage continued data sharing and collaboration to monitor the emergence and global spread of AMR Typhi, and to inform decision-making around the introduction of typhoid conjugate vaccines (TCVs) and other prevention and control strategies., Funding: No specific funding was awarded for this meta-analysis. Coordinators were supported by fellowships from the European Union (ZAD received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 845681), the Wellcome Trust (SB, Wellcome Trust Senior Fellowship), and the National Health and Medical Research Council (DJI is supported by an NHMRC Investigator Grant [GNT1195210])., Competing Interests: MC, ZD, DI, AA, MA, MC, KC, JC, BH, KK, MM, CP, SV, HW, AA, AA, SA, JA, PA, BB, AB, JC, Kd, AD, Jd, PD, CD, SD, ME, LF, DG, GG, MG, AG, CG, MG, RH, RH, YH, JH, OI, JI, JJ, CJ, DJ, JJ, GK, AK, AK, AK, SK, RK, RK, AL, ML, RL, SL, GM, TM, CM, AM, GN, SN, SN, TN, SN, EN, IO, SP, AP, FQ, FQ, SR, SR, DR, PR, RR, TR, JR, SS, SS, KS, MS, JS, JS, VS, JS, RS, SS, MS, AS, AS, KT, DT, AT, MT, MT, RT, NT, ST, KV, MV, BV, FW, JW, GD, SA, JK, DA, SB, KH No competing interests declared, NF NAF chairs the Wellcome Surveillance and Epidemiology of Drug Resistant Infections (SEDRIC) group, which has a focus on antimicrobial resistance. This could be perceived as relevant although not a direct conflict, IB IB has consulted to BlueDot and the NHL Players' Association, AP AJP is chair of the UK Department of Health and Social Care's (DHSC) Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) but does not take part in the JCVI COVID-19 committee. He was a member of WHO SAGE until 2022. AJPs employer, Oxford University has entered into a partnership with AstraZeneca for development of a COVID-19 vaccine. AJP has provided advice to Shionogi & Co., Ltd on development of a COVID19 vaccine, (© 2023, Carey et al.)

Whole genome sequencing has revolutionized infectious disease surveillance for tracking and monitoring the spread and evolution of pathogens. However, using a linear reference genome for genomic analyses may introduce biases, especially when studies are conducted on highly variable bacterial genomes of the same species. Pangenome graphs provide an efficient model for representing and analyzing multiple genomes and their variants as a graph structure that includes all types of variations. In this study, we present a practical bioinformatics pipeline that employs the PanGenome Graph Builder and the Variation Graph toolkit to build pangenomes from assembled genomes, align whole genome sequencing data and call variants against a graph reference. The pangenome graph enables the identification of structural variants, rearrangements, and small variants (e.g., single nucleotide polymorphisms and insertions/deletions) simultaneously. We demonstrate that using a pangenome graph, instead of a single linear reference genome, improves mapping rates and variant calling for both simulated and real datasets of the pathogen Neisseria meningitidis . Overall, pangenome graphs offer a promising approach for comparative genomics and comprehensive genetic variation analysis in infectious disease. Moreover, this innovative pipeline, leveraging pangenome graphs, can bridge variant analysis, genome assembly, population genetics, and evolutionary biology, expanding the reach of genomic understanding and applications., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2023 Yang, Guarracino, Biggs, Black, Ismail, Wold, Merriman, Prins, Garrison and de Ligt.)

Background: Genomic technologies have become routine in the surveillance and monitoring of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, as evidenced by the millions of SARS-CoV-2 sequences uploaded to international databases. Yet the ways in which these technologies have been applied to manage the pandemic are varied., Main Text: Aotearoa New Zealand was one of a small number of countries to adopt an elimination strategy for COVID-19, establishing a managed isolation and quarantine system for all international arrivals. To aid our response, we rapidly set up and scaled our use of genomic technologies to help identify community cases of COVID-19, to understand how they had arisen, and to determine the appropriate action to maintain elimination. Once New Zealand pivoted from elimination to suppression in late 2021, our genomic response changed to focusing on identifying new variants arriving at the border, tracking their incidence around the country, and examining any links between specific variants and increased disease severity. Wastewater detection, quantitation and variant detection were also phased into the response. Here, we explore New Zealand's genomic journey through the pandemic and provide a high-level overview of the lessons learned and potential future capabilities to better prepare for future pandemics., Conclusions: Our commentary is aimed at health professionals and decision-makers who might not be familiar with genetic technologies, how they can be used, and why this is an area with great potential to assist in disease detection and tracking now and in the future., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

In the second quarter of 2022, there was a global surge of emergent SARS-CoV-2 lineages that had a distinct growth advantage over then-dominant Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 lineages. By generating 10,403 Omicron genomes, we show that Aotearoa New Zealand observed an influx of these immune-evasive variants (BA.2.12.1, BA.4, and BA.5) through the border. This is explained by the return to significant levels of international travel following the border's reopening in March 2022. We estimate one Omicron transmission event from the border to the community for every ~5,000 passenger arrivals at the current levels of travel and restriction. Although most of these introductions did not instigate any detected onward transmission, a small minority triggered large outbreaks. Genomic surveillance at the border provides a lens on the rate at which new variants might gain a foothold and trigger new waves of infection., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

New Zealand's COVID-19 elimination strategy heavily relied on the use of genomics to inform contact tracing, linking cases to the border and to clusters during community outbreaks. In August 2021, New Zealand entered its second nationwide lockdown after the detection of a single community case with no immediately apparent epidemiological link to the border. This incursion resulted in the largest outbreak seen in New Zealand caused by the Delta Variant of Concern. Here we generated 3806 high quality SARS-CoV-2 genomes from cases reported in New Zealand between 17 August and 1 December 2021, representing 43% of reported cases. We detected wide geographical spread coupled with undetected community transmission, characterised by the apparent extinction and reappearance of genomically linked clusters. We also identified the emergence, and near replacement, of genomes possessing a 10-nucleotide frameshift deletion that caused the likely truncation of accessory protein ORF7a. By early October, New Zealand moved from an elimination strategy to a suppression strategy and the role of genomics changed markedly from being used to track and trace, towards population-level surveillance., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

In New Zealand, international arrivals are quarantined and undergo severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 screening; those who test positive are transferred to a managed isolation facility (MIF). Solo traveler A and person E from a 5-person travel group (BCDEF) tested positive. After transfer to the MIF, person A and group BCDEF occupied rooms >2 meters apart across a corridor. Persons B, C, and D subsequently tested positive; viral sequences matched A and were distinct from E. The MIF was the only shared location of persons A and B, C, and D, and they had no direct contact. Security camera footage revealed 4 brief episodes of simultaneous door opening during person A's infectious period. This public health investigation demonstrates transmission from A to B, C, and D while in the MIF, with airborne transmission the most plausible explanation. These findings are of global importance for coronavirus disease public health interventions and infection control practices.