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Economic theory posits that competition drives efficiency; the extent to which this is true in an oligopolistic audit market poses an empirical challenge. Furthermore, studies have postulated that both traditional and modern industrial organization theories are relevant for analyzing market competition. Therefore, this study investigated the effects of static and dynamic audit market competition on audit efficiency in the Nigerian banking industry. Secondary data were obtained from the audited annual financial statements of 12 banks from 2006 to 2020. The study adopted a 2-stage regression model; in the first stage, the audit efficiency scores were derived from an output-based, variable-return-to-scale version of data envelopment analysis (DEA) comprising audit report lag and audit fees as audit input variables and audit quality as the audit output variable. The efficiency scores were regressed on audit market competition and some control variables in the second stage via the bootstrapped truncated regression technique to analyze the effect of competition on efficiency in the audit market. The results showed a positive association between static competition and audit efficiency (50.57, p = 0.014). Because high concentration implied low competition, this finding implied that efficiency was impaired because of a lack of significant competition. The results also showed a positive and significant association between dynamic competition and efficiency, which implied that dynamic competition enhanced efficiency (0.21, p = 0.000) in the audit market. The study concluded that static competition impairs efficiency, while dynamic competition ensures efficiency in the Nigerian banking industry.

This study aimed to evaluate the value and affordability of insulin glargine 300 U/mL (Gla-300) in a budget impact model from a United States (U.S.) payer perspective by leveraging recent real-world evidence (RWE) studies and incorporating the recent insulin price caps where applicable. An economic model for a hypothetical one million U.S. health-plan population was developed to assess the budgetary impact of therapeutic interchanges in either direction between the two long- and longer-acting basal insulins (BIs) for patients with type 2 diabetes over a three-year model horizon. The utilization of long-acting BIs, longer-acting BIs, biosimilar BIs, and insulin degludec (IDeg-100) were informed by IQVIA data and internal forecasting at Sanofi. The DELIVER-2 and DELIVER-naïve studies provided healthcare resource utilization (HCRU) parameters. In the model base case, 24% of patients switched from long-acting BIs to insulin glargine biosimilars, IDeg-100, and other longer-acting BIs (Gla-300) by projected year 3. The base case total costs were $10,145 per patient per year (PPPY) in year 3 for the cumulative population. When all patients switched to Gla-300, the total costs in year 3 were $8,799, reflecting a net savings of -$660 PPPY compared to the budget increase of $686 PPPY in the base case. However, the longer-acting to long-acting BIs reversal scenario demonstrated a budgetary decrease of $676 PPPY over the model horizon. The reduction in incremental PPPY cost of $93 was observed using net drug costs rather than wholesale acquisition costs (WAC). The market shares for years 1–3 were based on expectations supported by the clinicians' expert opinions and were not obtained from real-world data. The economic value of increased utilization of Gla-300 was driven by the reduction in HCRU, costs and market shares assumptions. Budgetary reductions were achieved by switching patients from long-acting BIs to Gla-300. Type 2 Diabetes (T2D) is a chronic and debilitating condition that can lead to severe macro or microvascular complications. To mitigate these complications, it is crucial to effectively manage blood glucose levels. When other treatments prove ineffective in achieving adequate glucose control, insulin-based therapy becomes necessary. However, insulin-based treatments often come with the risk of hypoglycemic episodes, which can lead to increased utilization of healthcare resources (HCRU) and have a negative impact on costs. This study aimed to assess the budgetary impact of higher market shares of longer-acting basal insulins (specifically insulin glargine Gla-300) compared to long-acting basal insulins, insulin glargine biosimilars, and insulin degludec (IDeg) in the treatment of T2D. The perspective taken was that of a U.S. payer, taking into account the recent insulin price caps where applicable. The economic benefit of increased utilization of Gla-300 was driven by reductions in HCRU, costs, and market share assumptions. This resulted in a budgetary increase of $686 per patient per year (PPPY). In an alternative scenario where all patients transitioned to Gla-300, it led to a net savings of $660 PPPY. These findings provide valuable insights for decision-makers and healthcare professionals when making choices related to formulary placement and treatment utilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The President's 2021 Executive Order urged the Division to reevaluate certain aspects of antitrust analyses, facilitate a whole-of-government approach to reinvigorating competition, and pursue aggressive antitrust enforcement. Consistent with the Order, Division economists engaged on competition issues with several federal agencies while contributing to the Division's many investigations—including several cases that are in ongoing litigation. The Division also continued its vigorous enforcement efforts, including the proposed Cargotec-Konecranes merger and the proposed Aon-Willis Towers Watson merger. These mergers highlight issues that are frequently presented to EAG economists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The currency denomination of trade has been shown in many recent contributions to have far‐reaching effects on different macroeconomic phenomena, such as inflation and the international transmission of nominal shocks. In this work, we apply a novel index of bargaining power, which incorporates the network dimension of trade and brings fresh evidence as to the relevance of network‐related features (and implied bargaining power) in the choice of invoicing currency, which has received relatively little attention in the empirical literature, so far. By using a highly disaggregated, almost transaction level, data set of Italian imports and exports, we contribute to the existing empirical literature by documenting a very significant impact of trade network asymmetries, captured by our adjusted index of market share, on the choice of an invoice currency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Firms compete for clients, creating distributions of market shares ranging from domination by a few giant companies to markets in which there are many small firms. These market structures evolve in time, and may remain stable for many years before a new firm emerges and rapidly obtains a large market share. We seek the simplest realistic model giving rise to such diverse market structures and dynamics. We focus on markets in which every client adopts a single firm, and can, from time to time, switch to a different firm. Examples include markets of cell phone and Internet service providers, and of consumer products with strong brand identification. In the model, the size of a particular firm, labelled i , is equal to its current number of clients, n i. In every step of the simulation, a client is chosen at random, and then selects a firm from among the full set of firms with probability p i = (n i α + β) / K , where K is the normalization factor. Our model thus has two parameters: α represents the degree to which firm size is an advantage (α > 1) or disadvantage (α < 1), relative to strict proportionality to size (α = 1), and β represents the degree to which small firms are viable despite their small size. We postulate that α and β are determined by the regulatory, technology, business culture and social environments. The model exhibits a phase diagram in the parameter space, with different regions of behaviour. At the large α extreme of the phase diagram, a single dominant firm emerges, whose market share depends on the value of β. At the small α extreme, many firms with small market shares coexist, and no dominant firm emerges. In the intermediate region, markets are divided among a relatively small number of firms, each with sizeable market share but with distinct rankings, which can persist for long times before changing. We compare the model results to previously published empirical data from a broad range of Japanese industries, and find good agreement with a central statistical result relating the standard deviation of market share changes to the value of the market share before the change. • Two-parameter model of market structure evolution based on client switching. • Each individual client has a single firm, and can change firms from time to time. • Produces full range of market concentrations, from monopoly to many small firms. • Model results are consistent with empirical data from range of Japanese markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the liberalization process of the Moroccan mobile market since the beginning of the 21 st century. Our database ranges from 2004 to the end of 2020. First, operators' market shares are presented and analysed. Second, we build concentration indexes and other indicators of competitiveness. Finally, we conduct an econometric analysis to determine the extent to which regulatory measures, privatization, market structure and the population dimension determine market shares. Overall, we can argue that, although concentration remains high, the market has become more competitive since the liberalization process began. The statistical analysis and the econometric assessment show that the entrance of the third operator made the market more competitive. Indeed, there is evidence that operator companies competed to capture customers from each other during the period under study. These features suggest that mobile operators did not follow anticompetitive practices in order to restrain competition. • We analyse the liberalization process of the Moroccan mobile market. • Data ranges from 2004 to the end of 2020. • Operators' market shares and their determinants are statistical analyzed. • Although concentration remains high, the market has become more competitive. • It seems that mobile operators did not follow anticompetitive practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]