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Abstract: Subjects’ decisions in multiple-choice tests are an interesting domain for the analysis of decision making under uncertainty. When the test is graded using a rule that penalizes wrong answers, each item can be viewed as a lottery where a rational examinee would choose whether to omit (sure reward) or answer (take the lottery) depending on risk aversion and level of knowledge. We formalize students as heterogeneous decision makers with different risk attitudes and levels of knowledge. Building on IRT, we compute the optimal penalty given students’ optimal behavior and the trade-off between bias and measurement error. Although MCQ examinations are frequently used, there is no consensus as to whether a penalty for wrong answers should be used or not. For example, examinations for medical licensing in some countries include MCQ sections with penalty while in others there is no penalty for wrong answers. We contribute to this discussion with a formal analysis of the effects of penalties; our simulations indicate that the optimal penalty is relatively high for perfectly rational students but also when they are not fully rational: even though penalty discriminates against risk averse students, this effect is small compared with the measurement error that it prevents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]