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Environmental emergencies are associated with great harm, sudden onset and high publicity and cause serious damage to a broad range of ecological environmental, human health and social properties in a short period of time. Environmental decentralization can help local governments strengthen their independence and make better use of the advantages of environmental information to curb the occurrence of environmental emergencies, but regional corruption significantly weakens its effectiveness. Therefore, based on panel data of China's 30 provincial administrative regions between 2005 and 2016, this paper applies the panel threshold model to explore the relationship between environmental emergencies, environmental decentralization, and regional corruption. The results indicate that, first, environmental decentralization, environmental administrative decentralization, environmental monitoring decentralization, and environmental supervision decentralization all have a negative influence on environmental emergencies; second, as the degree of corruption in a region increases, the effect of environmental decentralization on restraining environmental emergencies decreases; and finally, there is heterogeneity in the relationship between environmental emergencies and environmental decentralization in various regions. Environmental decentralization in the eastern and western regions negatively affects environmental emergencies, while there is a positive relationship between the two in the central region. • Environmental decentralization restrains environmental emergencies. • The subindicators of environmental decentralization restrains environmental emergencies. • As the degree of regional corruption increases, the effect of environmental decentralization on restraining environmental emergencies decreases. • There is regional heterogeneity between environmental decentralization and environmental emergencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental emergencies are associated with great harm, sudden onset and high publicity and cause serious damage to a broad range of ecological environmental, human health and social properties in a short period of time. Environmental decentralization can help local governments strengthen their independence and make better use of the advantages of environmental information to curb the occurrence of environmental emergencies, but regional corruption significantly weakens its effectiveness. Therefore, based on panel data of China's 30 provincial administrative regions between 2005 and 2016, this paper applies the panel threshold model to explore the relationship between environmental emergencies, environmental decentralization, and regional corruption. The results indicate that, first, environmental decentralization, environmental administrative decentralization, environmental monitoring decentralization, and environmental supervision decentralization all have a negative influence on environmental emergencies; second, as the degree of corruption in a region increases, the effect of environmental decentralization on restraining environmental emergencies decreases; and finally, there is heterogeneity in the relationship between environmental emergencies and environmental decentralization in various regions. Environmental decentralization in the eastern and western regions negatively affects environmental emergencies, while there is a positive relationship between the two in the central region. • Environmental decentralization restrains environmental emergencies. • The subindicators of environmental decentralization restrains environmental emergencies. • As the degree of regional corruption increases, the effect of environmental decentralization on restraining environmental emergencies decreases. • There is regional heterogeneity between environmental decentralization and environmental emergencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For most developing countries, local government faces a trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection. The intentions towards having a better environment as the economy grows will trigger a shift in the priorities of local government from economy to environment at a certain level of economic development. To investigate the "pollute first, control later" path in China and how environmental regulation performs differently due to economic development, this paper develops a conceptual model to depict the nexus between economic growth and environmental improvement. A panel threshold model is estimated based on Chinese data from different spatial scales – 30 provinces and 105 environmental monitoring cities. The results validate the threshold of economic development of approximately CNY 90,000 GDP per capita, which represents the turning point for the local government priority change; such that only when it is exceeded does environmental regulation significantly reduce emissions. Until 2016, only 4 provincial districts and 35 prefecture-level cities have crossed the threshold, these being mostly in the more prosperous eastern coastal areas. The results emphasize the need to consider timeliness when evaluating the effectiveness of environmental regulation and highlight the importance of adopting differentiated governance. Moreover, the need to enhance the effectiveness of environmental regulation requires driving the change of local government's priority to the environment and strengthening the institutional capacity of environmental protection agencies. • A conceptual model of local government's goals of economic growth and environmental protection. • Panel threshold model to find the economic threshold of effective environmental regulation. • Environmental regulation is effective only if regional GDP per capita exceeds CNY 90,000. • Timeliness and differentiation should be considered for environmental governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]