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This paper analyzes the change of the employment rates in 35 democratic OECD and EU-countries, 1996-2006. Why were some countries more successful in increasing employment than other nations? This is the guiding question of this paper. I argue that there are various pathways to more or less employment growth. Countries that have reached a high level of employment already in the past face a ceiling problem, which makes further growth very difficult albeit not impossible. They may continue or pursue a variety of mixes of labor market policies without seriously endangering their previous level of employment. In contrast all countries that started from a low level of employment recorded strong increases if they had a low tax wedge. However, low pay roll taxes are not the only way to strong employment growth in countries with low employment level. The disadvantages of high pay roll taxes can be compensated by other employment-friendly policies. Consequently the politics of successful labor market varies. In countries with high employment level, the previous politics that were compatible with reaching a high level of employment are compatible with consolidating this level. In countries with low employment level, strong pro-market political parties, weak trade unions and collective bargaining is favorable to liberal employment-enhancing policy regimes. There are other pathways from low to high employment levels, but they are less frequently chosen. In general terms, I make two arguments: (1) Variations of employment performance may be explained better by looking at policy mixes and policy interactions rather than single policies. A policy that is employment-inhibiting in one context may be a structural precondition for employment-enhancing policies in other contexts. (2) The feasible options of policy makers depend on the level of employment and this is closely correlated with stage of the development towards a post-industrial labor market. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reforms weakening the power of local units, such as municipal amalgamations, have been high on the agenda in many European countries for some time. The political rationale for this trend is often cast in terms of administrative efficiency. As Chandler (2008) points out, if the justification of local government is purely expediential, it is quite legitimate for the central government to control and arrange the local level in a way which makes it most efficient in fulfilling its expediential aims. In contrast, ethical justifications of local government value this institution because it fulfils some morally desirable purpose in itself, regardless of its value to the central government. If there are any valid ethical justifications for local government they would put restrictions upon the justifiability of the central government to interfere in the activities of local government. In this paper we construct a normative theory of local government by developing an ethical justification of the local level. The basic idea is that the same foundational value - individual moral autonomy - constitutes the normative cornerstone of both democracy and the right to local autonomy. The implication of this argument is that if we value democracy, we must also value strong local government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing from research in Economics, Sociology and Political Science that has shown that diversity makes cooperation more difficult, this paper argues that one way a heterogeneous group can achieve cooperation is through formal oversight mechanisms. In European Union member states, one policy area where cooperation is essential is in the oversight of European affairs. Many policy decisions previously made by democratically elected national legislatures in Europe are now decided through the EU's policymaking process. National legislatures responded to this change by establishing oversight committees in European Affairs. While all national legislatures of EU member states have European Affairs Committees, there is considerable variation in the institutional designs of these committees. Using exact logistic regression to test several competing explanations on cross-national data from 25 European democracies, this article finds that the more political parties there are in a legislature, the more likely that legislature will establish a European Affairs Committee with the power to issue binding recommendations to guide cabinet ministers' negotiations at the Council of the European Union. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the role of domestic, country-specific conditions in the target countries for the conception and implementation of democracy promotion strategies by the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US). First, an analytical framework is outlined to allow the identification of 'differentiated strategies'. We build upon the assumption that the 'grey zone' of semi-authoritarian regimes presents the greatest challenge to external democracy promotion. Empirically, we look for conceptual differentiation at the global level and analyze differentiation in implementation in four country case-studies (Morocco, Tunisia, Belarus, and Ukraine). In general, we find a surprising similarity between the two actors' democracy promotion efforts. Even though the EU highlights a cooperative approach whereas the US openly pursue a two-track approach, democracy promotion efforts of the two actors are similarly adapted to a country's context and its development in our four case-studies. Our findings suggest that both actors only choose a truly conflictive approach in reaction to a dramatic worsening of the political situation. In contrast, undemocratic but stable semi-authoritarian regimes are not the focal point of democracy promotion efforts: the scope for cooperative action is significantly limited and not backed up by a conflictive approach. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]