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Abstract: One of the perennially intriguing questions regarding Kant’s approach to the human sciences is the relation between his ‘transcendental psychology’ and empirical cognitive psychology. In this paper I compare his analysis of the a priori conditions of human cognition in the Critique of pure reason with his empirical account of the human cognitive faculties in his Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. In comparing his approach to self-consciousness, sensibility, imagination, and understanding in these two works, I argue that Kant distinguishes between the transcendental and empirical aspects of the human cognitive faculties, and regards the transcendental functions as configuring the empirical faculties of human consciousness, or as giving them the structure that they require to become faculties of cognition. I then show that the cognitive faculties of human beings may vary in their empirical operation, even while they are configured by the same transcendental structure. Finally, I characterize Kant’s transcendental psychology in the first Critique as an account of the faculties that are required for a mind to be an agent or subject of cognition, corresponding to his account of the conditions that are required universally and necessarily for something to be an object of cognition. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The difficulty that observers experience when trying to identify a raised line drawing by touch is still largely unexplained. In this article, we show that observers who are unable to haptically identify a raised line drawing are suddenly able to do so after they have sketched on paper what they have in their mind. We conducted three experiments: first of all we show that this effect is robust; in the second experiment, we show that identification-after-sketching is caused by visual inspection of the sketch, and not caused by feedback in general; and in the third we show that sketches which were identified by the observers who produced them, were also identified by completely naive viewers. These experiments demonstrate that during raised line drawing identification the mental capacities required to interpret the stimulus seem to be inadequate: although enough pictorial information was present to produce a sketch which could even be identified by naive viewers, the stimulus could not be identified by haptic and mental processing alone. Furthermore, we investigated whether increasing the haptic perceptual field by using two hands instead of one hand had an influence on identification performance. We did indeed find that using two hands significantly increased identification. We use both results to discuss the underlying mechanisms of haptic raised line drawing identification. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In this paper, we aim to show that the framework of embedded, distributed, or extended cognition offers new perspectives on social cognition by applying it to one specific domain: the psychology of memory. In making our case, first we specify some key social dimensions of cognitive distribution and some basic distinctions between memory cases, and then describe stronger and weaker versions of distributed remembering in the general distributed cognition framework. Next, we examine studies of social influences on memory in cognitive psychology, and identify the valuable concepts and methods to be extended and embedded in our framework; we focus in particular on three related paradigms: transactive memory, collaborative recall, and social contagion. Finally, we sketch our own early studies of individual and group memory developed within our framework of distributed cognition, on social contagion of autobiographical memories, collaborative flashbulb memories, and memories of high school at a high school reunion. We see two reciprocal benefits of this conceptual and empirical framework to social memory phenomena: that ideas about distributed cognition can be honed against and tested with the help of sophisticated methods in the social-cognitive psychology of memory; and conversely, that a range of social memory phenomena that are as yet poorly understood can be approached afresh with theoretically motivated extensions of existing empirical paradigms. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This special issue highlights the unique role that social and behavioral science has to play at the forefront of genomics. Through the introduction of papers comprising this special issue, we outline priority research areas at the nexus of genomics and the social and behavioral sciences. These include: Discovery science; clinical and community translation, and equity, including engagement and inclusion of diverse populations in genomic science. We advocate for genomic discovery that considers social context, neural, cognitive, and behavioral endophenotypes, and that is grounded in social and behavioral science research and theory. Further, the social and behavioral sciences should play a leadership role in identifying best practices for effective clinical and community translation of genomic discoveries. Finally, inclusive research that engages diverse populations is necessary for genomic discovery and translation to benefit all. We also highlight ways that genomics can be a fruitful testbed for the development and refinement of social and behavioral science theory. Indeed, an expanded ecological lens that runs from genomes to society will be required to fully understand human behavior. Image 1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]