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The expression “spiritual, but not religious” (SBNR) has gained considerable traction among sociologists of religion and culture, media outlets, and the broader public in recent years. Though the expression itself has achieved wide appeal, few studies have explored what SBNRs believe about God, religion, or spirituality. This paper uses survey data from Wave IV of the Baylor Religion Survey (2014) and draws from the theory of “cultural omnivorousness” to show that SBNRs have significant sociotheological differences when compared to those who are both religious and spiritual (RAS). The expression “spiritual, but not religious” is more than a manifestation of religious deinstitutionalization or “believing without belonging.” Rather, being “spiritual, but not religious” involves sociotheological boundary work that distinguishes SBNRs from traditional monotheists. When compared to RAS respondents, SBNRs are more likely to view God as a higher power or cosmic force instead of a personal being and are more likely to adopt an individualistic ethic as opposed to finding moral authority in God or Scripture. By examining the historical context and sociotheological characteristics of SBNRs, this paper locates a boundary between SBNRs and RAS monotheists and offers theoretical reasons why SBNRs engage in sociotheological boundary work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: As a sociologist dealing with futures studies, Wendell Bell encountered considerable obstacles because his topic – the future, imagined, projected and shaped – poses significant problems for contemporary sociology. The paper discusses Bell''s engagement with these disciplinary difficulties and his search for conceptual and methodological solutions. The paper anchors Bell''s achievements in a wider historical context, identifies some of the new challenges facing sociology and considers some openings for change in our knowledge practice. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Income inequality is one of the central concerns of sociologists and stratification researchers. While most of the analyses in sociology cover the economic and demographic influences on income inequality, less research has sought to understand the impact of public policies. A major factor absent from the research in both economics and sociology is the role of state-level minimum wages. Neoclassical economic theorists hypothesize that a minimum wage will increase income inequality, while institutional economists argue that a minimum wage reduces economic inequality. This paper uses decennial state data covering 1960-2000 to test the hypothesis that states with higher minimum wages have lower levels of family income inequality. The results confirm the institutional hypothesis that state minimum wages reduce family income inequality. Estimates presented in the paper indicate that the effect of the state minimum wage is non-linear and it should be greater than $4.00 (2001 CPI) to be redistributive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years growing sociological interest in new forms of cultural distinction has led some to argue that the advantages previously conveyed by the consumption of ‘high’ culture ‘or ‘omnivorousness’ are being overwritten by the possession of what has been termed ‘emerging cultural capital’. So far, though, this term has only been discussed in passing within empirical work and remains in need of further analytical specification. This special issue seeks to both critically interrogate and develop this concept by bringing together the work of leading cultural sociologists around four key themes: the role of age and generation in the formation of cultural capital; the power of visual display for distinction; the significance of new elite cultures; and the need for methodological pluralism to apprehend the expressions and mechanisms of distinction. This editorial introduction outlines the descriptive terrain on which the concept of emerging cultural capital has rested until now before exploring the common themes that sit across all five papers in the special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Genotype–environment interaction (G×E) refers to situations in which genetic effects connected to a phenotype are dependent upon variability in the environment, or when genes modify an organism''s sensitivity to particular environmental features. Using a typology suggested in the G×E literature, we provide an overview of recent papers that show how social context can trigger a genetic vulnerability, compensate for a genetic vulnerability, control behaviors for which a genetic vulnerability exists, and improve adaptation via proximal causes. We argue that to improve their understanding of social structure, sociologists can take advantage of research in behavior genetics by assessing the impact of within-group variance of various health outcomes and complex human behaviors that are explainable by genotype, environment and their interaction. Insights from life course sociology can aid in ensuring that the dynamic nature of the environment in G×E has been accounted for. Identification of an appropriate entry point for sociologists interested in G×E research could begin with the choice of an environmental feature of interest, a genetic factor of interest, and/or behavior of interest. Optimizing measurement in order to capture the complexity of G×E is critical. Examining the interaction between poorly measured environmental factors and well measured genetic variables will overestimate the effects of genetic variables while underestimating the effect of environmental influences, thereby distorting the interaction between genotype and environment. Although the expense of collecting environmental data is very high, reliable and precise measurement of an environmental pathogen enhances a study''s statistical power. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article presents response by the authors to the critical comments made by sociologists R.S. Burt and William M. Bittner on the works of the authors. First, Burt and Bittner questioned the scope of the authors' article. They argue that one cannot extend the scope of the conclusions from one network analysis to other systems. In authors' view, this misses the point entirely. In the series of papers written on informant accuracy the authors have never drawn conclusions about the structure of any group studied, let alone extended any conclusions about social structure to other groups or to the world at large. What authors have been studying is not groups, but the methods by which most researchers have gathered data about groups. It is about these methods that authors have drawn a global generalization from their seven data sets: the method by which data are traditionally obtained (some variant of "who do you interact with") does not yield any reliable information whatsoever about who people in the group actually interact with.