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The purpose of this paper is to assess the solutions given to the participatory/efficacy dilemma by several NGOs specialized on trade and disarmament, and the two big IGOs that regulate both realmsâ€"the WTO and its Dispute Settlement Mechanism; the IAEA and its inspections. In recent years, prominent agents of change emerged everywhere with a major agendaâ€"introducing more participation within the intergovernmental decision making system; privileging some policy measures and contributing to their enforcement. NGOs demanded more consideration for their analyses and recommendations; IGOs were desperately lacking legitimacy as well as domestic support for their international decisions; both types of actors needed mutual recognition to fill the gap between their mandate and their impact. The optimal solution to this dilemma was a trade off between a growing inclusion of NGOs in multilateral processes; and an implicit switch from expressive to instrumental behaviour. However, on NGOs’ side the price to pay for gaining more access was a loss in the moral imperative of democracy and requirements to become more scientific; whereas to convert critics into positive attitudes, IGOs had to open up their black boxes, limit their closed sessions, and pay the transaction costs involved in such a dramatic enlargement of consulted entities. In such a switch from a competitive to a cooperative game, actors that were once vying for power became full partners more or less equals; and the traditional participation versus representation issue was superseded by a new deliberative understanding of international democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]