Search

This paper will examine the implications of the April 2005 Sino-Indian statement of strtegic partnership on the tripartite relations among Russia, China, and India. Less than a decade after Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov called for a strategic triangle among Russia, China, and India, the three countries have signed bilateral strategic partnerships with one another and regualarly meet in trilateral groups. The paper hypothesizes that the ties that bind these countries are tactical rather than strategic and therefore the long-term health of these partnerships will depend on whether changing identities and self-conceptions of leaders in each of these countries lead to a focus on absolute gains through cooperation versus an emphasis on relative gains leading to competition for influence and status in the Asian/Eurasian region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two regional protracted conflict rivals of Asia, India and China, have found ways to become strategic partners in the twenty-first century. This research probes what explains this change and whether or not the engagement strategies employed by them can produce similar results if used in the India-Pakistan bilateral relations? I argue that although at the strategic level nuclear weapons detonation by India in 1998 was instrumental in developing a strategic balance between the rivals and within a few years a stable security environment emanated in the conflict offing, creating a setting stage for the exploration of possibilities of partnership in the economic, trade, and political realms, one of the major contributing factors in the partnership has been the soft power that both China and India possess. While the two Asian giants share common attributes such as strong military, population, economy, and information technology, among others, soft power in the form of culture, education, and values/ideas pertaining to open economies has forced them to look beyond the dynamics of the intractable conflict and find a common ground to work together. Both are mature states in all of these domains due to which the domestic political/institutional differences did not create an impediment to substantive strategic cooperation. There is political resolve in both countries in maintaining long-term friendship, enhancing cooperation, and achieving common developments. This is the exact opposite of the India-Pakistan case. While India is strong in soft power capabilities, Pakistan lacks strength in this domain and remains even less interested in developing the attribute. Consequently, even though both India and Pakistan realize that cooperation on different levels is possible, attainable, and beneficial to both parties and have progressed in attaining some of their stated goals of cooperation as part of the composite dialogue, in the presence of asymmetry in soft power resources, they are unable to comprehensively tap the unexplored opportunities to becoming strategic partners in this century. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]