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This paper addresses the multiple disconnects separating neorealist international relations theory and the practice of foreign policy. Below, several of these that have already received great attention by scholars in the field are very briefly summarized. For example, neorealists carefully separate IR theory from foreign policy analysis. One cannot say much about the behavior of a single state, they repeatedly warn, based on a systemic IR theory. Foreign policy, neorealists acknowledge, is likely to reflect elements of domestic politics as well as international constraints. Then, much greater scrutiny is directed at an important disconnect that has not received close examination ? the divergence between the neorealist theory of international politics and the real world practice of American neorealists who often assume prominent roles in academic and policy debates about US foreign relations. Based on neorealist participation in these academic and policy debates, as well as the scholars? own explanation of their role in these controversies, the paper concludes that these neorealists arguably embrace reflective, communicative, and emancipatory notions of foreign policy decision-making. These are, of course, foundational theoretical concerns of constructivist and critical international relations theorists and are often disparaged by neorealists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the relationship between power and knowledge in the context of the construction of security in Australia. Specifically, it seeks to apply critical theoretical approaches to security to the Australian government’s security discourse regarding asylum-seekers in 2001 and terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2002. It is argued in this paper that perceptions of the provision of security are central to the political legitimacy of states. In particular, specific actions on the part of governments may be enabled by perceptions among their citizens that these actions maintain or further their security. If we accept this point, then the crucial question becomes: how do certain meanings of security come to resonate with particular populations in particular contexts? It is argued here that we can further our understanding of this process through acknowledging relationships between power and knowledge, and specifically the role of governments in creating contexts in which particular meanings of security become resonant. Through applying such an approach to the Australian government’s depiction of asylum-seekers and its response to terrorist attacks in New York and particularly Bali, we can move towards a greater understanding of the ways in which security is constructed and of the relationship between security and political legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growth of humanitarian law over the past 50 years has failed spectacularly to protect civilians caught in war. Old laws have failed to constrain new wars. An elaborate legal regime applies to international conflicts, treating belligerent states as sovereign equals who reciprocally honor the rules of war. By contrast, the regime governing internal conflicts is incomplete and uncertain. Molded by states, the law discounts the status of non-state actors, spurring governments to label them as rebels, insurgents, bandits, and terrorists, and to restrict protections accorded them. These same designations are often extended to civilian populations, thus eroding the category of civilian and the principle of non-combatant immunity. Despite mounting atrocities, many states resist strengthening the domestic regime, leaving NGOs to emphasize customary law and traditional principles of humanity. The theoretical argument rests on a critical analysis of Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which deal with conflicts not of an international character, as well as recent jurisprudence at the ICTY. The paper tests this skeptical view of humanitarian law against events in Chechnya, Colombia and Sudan. The paper lends credence to the new stream of international law research, which explores the political and ideological underpinnings of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the heart of Critical Security Studies (CSS) is a commitment to promoting emancipation. The argument of the paper is that, for that commitment to emancipation to be effective, CSS scholars must develop a deeper understanding of the ways in which academic professional training can undermine that commitment and must develop strategies so that they can succeed in academia while protecting that commitment. The paper sets its discussion of IR academic training in the context of the broader literature on the politics of professional training, in particular Jeff Schmidt’s ‘Disciplined Minds’: the primary function of academic professional training is not the inculcation of neutral skills but ideological discipline. The paper duscusses the extent of the success of CSS, peace studies and internet networks such as ZNet and NASPIR in preserving a commitment to emancipatory politics within IR academia. It concludes by arguing that there is a potential for a second wave of CSS characterised by a more effective approach to academic disciplinary politics; coalition building with other critical scholars who do not categorise themselves in terms of CSS; and greater engagement with those already engaged in emancipatory political practice [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticises the way that IR has understood the concept of hegemony. Obviously IR realists of the HST school reduce hegemony to leadership and the operation of power. However, those, like Cox, who seek to bring in a more social conception of hegemony from the work of Gramsci still limit the role of hegemony and conceive of it in a historicist manner. This paper argues for a critical realist conception of hegemony as rooted in the reproduction and cohesion of underlying social structures and generative mechanisms. The functional need to secure the unity of the social formation then finds its expression through the various hegemonic projects which are emergent from this. The paper argues for two distinct but connected notions of hegemony as structural unity of the social formation and the emergent realisation of this through concrete hegemonic projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates in security studies in the U.S. and Europe have drifted almost completely apart. In Europe it is common to present the theoretical landscape in terms of, say, critical security studies, the Copenhagen School, traditionalism and feminism. In the U.S. it is more common to see the major debate within security studies as being the one between offensive realism and defensive realism! Previously, almost all theoretical inventions in IR were made in the U.S. Currently, distinct theories are widely associated with places like Aberystwyth (Critical Security Studies), Paris (Bigo’s Bourdieu-inspired work) and Copenhagen (securitization). The new European approaches differ not only from security studies in the US, they also stand apart from most work done in other parts of the world. Are these theories peculiarly ‘European’ and if so, why? The paper aims at explaining the emergence of these European security theories. The explanation draws partly on the political context in the different regions, and partly on features of the intellectual fields, International Relations and Security Studies. The theories are also assessed briefly as to their relevance and usefulness. To what extent are they bound to local, European problems or relevant to the issues that are addressed elsewhere and vice-versa for the theories that flourish in the U.S. and the periphery respectively? Can they travel to the other parts of the world in a helpful role? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of what particular issues a theory for ?information age security? could address to further our understanding of some of the impacts of the so-called information revolution on security. It is argued that theorizing in a field, which is so vast and has so indistinct conceptual boundaries, is difficult at best and that theorizing about securing, as an act of making the information age more secure, is more fruitful. From the writings on impacts of the information revolution on international security, three main consequences of relevance for securing efforts are identified: 1) a quali-tative change of the threat spectrum, 2) a relative loss of power of state actors, and 3) complexity and change as essential features of the information age. While conventional IR theory has something to offer on point one and two, it falls short when it comes to accounting for complexity and change. In fact, if we want to take complexity and change seriously, a veritable theoretical challenge becomes obvious: The reason why the social world has been difficult territory for scientific investigation is precisely be-cause it is complex, whereas the methods and forms of understanding generally employed in IR are dependent on things being sorted out in simple terms. However, in a complex system, interaction can be so intense and transformative that it becomes difficult to distinguish between causes and consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the ways in which Turkey’s security discourses have been shaped by and have, in turn, shaped the transformation Turkey has gone through in recent years. Whereas the ‘Eurosceptics’ have underlined the need for a broad security agenda by making references to ‘globalised security’, while seeking to reshape practices in defence of ‘national security’, the ‘pro-EU’ actors have opened up Turkey’s definition of ‘national security’ for debate thereby sawing the seeds of an alternative security discourse. This is a significant departure from the earlier discourse of pro-EU actors who had refrained from using ‘security speak’ and sought to make the case for European Union membership on purely economic (welfare) and political (democracy) grounds. The point being that during the 1990s pro-EU actors in Turkey found the best way to bring about political change in Turkey as that of securitising economic issues and pointing to the economic costs of the existing conception of ‘national security’. The paper falls into three parts. Part 1 looks at the ‘traditional’ discourse on security (the discourse of politicians and civilian-military bureaucrats) that has prevailed during the republican era. Part 2 seeks to identify the 1990s changes in Turkey’s security discourses by focusing on the debates on the European Union membership. Part 3 suggests that a two-step strategy (first securitisation, then desecuritisation) might be the way out of the security dilemmas faced by developing countries like Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]