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This paper examines how secondary states experience unipolarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there have been efforts to conceptualise institutional change in international relations theory - above all with regard to regime formation and demise - (e.g. Aggarwal 1983, Finnemore/Sikkink 1998, Gehring 1990, E. Haas 1975, P. Haas 1993, Keohane 1982/1984, Young 1982/1991, Young/Osherenko 1993), these efforts lack in richness and systematics. There are at least two reasons for this: first, the very concept of 'regime' or 'institution' implies a certain stability and stasis, so that the analysis of change and dynamics tends to be neglected, especially in view of a widespread preoccupation with 'equilibria'. Second, 'institution' at international level is still often equated with 'cooperation', and development of the regulative and normative content of the institutions is considered of secondary importance.The paper will therefore integrate insights from the comparative politics, economic and sociological literature dealing with domestic institutional change into international relations theory. Three distinct approaches to institutional change will be elaborated (Powell/DiMaggio 1990, Hall/Taylor 1996, Thelen 2002): a) a functionalist / utilitarian approach which traces institutional change to changes in the demand for problem solutions (neoliberal institutionalism, rationalist regime theory); b) a power-distributional approach that attributes institutional change to shifts in the balance of power or to changes in preferences of the most powerful actors (neo realism); and c) a cultural-sociological approach which highlights the role of transformations in wider cultural scripts defining legitimacy and appropriateness for institutional change (cognitive regime theory, constructivism). Beyond these three distinct approaches, there is a body of literature that bridges these approaches and sees institutions change as result of functional, power-distributional, and cultural processes, and which particularly deals with path dependence.The paper adopts this latter view and conceptualises the analysis of regime change in three steps. First, students of institutional/ regime change need to inquire about the results of change (What aspects of the institution changed?) and hence need to identify phases of institutional change with regard to a ?baseline' and dimensions of change (scope/ depth). Second, the process of institutional change (How did the institution change?) needs to be looked at, identifying the paths, critical junctures, and sequencing of institutional change. While the first two steps are largely descriptive-analytic ones, the third one tackles the causation of institutional change (Why did the institution change?). A framework of independent (and highly interdependent) variables is developed that includes as drivers of institutional change: functional advantages; legitimacy patterns; (exogenous) knowledge and ideas; (endogenous) institutional learning; institutional 'nesting' und interaction; co-evolution with the non-institutional environment. Power is seen as an intervening variable that impacts on many of the other variables; external shocks are assumed to be occasions rather than genuine causes of change. This conceptual framework of institutional/ regime change is illustrated by examples from the realm of international biodiversity politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Literature on governance recently has come under critique in both sociology and international relations, with governmentality proposed as an alternative. The argument is that governmentality reflects more aptly the power and "rationalities" involved in governing processes. This article argues that while the governmentality approach does access better the content and "mentalities" of governing processes, including global-level processes, it needs to acknowledge and theorize the gradations of eligibility for objectifying (achieving and enacting) government. Some types of "civil society" members and nonstate actors are better positioned to achieve the status of simultaneous object and subject of government-others, largely, remain subjects, depending on their positions within professional hierarchies and locations within inter-state power dynamics. Some nonstate actors are positioned better to define governmentality's content, and even manage the terms under which they themselves, as well as others, are produced as citizen-subjects. In our examinations of the mechanisms of power in governing processes, we need to consider nonstate actors' positions in global social contexts. The paper examines the global governance of mental health as a heuristic case-study, with special attention to processes of diagnosing eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, in which the standard diagnostic code is spreading globally even though its recommended treatments are not working. The case illustrates that within governmentality processes, some actors remain decidedly more subjects than objects. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]