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The pending rise of China has been one of the most debated issues in international relations during the last decade. This situation creates problems for surrounding East Asian states, the majority of which are currently allied with the United States. What happens if China becomes a regional or even world leader? Will East Asian states be forced to choose between two competing powers? This paper seeks answers to these questions by examining prominent realist theories in relation to small state behavior in the international system, and applying each to the context of China and its surrounding states in Northeast Asia. First, I begin with an overview of the literature dealing with the rising power of China. Second, I seek to correctly understand the fundamental basis of the small state debate by examining in detail Waltz?s balance of power theory. An analysis reveals a fundamental flaw in interpretation: Waltz?s balancing hypothesis pertains to situations of multipolarity, rather than the current situation of unipolarity in the international arena. Waltz?s theory, when applied, predicts states will automatically align with the rising power against the dominant power. Given this finding I offer some facts on small state behavior in East Asia that show this may not be the case. Next, I turn to Walt(1987)?s balance of threat theory and discover Walt, while often understood as prescribing balancing behavior for the international arena, is actually unable to provide predictions for either bandwagoning or balancing in East Asia. I analyze the limitations of Walt?s theory and conclude the ambiguity of his conditions of state behavior, problems in operationalization of state actions and the lack of recognition of the role played by credibility in threat perception, undermine the ability of his theory to fully explain small state action in the context of our situation. Finally, power transition theory is revealed to provide inadequate, albeit roughly accurate, explanations of events in East Asia because of its overwhelming focus upon major powers. This paper deals briefly with its limitations and offers suggestions for further research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revisionist-status-quo dichotomy has been a dominant framework in analyzing the relations between a rising power and established great powers in general, and Sino-US relationship in particular. This paper intends to denaturalize this identity discourse and deconstruct its meaning in the first place. Although it is an effective heuristic cue for the established powers to manage a new entrant, it is not a value-free baseline for understanding the interactions between a rising power and the putative international society; it is even a biased standard for gauging the relations between China and the United States. In a great sense, this identity discourse is the source of misperception between these two great powers. The second part of this paper explains the rationale of China?s foreign policy by analyzing the "peaceful rise" discourse in Chinese academic and policy circles. This is a nationwide intellectual practice of conceptualizing China?s national interest and its future role in international society. This discussion reveals China?s rationale in dealing with two distinct sets of foreign relations: the relations between China and international society, as well as the strategic interactions between China and the United States. Almost all Chinese scholars? opinions confirm China?s desire to be a ?responsible major power?, and even a few hardliners express no more than ?defensive realist? concerns. Based on the above analysis, the third part of the paper further denaturalizes the socialized security dilemma between the US and China by analyzing their strategic interactions in East Asian area. Although the US, as the only superpower with the aim of maximizing influence in global and regional affairs, will naturally feel a threat from a newly rising power, the nature of the game between the two powers, in most situation, is cooperation and competition for providing public good to international society. Nowadays the transformative nature of international society as an intervening variable limits the chance that a state uses military force to solve disputes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares and contrasts the soft power resources of China and the U.S., and discuss on the wielding of soft power in their bilateral relations. There are so many uncertainties between these two gigantic powers in the Pacific Asia. Will China adopt a revisionist approach and use its increasingly stronger national power to challenge the status quo power, or continue to stay patient and low-profile in a long term? Will the U.S. step up its efforts to assemble an effective international alliance to contain China’s rise, or allow Beijing to emerge as an active and decisive leader in a region and actively engage China into the role of responsible great power? Traditional study of US-China relations focuses on both countries’ hard powerâ€"the ability to use economic inducement and sanction and/or military threats and invasion to get its way. A discussion of soft powerâ€"attraction and agenda-settingâ€"in the U.S.-China relations may provide us some new cues to the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. policy of encouraging China to become a “responsible stakeholder” is the newest manifestation of a policy that seeks to persuade China not only to participate in international affairs, but to share the burden of maintaining the existing internati ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can the United States promote effective multilateral cooperation in a unipolar world? More specifically, how can the United States enlist the active cooperation of rising major powers such as China and Russia? The paper’s goal is to introduce an approach to promoting multilateral cooperative international order that does not rely on shared institutional affiliation, commitment to liberal democratic norms, or the logic of economic interdependence. Our approach emphasizes states’ quest for a positive international identity and, more specifically, the influence of status and prestige concerns on their foreign policies. We argue that, properly channeled and adequately recognized, rising states’ concerns for international prestige and status can motivate them to contribute to the dominant power’s global governance project and world order. Our argument is illustrated by parallel case studies of the extent to which Russia and China have cooperated in multilateral efforts. The results indicate that both countries are more likely to cooperate if treated with respect and accorded a distinctive role that recognizes their incipient great power status. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]