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This paper examines similarities and differences in the counterterror strategies and tactics that two democratic regimes use to cope with the internal dimension of terrorist threats by either domestic or transnational terrorist organizations. I argue that in both polities one can see the emergence of counterterrorist garrison states. Each of these democratic polities has very different domestic legal structures that regulate and oversee the internal activities of the intelligence, law enforcement, and security agencies. Despite the very different historical, political, and cultural contexts, and different mix of threats, the internal security apparatus mobilization in each of these polities also has a number of distinct similarities. Each of these states has based their counterterrorism policies on the development of specialized counterterrorist military, law enforcement, and intelligence units; the reliance on research and development of surveillance, biometrics, and data base management technology; and rapid organizational reconfiguration both to deal with newly emergent threats and highly adaptive terrorist organizations, networks, and cells and in response to both perceived and real intelligence failures. ..ASA- In this paper I use case studies to develop a typology of counterterrorist responses used by democratic regimes and the ranges of factors that influence the selection of policy responses. Dependent on the nature of the terrorist threat the states are either more or less constrained in movement along a continuum of increasingly coercive and intrusive responses to terrorist threats; autonomy granted to the agencies of the security apparatus; and varying degrees of centralization or decentralization of the security apparatus. In addition to an examination of the interface between executive, legislative, and judicial branches and the law enforcement, military and intelligence apparatus I also examine the role of public opinion, human rights and civil liberties NGOs, and minority communities in the formulation of counterterrorist policies in each of these states. I principally restrict my case studies to the 1998 to the present, and compare counterterrorist tactics used to deal with the presence and activities of both domestic and transnational terrorist networks. For instance in the United States I examine counterterrorist mobilization vis-à-vis both the Al Qaeda network and the ultra-right Neo-Nazi, militia, and Christian Identity movements, and for Russia I examine their response to the Chechen conflict and related acts of terrorism throughout Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Obama Administration's national security strategy after the Iraq War is turning toward Northeast Asia, where are rising variable challenges to screw up regional security environment in danger. Even though Japan has conducted its main taskforce as the U.S. military headquarter in Asia since World War II, it recently required equal balance to upgrade its position in the military relations with the U.S. Japan's challenge has motivated the U.S. seriously rethinks its fundamental military strategy in Northeast Asia. In addition, the sinking of a South Korean warship by North Korea would revive China and Russia's military strategy to support North Korea in a very suspicious gesture whether North Korea actually attacked. It might be another symptom that China and Russia exploit this case to consider military expansion and take military actions to challenge the U.S. They criticize military drills and reinforcement between South Korea and the U.S. which will increase regional tension. North Korea even declares "Sacred War" in a reckless response signing additional provocations and China shows military strength with naval exercises off its eastern coast ahead of the U.S. drills with South Korea. Therefore, this paper investigates national security strategy of the U.S. how the Obama Administration should set up new military security line in Northeast Asia and rebuild the relationship with major powers based on regional security. It analyzes each step with detailed methodologies and offers effective strategy that the Obama Administration can take it in policy making process in advance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I submitted this as a paper proposal for the 2008 San Francisco ISA conference. I also was required to submit the paper to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for its. CIA did not approve because I was employed at the time by CIA. While CIA did not co ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligence and Diplomacy have different ethical roots but have coexisted uneasily since 1815 when the Treaty of Vienna stated that spying was not to be done as part of diplomacy. The rise of covert action as part of intelligence raised new ethical issues, which this paper discusses. It conclused that there can be an ethical basis for covert action, and this is especially necessary in democratic societies, Concluding, the paper draw upon ethicists present and past to suggest how this sould be done. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, interest has exploded in developing more effective counterterrorist measures. Most of the thinking on this issue has focused exclusively on government responses to this threat. By contrast, this paper explores the potential of using non-state groups to combat terrorism. Specifically, it discusses the limitations that the anarchic international system imposes upon existing counterterrorist strategies, and suggests the possibility of employing transnational criminal organizations to gather intelligence on terrorists, and using private military forces to undertake coercive action against them. In both cases, it explicitly identifies specific conditions when these unorthodox strategies would have the greatest potential for success, along with full discussion of the dangers of over reliance on such non-state groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the deaths of four contractors in Fallujah in March 2004 the Department of Defense realized that it needed greater oversight of contractors on the battlefield in Iraq. The Reconstruction Operations Centers (ROC), established in October 2004, provided four essential services: it allowed the military to track the movements of contractors on the battlefield; it provided a mechanism for contractors to inform the military of their future movements and report incidents; it was a means of co-coordinating military assistance for contractors in trouble; and, crucially, it provided threat information to allow contractors to avoid potential trouble spots and thereby reduce the potential burden on the military. The Nisoor Square shootings in September 2008 showed up some of the flaws in the system; not all DoD and State Department contractors were monitored because of the nature of their contracts and the ROCs were not physically located within the headquarters of the major commands, so communication was not as effective as it could have been. The system was refined to take account of these flaws, with the introduction of the Contractor Operations Centers (CONOC), but still left a large number of contractors outside the system. This paper will provide an account of the evolution of the ROC and the CONOC system and the creation of the civil-military intelligence interface that accompanied them. It will also examine the difficulties involved in overseeing the activities of contractors working for the wide variety of state and non-state actors and show how current efforts to regulate the industry might overcome these difficulties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After surprise attacks and other intelligence failures, the complaint is often heard that if only decision makers had listened more closely to the warnings they had received--if only they had treated intelligence more objectively, rather than letting their own beliefs and wishes interfere--disaster might have been avoided. But even though it is generally agreed that intelligence is of little use unless it is received and understood by policy makers, we actually know little about why some leaders are receptive toward intelligence, while others are not. This paper argues that the willingness of decision makers to listen to intelligence depends primarily on two factors: their belief in the seriousness of the issue or threat involved, and their trust in the utility of intelligence. It examines contrasting receptivity toward intelligence in the cases of Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway, and suggests that current models of intelligence-policy relations need to be revised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is practically a given nowadays that intelligence is a vital element in the conduct of effective peace operations. However, that has not always been the case. Traditionally, the United Nations has been wary, if not downright paranoid, about the collection and processing of intelligence compromising its role as an objective and impartial arbiter of international conflict. Information sharing has always been performed in UN missions, but in a constrained fashion that emphasizes openness and transparency but downplays any sort of �national business� that might be perceived to give advantage to one side of the conflict over the other. This caution about intelligence has political overtones too and, in a UN mission where the political objectives have been difficult to achieve while the military aspects have been successful, any informationgathering operations naturally become politicized. This paper offers the perspective of a former U.S. peacekeeper required to keep his military intelligence expertise muted in the interest of pursuing a political goal that ultimately proved elusive. Serving on a small UN observer mission in Western Sahara was a rewarding experience, but one that was unnecessarily difficult and at times frustrating. Lessons learned from that short tour nearly two decades ago are applicable to future peace efforts, especially in light of recent fast-paced events ongoing in North Africa which are contributing to the fragility and instability of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the means by which the British Army has collected, disseminated, and used intelligence in its counter-insurgency campaigns. As a small army wishing to generate maximum effect, the British Army has always looked to intelligence as a sig ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the literature on intelligence and war, regarding their interactions in fields ranging from strategy to conventional operations to counter insurgency and strike warfare, as well as matters such as command, control and communications, and the theory of strategy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligence analysts are constantly faced with labels throughout their daily work. In the national security realm, labels, such as terrorist, rebel, militia, and insurgent, are given to groups and are continually labels of interest to analysts and their decision makers. These particular labels have significant meaning, and many individuals have a preconceived idea, or cognitive biases, for what actions each of these particular groups conduct. The examination of the terms we use to label is significant, particularly in light of the US global war on terrorism and for national security interests. My thesis, upon which this paper is based, will shed light on whether cognitive biases exist when analysts receive reports concerning these particular labels. In addition, my thesis will attempt to place a quantitative measure to these biases by using the online experiment. By using the same information and only switching which label (terrorist, rebel, militia, insurgent, or group) is used, I will attempt to determine how much impact, if any, each label has on analysis. This research is important because the use, or misuse, of particular labels can directly affect US government action or inaction. Because intelligence analysis assists in policy decisions, it is important to be precise and cautious in our use of such labeling terms, and this is the purpose and significance of my research into this topic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explicit conceptual modeling (ECM) within intelligence analysis is a topic on which very little specific research has been done, however; when considering the complexity and depth of most intelligence requirements it becomes evident that consideration of this topic is both crucial and long overdue. This study examines what little literature exists on conceptual modeling within the field of intelligence, in addition to discussing relevant studies from other fields that help to shed light on the need for, and value of, incorporating this technique into intelligence analysis. After examining the pertinent literature, an experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis that intelligence analysts who engage in ECM will generate better analytic products, as evaluated by thoroughness of process and accuracy of product, than analysts who do not. However, despite a wealth of literature strongly suggesting that ECM will improve analysis, the results of this study's experiment did not support that notion. This paper concludes with recommendations for future research, and this author's opinion regarding the lack of support shown for ECM in this study's results. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will analyse the lessons learned during the creation of the intelligence interface between the military and Private Security Companies (PSCs) in Iraq, under the auspices of the Department of Defense (DoD), and suggest a template for future co-operation based on these lessons. It will fill a gap in the current literature regarding PSCs in modern warfare, which tends to focus on the moral or ethical implications of the physical security aspect of their work and ignores their intelligence capability, which is a major part of the services they provide and a key facet of their relationship with the military in Iraq. The war in Iraq has seen an unprecedented number of PSCs working in support of military operations, all of which need access to timely and accurate intelligence to carry out their mission safely. The DoD established civil-military operations centres to co-ordinate the activities of the PSCs supporting the reconstruction effort throughout Iraq and provide them with intelligence. The military was expected to pass unclassified information to the civilian intelligence staff at the operations centres, who were contractors working for a British PSC, to analyse and disseminate to the wider PSC community. However there was no uniform system in place for the military to provide this information and co-operation was largely based on personal relationships between the intelligence analysts at the operations centres and their military counterparts, which often had to be rebuilt when units changed over. As time passed more formal guidelines were produced but not uniformly applied. The military intelligence staffs were also faced with problems regarding security clearances and declassification of information for which they were often unprepared. Local ‘ad hoc’ solutions were used to resolve many issues. The relationship was, however, usually found to be mutually beneficial as the military found their situational awareness enhanced through contact with PSCs operating on the ground and the civilian analysts often provided useful insight into the current situation. Since PSCs are likely to be present in many future conflicts, the problems encountered in Iraq will recur unless there is a sound framework for intelligence co-operation with the military based on mutual understanding and recognition of common aims. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Providing strategic warning to policymakers about potential threats and dangers is a key function of governmental intelligence organizations, and one by which their performance is most sternly judged. Today, however, the context for warning has fundamentally changed as globally networked challenges increasingly overshadow their historical state-centric counterparts. This changing context has, among other things, significant consequences for strategic early warning methodologies. Traditional monitoring and surveillance methods define a set of indicators and a possible timeline towards the escalation of a conflict. Once a (large) set of indicators has been established, a warning signal emerges as soon as an indicator passes a certain level. Although these indicator-based approaches are to some extent artificial, they possess important strengths: first, they allow for a certain degree of objectivity in assessing situations; second, they require analysts to anticipate potential future developments on the basis of scenarios. The main weakness of this method, however, is that the analysts must know the threat that the system is designed to warn about in advance. This approach may thus work fairly well for clearly identifiable threats, but it is not suited for diffuse challenges and is particularly inadequate for the detection of emerging risks that are not yet on the watch-list. Thus, in the new threat environment, warning is transformed from an exercise in surveillance-monitoring identified indicators (such as military mobilization) to one of reconnaissance- meaning searching for weak signals-of potential, perhaps even completely unknown threats that can emerge anywhere or at any time. Clearly, no single analytical technique can be rated as the most accurate approach to the study of all problems, so that analysts must apply the methods that are best suited to a given problem and consider combining approaches when possible in order to maximize the accuracy of results. Some methodologies work well when the shape of the threat is clear. For example, data-mining technologies can be used to forecast terrorism using large volumes of data on known and potential terrorists to identify links, patterns, and anomalies, and to predict which individuals are likely to carry out terrorist attacks. A completely different set of approaches that aim to maximize weak signal detection in a complex system (such as horizon scanning or cognitive mapping) is required to identify factors for change that are hardly perceptible at present, but which will constitute a strong trend in the future or can have dramatic consequences, or to identify certain events or developments that could set off alternative dynamics and paths. In this paper, we aim to develop a typology of threats in today's strategic environment and evaluate various methodologies as to their use for different types of threats. To this end, we first identify the key characteristics of the new threat environment (based on a substantive literature review of relevant works in the field of international relations and strategic studies), use these insights in a second step to develop a typology of threats with significance for strategic foresight and warning, and third, discuss what kind of methodological approaches are needed for each typology. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligence studies is, relatively speaking, a new discipline that has sprung up a bit like an English gardenâ€"unkempt, haphazard, but vital and thriving. Sometimes for the instructor, it is hard to know what is a rose, even with its thorns, and what is a dandelion. For instructors, finding the right balance between the history of intelligence, which has rich lessons to serve up, and the craft of intelligence, which has rich lessons to apply, is often a challenge. As Christopher Andrew, a renowned expert on the history of intelligence has observed, the further you look into the past, the further you can see into the future. We need to start by looking at how we have done intelligence studies until recently to see a way ahead.My experience in teaching intelligence studiesâ€"which is of recent vintage--suggests that a blend of both approaches can provide a powerful base to ground students in the discipline. Intelligence has a very insular culture and connecting with its history provides a sort of entrée into a secret world. But knowing the history and culture of anything, does not fully equip a student to practice the craft; most intelligence studies students are eager to be practitioners, not just theoreticians. My paper would suggest a way to balance the two elements.I plan to draw heavily on lessons learned from an over 25 year career at CIA, which I have captured in a draft article for CIA’s Studies in Intelligence. How do you avoid error by applying historic awareness but also avoiding mistaken historic analogies? What role can analytic method play in grounding intelligence analysis? How can instructors engage students in an exploration of the field, keeping it interesting, relevant, and real-world? The panel would look at this and other issues that would help the new discipline find its voice and answer the demands of clamoring students and critical administrators who do not want a flash in the pan quasi-discipline that will fade as terrorism threats transform or possibly recede. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 presents both a political and legal problem for the United States government. It is a political problem because people demand protection, preparedness, and prevention of such attacks. These functions and activities are performed by the security forces of the countryâ€"the military for fighting war, and state and local civilian officials for fighting crime. These security forces develop and rely upon intelligence. Today, there is a global insurgency, one of whose tactics is terrorism and whose major target is the USA. A response, a counterinsurgency operation, requires a political-military strategy integrating civilian and military activities in a unity of effort through sharing of intelligence. If this strategy were available in the US, it would enable the security forces to identify support in the USA for the insurgency. Yet, the military and state and local civilian officials of the USA rarely interact within the USA. I intend to show that a unified military and civilian response would be a legal problem because this situationâ€"separation of effortsâ€"exists because of the US constitutional system. Its featuresâ€"separation of powers, federalism, and separation of the civilian sector from the military sectorâ€"preclude such a political-military strategy and unity of efforts through intelligence integration. This paper seeks to understand the consequences of the US system of government on the effectiveness of a domestic response in the US and on how that response affects the global counterinsurgency effort. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews and classifies all Israeli intelligence failures. The paper identifies two general types of failures - strategic failures and tactical failures. Among the strategic failures examined in this paper are the Yom Kippur War (the most serious of the Israeli failures), Egyptian President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, the breakdown of the first intifada in 1987, the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, and the break down of the second intifada in 2000. Among the tactical failures examined in the paper are the Bisfortunate Business Affair in Egypt in 1954 and the attempt to assassinate Haled Mashaal in Jordan in 1997. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary terrorism presents a significant challenge to global security and law enforcement institutions. Non-state actors operating across international borders, engaged in an apparent global insurgency of extremism that transects the traditional boundaries between national security and criminal enforcement, pose significant challenges to both intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These networked global insurgents blend political and religious fanaticism with criminal enterprises to challenge the rule of law and exploit the seams between crime and war. Preserving global and national security requires traditional organs of national security (the diplomatic, military and intelligence services) to forge new partnerships with police and public safety organizations at the state and local (sub-national) level. Significant operational, policy and cultural challenges must be overcome to forge an effective global network of public safety, law enforcement and traditional intelligence organizations to understand and anticipate current and evolving terrorist threats. The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group is an existing all-source fusion effort with experience in bridging these operational seams. Organizational, operational and policy challenges encountered and bridged by the TEW will be discussed with particular emphasis on indications and warning and operational net assessment to develop all-source situational understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary focus of intelligence studies is to find ways of improving the quality of information gathering and analysis. But excellence in obtaining and assessing the information is not sufficient. If the intelligence product has no impact on the decision maker, then resources spent on the intelligence system have been wasted. This paper explores the issue of how, when and why intelligence impacts ? or fails to impact ? decision making at the highest levels. The paper uses the typology method to identify four types of potential effect and failure of effect of intelligence on the decision maker. Each type is characterized by the unique traits of the decision maker and the intelligence maker, the relationship between them and the general context. The second part of the paper uses this theoretical typology to examine the impact of the Israeli intelligence (AMAN) on key decision makers in five critical episodes between 1955 and 1990. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work analyzes the critical role of intelligence in foreign policy. The case study focuses on one of the most significant intelligence failures for the U.S. in the Middle East, the failure to predict the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979. This paper discusses the failure to foresee the growing domestic crisis in Iran which led to the toppling of the pro-American monarchy and its replacement by an Islamic Republic hostile to U.S. interests. This was the result of the blinding of American intelligence for strategic, economic, and domestic political reasons. Second, the paper discusses the delicate politics of trying to gain intelligence on an ally. This leads to a discussion on the significance of alliances and the problems in particular of great powers gathering intelligence on regional allies. This paper utilizes secondary as well as primary U.S. government documents. The paper also discusses the structure and institutional norms of American intelligence and how these problems continue to manifest themselves today. This paper would fit well on panels focusing on intelligence studies, American foreign policy in general, as well as Middle East politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of widespread agreement among observers both inside and outside of government circles that information sharing is critical to homeland security, U.S. counter-terrorism agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, and the newly created Terrorist Threat Integration Center, continue to experience considerable difficulty sharing tactical and operational intelligence among relevant stakeholders. Drawing on theories of organizational behavior and the author?s interviews with counter-terrorism officials, this paper examines the institutional and individual constraints that continue to hamper information sharing across federal agencies. These limitations include knowledge-based routines that agencies use to control (and hoard) intelligence, such as ?originator control? (or ORCON, as it is widely known in the intelligence community), inter-agency turf battles that remain alive and well since 9/11, and impact of bounded rationality on government officials working in this dynamic, stressful environment. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of research for homeland security, suggesting that efforts at reforming intelligence agencies should focus less on reorganizing and centralizing existing bureaucracies and more on redesigning incentive structures and knowledge-based routines created during the Cold War. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"I was shocked to the point that I was blinded by sheer disbelief ? In the end, [the U.S.] completely disregarded the years of sacrifice made by Japan, forcing us to forgo the great nation status that we had striven so hard to establish in the Far East. But to do so for Japan was none other than committing suicide. We now had no choice but to rise." (Jidai no Ichimen [An Aspect of Time], 2 vols, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1985.) According to the memoirs of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, these were his immediate reactions upon reading the cable that had just arrived from the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. Included in the cable was a note from Secretary of State Cordell Hull that contained an explicit rejection of Japan's proposal to resolve the current U.S.-Japan crisis. The message of the so-called "Hull Note" was clear: Japan needed to first withdraw from China before the U.S. would consider any Japanese demands. It was the same unequivocal position that the U.S. had maintained since early 1941. Unquestionably, Washington was unwilling to make even the slightest compromise towards Tokyo; appeasement was clearly out of the question.If there ever did exist a point-of-no-return on the road to Pearl Harbor, it was certainly on this day of November 26, 1941, when Togo - the leading advocate for peace in the cabinet - gave away all hope. Of course, Togo was no pacifist. However, he also was cognizant of the fact that war with the U.S. was futile and would only spell disaster for Japan. If so, then what pushed Togo to the brink that he felt Japan had "no choice but to rise"? Was it, as most Japanese historians claim, because the "Hull Note" was so uncompromising in its stance that it basically amounted to an ultimatum? Moreover, why was Togo so utterly dismayed? His emotionally charged words reveal that the foreign minister was so taken aback by the note that he felt a overpowering sense of betrayal. Could it be that Togo had been expecting an altogether different reply from the U.S.? Was he privy to any intelligence that would suggest otherwise? In light of the new evidence on prewar Japanese sigint recently discovered at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and the Diplomatic Record Office (DRO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan, the purpose of this paper will be the following: First, to illuminate the history of the hitherto highly obscure Japanese Black Chamber (Section 18),and two, to set forth a more logical and coherent explanation to Togo's volte-face in his policy towards the United States that ruptured all hope for peace. In conclusion, the paper will incorporate the new knowledge gained concerning Japanese prewar sigint and reveal how intelligence analysis had a detrimental impact on policy decisions a critical juncture. Through this undertaking, this paper will refute the longstanding understanding that the so-called "Hull Note" was the final straw that led to Pearl Harbor. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an empirical analysis, rare in the field, on the pattern of congressional accountability over America's intelligence community. The pattern since 1975, when serious accountability was established over the secret agencies, indicates that robust supervision occurs only after a major intelligence scandal or failure---a "shock." The shock event is treated by lawmakers as do firefighters a significant conflagration. Lawmakers rush to investigate and put out the flames. Here is Congress in its most intense phase of accountability. The firefighting is then followed by a period of fairly intensive "police-patroling," whereby lawmakers pass reforms and other take steps to prevent a similar fire in the future. In a downward slope on the curve of intense accountability, lawmakers subsequently return to a period of low-intensity, routine patroling. A few years later, a new fire breaks out and the cycle begins again. The paper explores the details of the cycle's phases, leading to an analysis of the average time sequences of each phase, the types of oversight activities that occur within each phase, and the specific "shock" triggers that lead to major reform responses. The time period covered is from 1974-2006, including both intelligence oversight committees on Capitol Hill. This will be the first quantitative analysis of intelligence accountability in the United States. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now generally accepted that national security transcends internal and external boundaries. Multiple authorities at the local, state, and national levels have responsibility for national security, and emergency managers are increasingly involved in security planning. The need to co-ordinate across several levels of government and to integrate new actors creates important governance challenges and has led to the creation of novel security governance units. In Canada, for instance, Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) housed in local police departments or RCMP detachments bring together police, military, intelligence, and other agencies to focus on threats to national security. In the United States, "fusion centers" and Joint Terrorism Task Forces serve a similar function. Drawing on theories about multilevel governance and the bureaucratisation of security (Paris School), this paper will seek to answer a number of questions in comparative context: How are these units similar or different? What prompted their creation? What explains their composition? What can their existence tell us about the changing nature of political authority and security governance?. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine both the current and future recruitment needsOf Canada's intelligence community. Having established these needs, it will analyze two related topics: training requirements andchanging organizational cultures. It will explore ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is to discuss the role of the secret services in the Post-Cold War Era, analyzing the particular case of Brazil. With the end of Cold War, many countries had to restructure their intelligence, in order to be prepared to deal wi ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has made ongoing efforts in establishing a robust legal framework on intelligence and security. This paper addresses the pluses and minuses of the legal basis for the effectiveness in US intelligence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes two ethical principles which, if practically adopted, can reduce the likelihood of falling victim to motivated and unmotivated biases in intelligence analysis. The first is: "I do not think that I know what I do not know." It aims at reducing the unmotivated adherence of analysts to a mistaken preconception despite the availability of contradicting information … a type of behavior which was the source of numerous estimation failures. The second is: "The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." This principle aims at preserving the objectivity of the intelligence product and lessening the tendency of intelligence makers to tailor it according to their consumers' political needs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses one of the major issues in the United States intelligence community--the sharing of information across agencies. Unfortunately, even after the events of 9/11, intelligence analysts within the FBI, CIA and DIA still withold information from each other. This leads us to ask why? Using social identity theory, we explain that in the case of intelligence sharing, each of these groups are engaging in intergroup competition and want to be seen as the best in the business. Therefore, they do not have any incentive to work together toward common goals. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present body of literature on the causes for intelligence failures has not shown so far the impact of cultural factors neither on traits in data collection, nor on the quality of information processing. Consequently, the literature lacks convincing explanations why certain organizations are more likely to fall victim to specific obstacles while others less so. In order to bridge this gap in the theory of intelligence failures, the suggested paper will: (a) Introduce the concept of ‘intelligence culture’ to explain the variance in the predisposition to analytical pathologies across various intelligence organizations, and (b) Illuminate the main cultural traits of the CIA, the Soviet/Russian Intelligence Services and Israel's Military Intelligence (AMAN), in order to present their impact on the way specific obstacles hamper high quality information acquisition and processing and lead to intelligence failures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shaping and packaging the intelligence product to suit the needs of the consumer probably is just as important for intelligence success as is the substance of the product. Intelligence professionals have been, and continue to be, weary of this aspect of their business for fear of being accused of “manipulating intelligence,” “cooking-the-books,” or politicizing intelligence. Yet, consumers of intelligence, especially strategic decision makers, respond to intelligence products like everyone else, in that they will use them only if they are aware of the products, can understand their content, and accept the information they impart as important enough to incorporate into their decisions. If the intelligence product fails to “sell” itself to the consumer, then its content â€" however accurate, timely, and relevant â€" essentially loses value as an input into the policy decision process and may actually contribute to intelligence failure. This paper explores the marketing side of producing strategic intelligence, identifies the strengths and shortcomings of the production process and distribution, and makes several recommendations to improve intelligence marketing for greater intelligence effectiveness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following recent terrorist attacks, intelligence agencies have been in the limelight. In particular their failings to coordinate efforts and to collaborate with other intelligence services have been subject to criticism. While the US has responded by revamping its intelligence community and creating the new Department of Homeland Security, little seems to have happened at the European level. The paper seeks to explain why some intelligence cooperation takes place within the EU and why some, not to say the bulk, does not. To gain precision, it outlines a model that divides intelligence into different stages, topics and levels. This ‘intelligence cube’ allows for an accurate discussion on cooperation in distinctive areas. Although the study mainly follows a pragmatic functionalist approach, suggesting that collaboration is utility driven rather than an end in itself, it does not argue that an increased Europeanisation is desirable. Rather it suggest that efficiency considerations offer the most convincing explanation why no new European Intelligence Agency has been created and why so little cooperation takes place within EU structures. This explanatory illustration is followed by a normative appreciation of what improvements the Union can and should undertake to advance the intelligence community’s contribution to the fight against terrorism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship of regional studies to intelligence issues and concepts? No where is the question more important than in the Middle East. This paper explores the contributions that regional studies make to cultural intelligence and to framing intelligence issues and concepts for both intelligence professionals and policy makers. Explored are 1)what are the relevant cultural fundamentals, 2) what are the relevant case studies and history, 3) what are the policy, political and ethical questions that should be emphasized, and 4) what is the intelligence optic on the Middle East? Answers are based both on the teaching of courses on the Middle East and Islam at the Joint Military Intelligence College as well as on the experience of intelligence users and professionals in Washington and the field. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the intelligence failure of 2001, the NYPD?s Intelligence Division has undertaken an unprecedented global expansion. New York City officials, feeling they had been left out of the loop regarding terror threats by the FBI and CIA amongst others, has undertaken to provide for their own security in a manner that is considered innovative by many, and threatening by some. The Intelligence Division has sent officers to capitals in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, developing an intelligence gathering apparatus to rival the scope of those in many moderately sized countries. This internationalization of a municipal police force is unlike anything that has been seen before; with perhaps the possible exception of London?s Metropolitan Police. This paper will conduct a comparative case study of the NYPD Intelligence and Counterterrorism Divisions and the London Metropolitan Police?s Special Branch, which is responsible for counter-terrorism operations. These two municipal police forces, from two of the world?s most significant cultural, social and economic hubs are at the cutting edge of law enforcement and counter-terrorism; and may be offering up an increasingly appealing option to other cities: the internationalization of municipal policing. The implications of internationalized municipal policing for International Relations are myriad. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Romania has implemented fundamental changes in the intelligence system since the end of Communism, accession to NATO and EU. Not only is the system clearly under democratic control, but also appears to be effective both domestically and internationally. The paper examines how Romania managed to reconcile and achieve a tradeoff between the two competing imperatives of operating intelligence in a democracy - effectiveness and transparency. It analyzes what obstacles Romania overcame to accommodate the effectiveness of its post-communist intelligence system with the public need for information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the past decade the Italian intelligence system has been substantially reformed. Indeed, with the new government it is likely to be reformed even more. The intelligence system has proven very effective not only in internal counterterrorism issues, such as the recent Winter Olympics, but also in Iraq. This paper will deal with the reforms and highlight some of the measures of effectiveness in demonstrating the positive results of the reforms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In intelligence, a damage assessment is designed to learn if a spy has given away secrets or compromised operations. This damage assessment is more like that done after bombing a target to see if it was destroyed. The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 hit the US Intelligence Community like a bomb; it was supposed to move the IC away from its Cold War mentality and organization to better fight terrorism. But, the results have been far from devastating. This paper will assess the damage and see what might be saved or fixed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Colombia has been engaged in internal insurgencies for forty years. Only recently has the government, with the heavy support of the United States, begun to make headway against the three armed groups - FARC, ELN, and AUC. The ability of the intelligence agencies, especially the civilian - led DAS, has generally been found wanting. The intelligence community in Colombia has been undergoing reform for two decades though the pace has increased recently in response to a series of scandals. This paper will analyze the reforms and seek to assess their impact in terms of transparency, democratic control, and effectiveness. The views expressed here are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Navy or the Department of Defense. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses intelligence cooperation within the European Union and proposes the development of a European Union Intelligence Agency comparable to the CIA of the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite persistent debates about what intelligence means or ought to mean, there is general tendency to assume that whatever the answer to this question intelligence can be discussed as if it were a common across a wide range of national and institutional contexts. The following article argues that intelligence actually covers a range of very different issues in differing institutional contexts and that one of the most significant differences lies between civilian and military notions of, and approaches to, intelligence. This reflects the fact that the civilian and military realms need 'intelligence' to do very different things in very different operational contexts. These fundamental divergences lead to some key functional and institutional differences while intensifying others. The result is that much discussion of 'intelligence' is conducted at cross-purposes with participants often talking past each other. More significantly, it is argued that trying to approach civilian intelligence activities and needs in terms of a military intelligence conception, or vice versa, is potentially troublesome and can have negative consequences for the conduct of either and COIN in particular requires a fusion of the two approaches for which stand-alone military processes and procedures are illequipped. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, the analysis of the military-intelligence applications of space technologies has been cordoned off in the field of security studies from broader questions of lead industries, high technology competition, intra-core rivalry and the North-South divide. Yet, a historical analysis of the interrelationship between high technology development and security military/developments shows the need for an integrated approach, as the U.S example indicates. Since at least the late nineteenth century, U.S. military spending has served as a crucial mechanism for high technology development and in overseas power projection at one and the same time. In the nineteenth century such military spending centered around the steel-naval complex, in the twentieth century around high technology warfare, notably the aerospace, communications and electronics complex, replete with satellites and related technology, as important to the contemporary dominance of Wal-Mart as it is to the U.S. military. Indeed, the so called revolution in military affairs and network centric warfare theorists have delved into many of the interconnections between flexible just-in-time production and distribution and just-in-time warfare. Twenty-first century developments involving the militarization of space similarly serve as a vehicle for high technology development with great commercial applications and in overseas power projection at one and the same time, arguably propping up both profits and power. Crucially, military spending is exempt from restrictions against subsidies in the World Trade Organization. Thus, such military spending by core states â?? both the U.S. and the European Union â?? provide a vehicle for subsidizing high technology industry denied to many Third World countries under W.T.0. rules â?? while arguably increasing the ability of the North to militarily dominate the South. That being said, such public subsidy of private profit via military spending, while helping to give rise to the aerospace, telecommunications and satellite industries and related forms of global military power, has also been plagued by declining competitiveness and increased competition, as in the instance of the U.S./Boeing and its rivalry in the W.T.O. with the EU/Airbus indicates. Furthermore, in a world plagued by increasing poverty and asymmetrical warfare, the utility of such forms of military dominance may be diminishing as well. This paper explores these themes through a theoretical and comparative-historical lens, examining past trajectories to illuminate present choices. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1953 and 2003, 19 major shifts have occurred in Israel's strategic environment. With only one exception (Egypt's decision to launch the War of Attrition in 1969) Military Intelligence (AMAN), Israel's national estimating agency, has failed to provide a warning against the emerging threat or to properly assess a promising opportunity. This paper covers the period of 1953-1973 and presents eight of the 19 cases. Each of these presentations is made of three parts: (a) the context in which the intelligence estimate took place; (b) AMAN's performance; and (c) the causes for quality of AMAN's performance. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The comparative analysis of national intelligence systems, structures and cultures requires an in depth look at key components of the national intelligence process, as well as issues relating to the extent of co-operation with other national security and intelligence agencies and ?special relationships?, where they exist. This paper will explore these issues and problems relating to comparative analysis of national intelligence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Israeli perceptions of intelligence were conditioned by the long struggle against terrorism and by the role played by intelligence in foreign policy and relations with countries which did not officially recognise Israel. The extensive use of intelligence for policy formulation and implementation in Israel gave the intelligence services an important and often central role in policy making. This paper will examine Israeli national perception of intelligence and the influence of these perceptions on the activities, legal status and resources of the Israeli intelligence community. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the current debate whether or not the Bushadministration fixed its intelligence around the purpose of going to war inIraq. After laying out the merits of this debate, parallels are then drawnto US intelligence efforts prior to United Nationâ??s forces entering NorthKorean territory in the fall of 1950. Chinese intervention followed thisadvance and propelled the war on the Korean peninsula in an entirely newdirection.The main finding is that in both cases, the intelligence worked as it was supposed to do. And in both cases, the problems arose in command. As far as Korea is concerned, all partiesâ??military and civilian leadershipâ??wishedto enter North Korean territory; the confusion lay in how far to go. This lack of clarity contributed greatly to Chinese intervention. In Iraq, the US military expressed deep reservations about the need for the attack andits prospects for success after a military victory, but was overruled by the administration.The point is that intelligence is only as useful as the policy makers. Both got it wrong in Korea, only the civilian side in Iraq. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canadian intelligence has played an increasing role over the past decade in supporting policy formulation and implementation. Canadian perceptions of intelligence evolved are currently changing, mirroring the developments relating to the global war on terrorism, the war in Iraq and Canada's increasing international roles. The paper will examine the changing perceptions of intelligence and security in Canada and explore the affects of theseperceptions on policy and government. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]