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The Six-Party Talks, being the culmination of about fifteen years of diplomatic endeavors that had started with the 1994 Agreed Framework, were hailed as a disappointing mechanism after the September 19, 2005 agreement was dismissed a few days after its signature. After North Korea tested its nuclear weapon in October 2006, the whole process seemed to have been crucified. However, the Six-Party Talks appeared to have been resurrected in light of a new agreement reached during the fifth round of talks held in February 2007. Nevertheless, many still argue that all those years of negotiations have only led to agreements very similar in nature to the 1994 Agreed Framework. Thus, scholarship on the topic of North Korea often looks at independent variables and their effect on the future of Northeast Asia. The outlook chosen in this paper is different from existing works. We do not concentrate on explaining how to obtain change in the dependent variable (outcome of negotiations) but we suggest that while not much progress has been made in terms of implementing agreements, change in the power structure of the system with the United States getting entangled in the War in Iraq, its unwillingness to directly deal with North Korea from 2001 to 2003, Pyongyang's ability to overcome its own economic disaster and domestic political crises, as well as China's willingness to become a prime actor in the Six-Party process have led to parties now being able to talk. Thus, we argue that increased knowledge and familiarity with each actor's position has led to increased cooperation which has then been translated into the acceptance of multilateral rounds of negotiations as a credible structure to deal with instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. In essence, even though no ideal destination has been reached yet, everybody is better off being on the road and searching for a way, instead of being left alone, unable to understand where others would like to go. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That China has been politically and economically playing an important role in the world has great impact to regions all over the world, especially in East Asia. After the Cold War, Japan has gradually walked out of its past "one nation pacifism," actively participating in the international affairs under frameworks of "U.S.-Japan alliance" and the U.N. It is to fulfill its dream of becoming a "political great power." Therefore, Japan has also been playing an important role in the regional issues. On November 2002, North Korea decided to reactivate its uranium-enriching program. It has raised the tension in the region of East Asia; it has also disturbed international relations in the region. The U.S. expects China and Japan, two great powers in the Northeast Asia, intervene in the North Korea problem, hoping to solve the problem with multi-literal agreement. Can the North Korea nuclear crisis shorten the diplomatic distance between China and Japan, establishing the "military strategic partnership," or showing the radical paradox between the two countries? Examining interactions between China and Japan in the North Korea nuclear crisis can clarify the thinking of two countries' regional strategies and benefits of competition and cooperation in politic, security, and economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What kind of world order can we dream that can overcome the division of the world? We might dream of Pax Imperium or Pax International. However, the present world situation reminds us of the following Biblical passage: "Do you think that I have come to give peace on earth? No, I tell you, but rather division." Instead of living in the Cold War dominated by the rivalry of two dragons, we find ourselves caught in a jungle with a bewildering number of small poisonous snakes that have sprung out from the blood of Medusa of the Cold War. What about Northeast Asia? A regional order of "metastability" was erected in Northeast Asia during the Cold War. Northeast Asia’s metastability is a reflection of the sustained insecurity, historical memory of dispute and violence, and absence of institutional settings for regional governance. With regard to several Northeast Asian countries including Korea, Pax San Francisco was concluded in 1951, as the proverb says, De vous, chez vous, sans vous. A sudden impact on Northeast Asia metastability might come from many different directions: the absence of a Peace Treaty between North Korea and Japan since World War II; the absence of a Peace Treaty between North Korea and the United States since the Korean War; the North Korean flirtation with nuclear arsenal; China’s quest for the restoration of a ‘traditional’ Sinocentric order; the Japanese reluctance to learn from the German way of “closing the book” and to relent the myth of Japanese imperial infallibility; the unresolved territorial disputes between Russia and Japan; and, the volatile tension between China and Taiwan. Especially, Sino-Japanese cognitive divide is deepening in Northeast Asia. Is China really a part of Northeast Asia as conceived? In spite of this unilateral expectation, what if China tends to consider Northeast Asia as a part of China rather than vice versa? Comparing to China, Japan has contributed to the concept of modern international relations since the Meiji Restoration, but distorted and betrayed it. Japanese concept of Greater East Asia misused regionalism as an ideology of war. After the end of the Cold War, Japan showed two distinctive tendencies: its security policy has inclined toward the US, and its domestic politics are increasingly occupied by the voices of neo-nationalism. China has severely criticized these Japanese diplomatic maneuvers. This situation might revive the historical legacies of confrontational power struggle in this region. Between the U. S. and South Korea, there is a cognitive divide on North Korean persistence. Since 1990, Many presumed authorities predicted its coming collapse. The year is now 2006. How long are we supposed to wait to see the collapse of North Korea? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]