This paper explores the manner in which agents perceive time, the nature of perceptions of time across political arenas, and the impact of differing conceptualizations of time on the resolution of long-lasting conflict. This paper seeks to assess the contingent or extemporaneous nature of these perceptions and proposes a new framework to examining the resolution of long-lasting conflict by hybridizing rational choice and game theoretical modeling with Karl Popperâs distinction between âhistoricistâ and âexperimentalâ visions of statehood. The framework is applied to two cases, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan in Kashmir.Game theoretical and rational choice models offer both a means to delineate the beginnings and endings of strategic interaction -sequential and simultaneous games- and a parsimonious perspective on time horizons, i.e. discount rates. As a result when examining long lasting conflict it is tempting to see new rounds of bargaining as an iteration of the initial interaction. However, over long periods of time, actors and arenas of interaction can change. As such, this paper proposes a dichotomy of âsequelsâ and âspin-offsâ of initial interaction. In the former, arenas and actors are the same over more than one round of bargaining, whereas the latter accounts for changes in arenas and/or actors, where nonetheless, the nature of bargaining has remained consistent. Perceptions of time can also change. As a result discount rates, as measures of perceptions of time, are of limited applicability. If actors have a âhistoricistâ perspective on arresting change, perceptions of time then exist extemporaneously to actual political change and no real distinction can be made between immediate and future gains. On the other hand, actors can also employ âexperimentalâ lenses through which time is viewed as change. Unlike the âhistoricistâ lens there are no a priori preferences fixed in time and thus the âexperimentalâ lens can incorporate discount rates and their reassessment over multiple rounds of bargaining. Thus, after the initial round in a long-lasting conflict, actors can find themselves either in a âhistoricist sequelâ, a âhistoricist spin-offâ, an âexperimental sequelâ or an âexperimental spin-off.â This paper contends that the conflict in Kashmir shows signs of being in an âexperimental sequelâ, as a result of Pervez Musharrafâs 4-point plan and the proposal for the emergence of a âsoft-bordersâ, whereas, due, in part, to the ascension of Hamas and the death of Yasser Arafat, the Arab-Israeli conflict shows signs of being in a âhistoricist spin-off.â This paper contends that despite the routinized, and perhaps anti-democratic nature of âsequelsâ, particularly when they perpetuate military dictatorship, the unfixed nature of âexperimentalâ perceptions can compensate for the latter. On the other hand, while âspin-offsâ can imply a break from the status quo and the possibility of real change, a âhistoricistâ lens can trump these prospects by falling back on an idealized, extemporaneous, perception of time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]