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In political science, there is an on-going debate about the usefulness of rational choice theory in analyzing particular real world situations. The rational choice school has been known for its ability to develop general theories. With its methodological sophistication, it has developed prominent theories with many testable hypotheses, but little attention was paid to the individual and real-world political events by this school. Critics of rational choice point to the abstract and logical character of game theory, but do so in order to condemn it. The failures of rational choice theory, Green and Shapiro (1994) declare, are “rooted in the aspiration of rational choice theorists to come up with universal theories of politics. The result, they argue, is a preoccupation with theory development, accompanied by a striking paucity of empirical application (1994, x). Research “becomes theory driven rather than problem driven; its purpose is to save or vindicate some variant of rational choice theory, rather than to account for political phenomena (1994, 6). Recently Bates et al. (1998) introduced the notion of analytic narratives. According to them, analytic narrative combines analytic tools that are commonly employed in economics and political science with the narrative form, which is more commonly employed in history. It is narrative; it pays close attention to stories, accounts, and context. It is analytic in that it extracts explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which facilitate both exposition and explanation. It is problem driven, not theory driven; it is motivated by a desire to account for particular events or outcomes. It is devoted to the exploration of a case, not to the elaboration of theory. In these ways, it counters the charges raised by Green and Shapiro. Although informed by deductive reasoning, it seeks no universal laws of human behavior” (1998). In this paper, I employ the analytic narratives approach to account for a particular event. The real world event of interest is the changing relationship between North and South Korea and one between the U.S. and North Korea, and the methodological tool applied is game theory. As I will demonstrate in the paper, both South Korean and U.S. policy makers have attempted to formulate their new North Korea policies while they were uncertain about the true intentions of the North Korean leadership and its weapons capabilities, especially since the late 90s. By developing two Bayesian models of the Korean situation, I make some very interesting predictions and policy recommendations. One potential payoff of developing game-theoretic models of a real world situation such as that on the Korean peninsula is that I can make predictions and policy recommendations specific to the situation and observe empirically how the players act as the situation unfolds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For nearly fifteen years, the United States and shifting combinations of Northeast Asian states have attempted through negotiation to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear state. During that time, the DPRK’s interlocutors have puzzled to decipher its true motives and negotiating position. DPRK demands have fluctuated, sometimes wildly; new demands have appeared and disappeared. This paper will closely examine the variation in the positions taken by the DPRK--from the first a “going critical” crisis of 1993-1994, to negotiations over the North’s missile program in the late 1990s, to the seven years of the Bush administration’s efforts to force the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitionsâ€"in an effort to discern what patterns, if any, emerge, and to identify explanatory variables for any continuities or discontinuities. This paper hypothesizes that the DPRK’s core demands were fixed during the negotiation of the Agreed Framework, and despite major changes in the regional and international environment over the ensuing years, the regime has consistently sought to resurrect the basic terms of that agreement. This strategy is reflected in the terms of the 2005 Joint Statement and the 2007 Beijing Agreement. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rising anti-Americanism in the winter of 2002 despite the increasing security threats from North Korea, has led some to call the situation a crisis in the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, the opinion polls from June 2003 and February 2004 show that anti- Americanism in South Korea has substantially waned. The main aim of this paper is to examine whether the recent wave of anti-Americanism has the content and intensity to threaten the legitimacy of the ROK-U.S. alliance. By analyzing the changes in public attitude and perception towards the U.S. over the past two years based on three survey data, this paper argues that anti-Americanism in South Korea has not posed any real threat to the alliance. However, the polarized public opinion towards the U.S. remains a potentially serious threat to the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The placement of North Korea on the Axis of Evil and the articulation of the national security strategy of proactive counterproliferation have only served to heighten tensions in Northeast Asia and to further derail diplomatic efforts to dismantle the North Korean nuclear program begun under the U.S.- North Korea Agreed Framework. The Bush administration has asserted that current the North Korean crisis should be handled on a multilateral basis. However, multilateral seems to mean forcing its partners to accede to a harsh and punitive policy toward North Korea rather than genuine multilateral discussions and consultation. This paper intends to examine the how the Bush administration applies its national security policy toward resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis through the analysis of the two rounds of multilateral six-party talks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terrorism becomes a fatal factor to annihilate global security in danger and the U.S. requires strategic responsibili ty and policy as a global leader which takes charge of international security. Especially, national stage of terrorism c an challenge overall U.S. security policy so that it would cause war to eradicate terrorism like the Afghanistan War a nd the Iraq War. After two wars, the U.S. seriously highlights North Korea's military attacks influencing overall regi onal security in Northeast Asia. Even after the U.S. removed North Korea from the terror list, its military attacks have become more aggressive an d tricky. North Korea indignantly declared "Sacred War" based on its nuclear deterrent against military drills of the U.S. and South Korea after the sinking of South Korean warship, Cheonan. North Korea is likely to expose itself to further attacks. I will discuss two ways in this paper to defeat North Korea's military attacks which will be the Obama Administra tion's heavy duty in 2011. One is direct military policy to abolish North Korea's military terrors. The other is tension policy through variable routes. North Korea has shown two cards of military provocations and dialogue gestures. I will find out the fundamental winning policy to terminate North Korea's military attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the mid-1980s, the United States has been laboring to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. The executive branch, through the work of two Bush presidencies and the Clinton administration, has been the chief architect of U.S. non-proliferation policy in Korea. Despite White House dominance of America’s North Korea policy, Congress has also played an important role at various times and had a significant impact on that policy. For example, the Congress controlled the funding for the heavy fuel oil shipments required under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Several times, the shipments were late due to funding delays in Congress. Many in Congress were critical of the agreement maintaining it gave away too much without sufficient concessions from the North. In 2001 the Bush administration shifted to a more confrontational posture in line with the Republican majority in Congress. Eventually, the administration discovered a second, covert nuclear weapons program that violated the 1994 agreement. While the Bush administration struggled with this dilemma, several congressional delegations visited North Korea in an effort to gather information and help achieve a diplomatic solution. In 2004, the Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act in an effort to improve human rights generally and assist refugees fleeing from the North. Thus, while the executive branch continues to guide the overall direction of U.S. policy, the Congress has played a significant role at various points. This paper will examine the Congress’ role in determining American policy toward North Korea and its nuclear weapons ambitions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea’s bitter relations with the United States since the Korean War had a profound role in shaping the DPRK’s overall foreign policy. The U.S. was viewed as a hostile adversary bent on undermining everything Pyongyang perceived as a positive agenda for the entire Korean nation. The U.S. allied ties with South Korea and Japan and rivalries with the Soviet Union and the PRC during the Cold War reinforced Pyongyang’s negative policies toward Washington. Toward the end of the Cold War and in its wake, the U.S. changing relations with China and Russia might have caused Pyongyang to perceive Washington in a more benign manner, but North Korean distrust of American leaders prevented that. North Korea’s instinctive reaction to the United States’ evolving policies reflected what many Americans perceived as paranoia. At the root of those North Korean attitudes was a profound fear of what the U.S. could and might do to the DPRK. The Bush administration’s post-9/11 use of the “axis of evil” metaphor to include North Korea reinforced that anxiety. As the 21st Century evolved, however, the changes in U.S. relations with South Korea, China, and Japan â€" and each’s complexities with each other, when coupled with the problems the U.S. experienced in its Iraq War â€" collectively caused a growing debate within U.S. foreign policy circles about the virtues of realism and pragmatism which increasingly signified an evolution within U.S. approaches to international affairs. Although North Korea has not responded fully to this contextual evolution, there are growing indications â€" based on inter-Korean relations, PRC-DPRK ties, and DPRK-Japan interactions â€" that North Korean leaders perceive opportunities to adapt Pyongyang’s foreign policy to changing circumstances to its advantage in ways that are gradually yielding a more pragmatic and flexible approach toward Washington. The nature of that pragmatism and how it has and may well continue to adjust to Washington’s evolution is an important aspect of Pyongyang’s evolving foreign policy. Its background, current conditions, and prospects for both Pyongyang and Washington shall be the focus of this paper. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an outline of a research paper which focuses on the U.S. human rights policy to North Korea in Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Topics include the U.S. human rights foreign policy in the 21st century, the U.S. human rights foreign policy after World War II, and case studies on human rights in several countries including South Korea, China, and Iraq.

The article presents a paper on whether the U.S. should pursue regime change in North Korea prepared for the 2005 annual conference of the International Studies Association in Honolulu, Hawaii in March. It notes that the U.S. failure in Iraq may encourage North Korean President Kim Jong II to increase aggressive behavior. It suggests to the U.S. and its allies to develop a multi-faceted strategy that will remove threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons. It proposes a policy which is based on the assumption that North Korea already have nuclear weapons.

In this paper, I consider how an ongoing U.S. presidential election campaigns influence foreign policy decision making in crises. While some argue that leaders will use foreign policy to domestic advantage to create an ?October Surprise? (a dramatic foreign policy achievement shortly before an election), others suggest that politics effectively stops at the water?s edge and elections play no role in foreign policy calculations. Employing an intensive case study of the 1976 Poplar Tree Crisis between the United States and North Korea and with reference to the 1972 Vietnam Easter invasion crisis, this paper suggests that while presidents consider electoral factors in their decisions, they do not attempt to manipulate foreign policy for electoral purposes. The paper is available from the author at: dfoyle@wesleyan.edu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

US, South Korean, and Japanese interests in coping with North Korea’s nuclear agenda overlap, but there also are substantial differences. Each country’s policies shall be assessed in terms of its bilateral objectives versus North Korea. Based on that assessment, the historical record of trilateral cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea and the prospects for future cooperation shall be evaluated. In addition, North Korea’s responses to each category and its options shall be analyzed. In each of these instances salient domestic and international factors shall be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will analyze North Korea's foreign policy toward the U.S. since October 2002, focusing on the individual level of analysis by examining the psychological and perceptual variables motivating Kim Jong Il to make his distinct foreign policy toward the U.S. There are a number of scholarly studies on DPRK-U.S. relations and DPRK's foreign policy toward the U.S. However, those studies have failed to explain the impact of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il who plays a central role in shaping North Korea's U.S. policy. Thus, this paper attempts to bridge the gap in the current theoretical literature. The author will analyze how Kim Jong Il's perception, idiosyncrasy and definition of situation have effects on DPRK’s nuclear policy toward the U.S. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of an isolationist state in modern international relations has undergone redefinition over the course of time. Whether the term isolationist state has referred to ancient Sparta, US foreign policy during the 19th century, select communist policies during the Cold War such as Albanian domestic/foreign policy, or present day North Korea and Burma, the concept has retained viability in explaining and understanding international relations. Since 1945, the modern global system of states has become politically and economically integrated, consisting of extensive networks of state-to-state engagement and interdependence. Given the globalized nature of the modern global system, this study seeks to expound upon the reasons and consequences for states that opt out of the international system. For this purpose, this paper examines the notion of isolationist states via a discursive and interpretative analysis of case studies of isolationist states that choose to cut off relations with the outside world.This paper seeks to examine in depth why and how states isolate themselves from the globalized system of international relations. Countries like communist Albania (1944-1992) have had an isolationist regime at some point in their history and later engaged the international system. Others like North Korea and Burma continue to maintain self-imposed isolationism. The question then becomes, why do some states choose to dispense with isolationism and engage while others maintain the status quo? What do states have to gain by opting out of the international system? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the literature on US foreign policy towards North Korea is problem-solving oriented. It questions the different paths Washington should follow to put an end to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic ambitions. However, these writings fail to problematize the prevailing representation of those ambitions as a significant threat to U.S. national security, as well as the ends of US policies. Drawing mainly upon the work of Michel Foucault and on the theoretical approaches in international political sociology that have integrated his writings (e.g. the “Paris School” and several poststructuralist authors in IR), this paper argues that US foreign policy towards North Korea seeks first and foremost to “discipline and punish” that country. In the first part of my paper, I take a look at the dominant narratives about North Korea in the policymaking and strategic circles, considering those narratives as fundamental conditions of possibility for foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a growing number of narratives producing a North Korean subjectivity which is associated with the criminal figure in U.S. civil society. Indeed, Pyongyang has been identified as a “rogue” and “outlaw” subject that needs to be monitored, disciplined, if not tamed. Such an identity construction process has been consolidated over the years and has become North Korea’s hegemonic representation in the U.S. The outlawing/othering of North Korea in the US dominant strategic discourse has thus made it an outsider in the international community. As a result, such metanarrative has limited the scope of possible political and diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and has led to a foreign policy of taming and subservience. In the second part, I illustrate that many aspects of both the Clinton and W. Bush administrations’ foreign policies â€" such as economic sanctions, diplomatic talks, military exercises, and nuclear inspections â€" can be understood as dispositifs of a power relations’ praxis towards North Korea. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will discuss the origin, development and impact of US financial sanctions against North Korea as a key obstacle to the six-party process. The paper will make a possible solution to this important issue. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper would attempt to examine the evolution of the Bush policy in the context of relevant International Relations theory, i.e., theories of individual (cognitive maps of Bush and other policy makers), unit level (including factional struggles in the administration, two level games, sanctions theory) and system levels (the security dilemma, alliance theory, etc.). The paper would thus examine both formative influences and the theoretical soundness of the Bush policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will analyze the US-South Korean alliance and the two countries? approaches towards the North Korean nuclear issue. It aragues that US-American and South Korean strategies towards North Korea and the Korean Peninsula?s security environment are on diverging trajectories and will further deteriorate.The paper will suggest that US foreign policy will continue to use pressure on North Korea in order to get Pyongyang to fully abandon its nuclear weapons program. As in the past, North Korea will not be receptive. Moreover, US policy will continue to slowly erode the close partnership with South Korea as Seoul will continue to pursue a much more cooperative policy towards the North. The net result, it will be suggested, is a slowly deteriorating US-ROK alliance and overall security situation on the Korean Peninsula. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea, the first and only country that has ever withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has been the main target of the U.S.-led global counterproliferation campaign. Numerous scholarly works and policy analyses have been published with the almost sole objective of answering the question of how best to cope with the North Korean nuclear conundrum. Is a policy of engagement or containment more effective? Is a bilateral or a multilateral approach more conducive to yielding a speedy resolution? Implicit in these types of questions is the assumption that the North Korean nuclear challenge would prompt a similar debate on exploring creative solutions in East Asian countries, presumed to be sharing the same sense of urgency in resolving the nuclear crisis. A careful observation at domestic security debates in China, Japan and South Korea in the aftermath of the so-called "second North Korean nuclear crisis" shows a different picture. Far from seeking an effective formula for solving the nuclear impasse, countries in East Asia engage in domestic security debates that go far beyond the immediate issue of resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. Based on a series of interviews of officials and analysts in East Asia and a survey of regional sources, the paper explores the domestic contexts of China, Japan and South Korea in which the North Korean challenge is being contested and intertwined with other regionally salient issues such as the role of the United States as the linchpin of regional stability, alliance management, and regional rivalries. In doing so, the paper aims to demonstrate the process by which the North Korea factor alters the contours of domestic security dynamics with serious implicaitons for regional security dynamics in East Asia. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My research paper deals with the U.S. Foreign Policies concerning about the human rights situations in North Korea and Iraq. It attempts to compare the cases of North Korea and Iraq. Moreover, the study investigates the relations between U.S. military action and human rights protection as a main reason of intervention. Ultimately, it tries to predict the future of North Korea based on the Iraqi case.... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are American policy makers so concerned with the possibility that states like North Korea and Iran might acquire nuclear weapons? Does the fact that new nuclear states lack experience in dealing with nuclear weapons influence their ability to credibly signal resolve in disputes or the level of certainty adversaries have about their likely behavior? This article evaluates whether the length of time states have nuclear weapons influences their behavior and the behavior of opponents in militarized disputes. Utilizing multiple statistical models and illustrative cases, the paper shows that while acquiring nuclear weapons makes states significantly more likely to reciprocate militarized challenges and have their challenges reciprocated, over time the effect reverses. In contrast to Waltz?s static understanding of nuclear weapons, this variation in outcomes over time highlights the difficulties involved in successfully coercing new nuclear powers, explaining why global powers like the United States strongly oppose nuclear weapons proliferation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jason E. Bartolomei and William D. CasebeerNorth Korea has long been one of the United States? greatest foreign policy challenges. This paper seeks to provide policy makers a new perspective on potential North Korea policy options using a systems engineering framework for the problem. By using a systems engineering approach, policy makers will be able to expand the number and quality of the mental models surrounding reasoning about U.S.-North Korean relations and to develop a more robust policy that addresses all facets of U.S. interests in the region. While systems engineering approaches are not a panacea, they are nonetheless extremely helpful for generating new thinking about old problems and are a critical component of any effective engagement strategy. In the case of the DPRK, even the first two steps of the systems engineering process?the identification of stakeholders and explicit analysis and comparison of their goals?bring to light new policy options for coping with North Korean proliferation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will deal with patterns of US/North Korean negotiations behavior observed at the six-party talks. The author will make some suggestions to resolve the second North Korea?s nuclear crisis based on the negotiations patterns of both sides. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite dramatic fluctuations in the relationship between the United States and North Korea since the end of the Cold War, there has been little effort to examine the extent to which the strategic and tactical thinking of both countries have changed. This paper argues that in the post-Cold War era, while Washington has changed its strategic thinking from Clinton?s ?regime transformation? to Bush?s ?regime collapse,? Pyongyang?s strategic thinking for its ?regime survival? has remained basically unchanged, although its tactical thinking has changed from cooperation to confrontation in response to the changes in the US tactical thinking from engagement to containment. In an effort to understand the continuity and change in foreign policies in both countries, this study uses constructivism as a theoretical framework to analyze rules and order constituted by both countries and explore their effects on foreign policy decision making processes. To do so, this study draws on public speeches and statements primarily from Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and the Foreign Ministry of North Korea for Pyongyang?s part, and documents mainly from the White House, U.S. State Department, U.S. Defense Department, CIA, and U.S. Congress for Washington?s part. These statements are coded according to rule types in order to uncover evidence of these strategic and tactical changes. This approach will especially be beneficial given the lack of information about North Korea caused by its isolation. This study will also contribute both to constructivism and foreign policy analysis by showing how international relations are social relations, an approach that brings agent and structure together in the same analysis and, in consequence, that highlights both structural adaptation and policy innovation.Keywords: US-North Korean Relations, Constructivism, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, The Clinton Administration, The Bush Administration, Regime Transformation, Regime Change, Regime Survival, Strategic and Tactical Thinking ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, United States security is challenged by a major nuclear proliferation concern on the Korean Peninsula, as North Korea is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. This paper argues that the similarities and differences between Clinton?s and W. Bush?s foreign policy towards North Korea can be understood through Jeffrey Taliaferro?s defensive realist model, which includes systemic, state and individual variables. First, at a systemic level, the nature of the security dilemma in North East Asia and the offense-defense balance in military technology explain why both administrations have privileged the diplomatic path in order to resolve the 1993 and 2002 nuclear crises. Second, at a state level, the growth of China?s influence over North Korea illustrates why Clinton?s administration engaged bilaterally with Kim Jong Il?s regime, whereas W. Bush?s administration has chosen to go the opposite way. Third, at an individual level, the perceptions of key decision makers in each administration demonstrate why the Clinton administration opted for a strategy of economic engagement and political cooperation, whereas Bush?s closest advisors favored economic pressures and political isolation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Six-Party Talks, being the culmination of about fifteen years of diplomatic endeavors that had started with the 1994 Agreed Framework, were hailed as a disappointing mechanism after the September 19, 2005 agreement was dismissed a few days after its signature. After North Korea tested its nuclear weapon in October 2006, the whole process seemed to have been crucified. However, the Six-Party Talks appeared to have been resurrected in light of a new agreement reached during the fifth round of talks held in February 2007. Nevertheless, many still argue that all those years of negotiations have only led to agreements very similar in nature to the 1994 Agreed Framework. Thus, scholarship on the topic of North Korea often looks at independent variables and their effect on the future of Northeast Asia. The outlook chosen in this paper is different from existing works. We do not concentrate on explaining how to obtain change in the dependent variable (outcome of negotiations) but we suggest that while not much progress has been made in terms of implementing agreements, change in the power structure of the system with the United States getting entangled in the War in Iraq, its unwillingness to directly deal with North Korea from 2001 to 2003, Pyongyang's ability to overcome its own economic disaster and domestic political crises, as well as China's willingness to become a prime actor in the Six-Party process have led to parties now being able to talk. Thus, we argue that increased knowledge and familiarity with each actor's position has led to increased cooperation which has then been translated into the acceptance of multilateral rounds of negotiations as a credible structure to deal with instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. In essence, even though no ideal destination has been reached yet, everybody is better off being on the road and searching for a way, instead of being left alone, unable to understand where others would like to go. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Barack Obama began his presidency pledged to opening a new era of American engagement. But what he understood engagement to be and how he practiced it with respect to addressing North Korea's and Iran's nuclear programs was not what is generally understood to be "engagement." Though prepared from the start to offer positive sanctions (the defining means of engagement) to those states if they complied with U.S. demands for denuclearization, the administration quickly implemented a second, coercive track to compel the two states to engage. After two years of steadily escalating pressure, both Iran and North Korea had agreed to rejoin talks, but whether the scene was set for true engagement remained to be seen. The administration's experience through early 2011 confirms theoretical expectations that successful engagement between adversaries is highly unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and North Korea have had a troubled relationship since the creation of the DPRK in 1948.For the United States the DPRK was one of many strategic adversaries, but a particularly nasty one. For North Korea in principle the US epitomized an imperial threat to everything the DPRK represented and in practice posed a tangible military threat to the DPRK?s very existence. This paper will examine the changes and continuity in US North Korea policy during G.W. Bush?s second term. This research will specifically discuss the following questions: How U.S. policy toward the DPRK's nuclear policies (energy and weapons) evolved to date?; What policy options does the United States possesse?; And What are the prospects for the United States resolving its concerns about North Korea's nuclear capabilities? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The North Korean nuclear issue-- a serious international issue as the most important obstacle to the Korean peace process-- needs to be resolved as soon as possible peacefully through diplomatic negotiations at the six-party talks. The Bush administration insisted that the North Korean nuclear crisis be resolved through the six-party process. The author has argued that the six-party process is the best means to resolve the North Korean nuclear dispute. The author maintains that bilateral talks between the U. S. and North Korea are essential to a resolution of North KoreaÂ’s nuclear standoff peacefully and diplomatically. Both need to engage in direct negotiations without preconditions through the six-party talks. Both U.S. and North KoreaÂ’s hard-line policies cannot resolve the nuclear issue peacefully. Therefore, both sides need to be flexible about their respective positions with political will to make a compromise. This paper has three specific goals: (1) to evaluate the fourth and fifth rounds of the six-party talks as a multilateral framework of resolving the nuclear issue; (2) to take a closer look at the U.S. financial sanctions against North Korea and the positions of concerned parties; and (3) to make policy recommendations for implementing the 9.19 joint statement to realize a denuclearized Korean peninsula. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent issue of ISQ, Peter Howard argued that realism would have expected the United States to invade North Korea rather than Iraq in 2002, and that only a language-based constructivist approach to international relations can explain why the U.S. chose to invade Iraq instead. I present a rational and empirical analysis suggesting that this approach is totally unnecessary to explain this decision, and that it was completely rational for Iraq to be a preferred target over North Korea. The language analysis interprets realism too narrowly, and in fact unreasonably. I present predictions from statistical models of war duration and fatalities that show that a war with North Korea would be predicted to be dramatically longer and more dangerous than a war with Iraq. Given similar fears in both cases, the United States chose the target that was expected to be easier, that is, the target with lower (expected) costs of war. This is perfectly consistent with rational choice/expected utility theory. The analysis suggests that the constructivist language games followed the rational choice between targets rather than influenced that choice; policy differences in this case can in fact be explained by ?mainstream? theory. [Note: I do not intend in this paper to defend decisions concerning Iraq or North Korea. Rather, it responds to the argument that between the two potential targets, North Korea should have been the selected target. While invading either state may have been misguided, statistical evidence suggests that North Korea would have been an even more difficult target for the United States to tackle.] ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, government, academic and media accounts have frequently characterized nuclear nonproliferation policies of the United States and other developed states as an example of a ?good cop/bad cop? strategy. Social-Psychological literature has long identified ?good/cop bad cop? as a strategy by which a hostile and a sympathetic agent each play off one another to induce compliance from a target torn by the stress of ?emotional contrast?. This paper examines whether this model can fruitfully be applied to nonproliferation diplomacy toward the two remaining states in the Bush ?axis of evil?: Iran and the Democratic People?s Republic of North Korea (DPRK). Individual level theories of state behavior suggest that it may. Neo-Realist would tend to suggest that it may not. The Iranian and North Korean proliferation threats are vastly different in many respects. However, in both instances, ongoing multilateral diplomacy (including negotiation) has cast the United States and its partners in contrasting roles, with the former favoring pressure and sticks, and at least some of the latter favoring a engagement and carrots. These roles are at least suggestive of the model. But are these different roles evidence of a planned, coordinated attempt to create dissonance in, and concessions from, the two target countries? Or are they merely a default position reflective of oft-remarked differences of interest and world-view between the United States and its European and Asia negotiating partners, differences that may be exploited by the target states? In theory, the good cop/bad cop strategy operates in the context of a power distribution that strongly favors both influence agents over the target. In a unipolar global system, what is the effect of a wide power disparity between the bad cop and the good cop on the prospects for advancing nonproliferation goals? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The North Korean nuclear crisis exemplifies how a determined leadership of an impoverished country can adroitly enhance its power position by exploiting weaknesses in a global regime -- in this case the NPT -- and disparate and even conflicting interests of the powerful countries. Will going nuclear further add to the small state's ability or weaken it? What policy options does the U.S. and other powers have to contain the danger of a nuclear North Korea and, at the same time, enhance peace and stability beyond the nuclear crisis? This paper will explore these questions. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's North Korea policy throughout the postwar period was dictated by its need to maintain its alliance with the United States to secure its own peace. The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework did not alter Japan's fundamental policy toward North Korea. The current nuclear crisis and the prospect of a nuclear North Korea is forcing Tokyo to review its approach to Pyongyang. Japan supports the six-party talks as a means to solve the nuclear crisis, but it is increasingly aware that the multilateral framework may not be able to produce an outcome acceptable to both North Korea (the source of Japan's security anxiety) and the United States (the most reliable security ally), as well as to the other regional powers. A nuclear North Korea would spell an end to the Pyongyang Declaration, in which Japan and North Korea stated that normalization of their bilateral relations would contribute to the broader regional peace and stability. It would force Japan to reconsider its security policy in a fundamental way, with far reaching implications for Japan's relations with the other neighboring countries. This paper will discuss Japan's current policy toward the North Korean nuclear crisis and the implications of a nuclear North Korea for Japan's relations with the United States and other neighboring countries. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the secretive nature of North Korean regime, uncertainty of North Korea’s strategic targets plays an important role in evaluating the nature of North Korea crises. In retrospect to the history of Korean Peninsula, this essay argues that North Korea ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades the US has identified and aggressively confronted states like North Korea, Iran, and Libya as pariahs due to their attempts to gain nuclear weapons outside of, or despite the international nonproliferation regime. So then how exactly do w ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 12 1993 as North Korea declared that it refused to allow inspectors access to its nuclear sites and would plan to withdraw from NPT the Korean peninsula had faced to the political crisis. Although temporary breaking off, however, the region had come to stable situation as singing the Agreed Framework and then establishing KEDO. Then the EU participated in KEDO regime as they decided to contribute to KEDO ECU 15 million annually for five years in1997. In these conditions, this article focuses on “How to explain emerging of KEDO”, “Why suddenly and lately the EU participated in KEDO”. In certain environment, international players try to make decisions in an attempt to optimize their outcome and efforts. If they are players of rational choice tendency, it is essential assumption to make their action. This behaviour naturally leads to create regime in given-issue areas. Regime theory can be explained as choice matter and is beyond debates between Realists and Institutionalists because their main arguments all are based on rational choice â€" based on interests and power - of international players in anarchic system. Thus game theory base on rational choice assumption is a valuable instrument to describe KEDO emerging and the EU’s accession to KEDO as empirical cases. The former will be analyzed as Prisoner’s game and latter as suasion game. Furthermore, this article also tries to analyze “How did the U.S. solve the credibility dilemma?” If the dominant power adopted a linkage strategy in suasion game by informal bribes or lobbying, the power often faces to have to carry out promises. In KEDO case, it has important implications that instead of KEDO, the six-party talks have been developed since George W. Bush Administration has inaugurated in January 2001, and that it has brought to change from global regime to regional one in East Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can the United States more effectively deter North Korea? We revisit the traditional model of deterrence theory, and compare its successful application against Soviet aggression to existing attempts to prevent potential North Korean ambitions to sell or use its nuclear material or technology. We argue the United States has not applied the full range of deterrent tools, which include not only threats of retaliation, and the capabilities and commitment to do so, but also requires sustained diplomatic ties and palatable alternatives for the opponent. Thus we base our discussion of US-DPRK bilateral relations on a broader interpretation of deterrence theory, and propose a two-pronged strategy for the U.S. First, we propose that the U.S. rigorously engage North Korea in “transformational diplomacy,” which: (1) calls for the U.S. to engage weaker states in a spirit of partnership, not paternalism; (2) empowers American diplomats to take the lead in shaping political outcomes as needed; and (3) reallocates diplomatic resources where none presently exist. Second, we propose a different approach to mutual cooperation in energy provision in the Korean peninsula, premised on having North Korea, which currently has no existing capabilities for nuclear energy generation, host reactors that deliver energy to South Korea. This would allow for a scenario where the North never finds it in its interest to disrupt energy supplies to the South, and where the South is willing to pay the fixed costs of nuclear plant construction, in exchange for a discounted stream of energy supply from the North. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines competing theoretical accounts of the regional activism following the second nuclear crisis in North Korea in October 2002. It offers an alternative account based on regional understanding and practice regarding the North Korean challenge. The author argues that the U.S. and the regional countries have different understanding of the North Korean issue. It considers the efforts of the U.S. to seek the regime transformation of the Kim Jong Il regime as a positive sign.

The article discusses the autonomy in the foreign policy of Japan. It presents a historical background of Japan's relationship with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the immediate post-World War II period. It summarizes the domestic factors within Japan that led to a different North Korea foreign policy to that of the U.S. It mentions how Japanese autonomy is maintained in policy regulations.

The article discusses the tension between North Korea and the U.S. over the nuclear issue. It states that the Pyongyang government may take advantage of the tendency of the U.S. to use its own preemptive preemption strategy as the U.S. cope with North Korean brinkmanship in the Iraq war. It suggests that U.S. authorities should determine the nuances behind Pyongyang's approach to brinkmanship. It cites the need for the U.S. government to revise its policies to allow the expansion of bilateral and multilateral contacts between the two countries.

The article discusses the nature and sources of the dispute between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea. It explores the U.S.-ROK political relationship with emphasis on the leadership of U.S. President George W. Bush. It provides an overview of the salient issues in bilateral relations between the two countries. The author describes the approaches by Roh Moo-Hyun of the New Millennium Party and Bush to the nuclear issues in North Korea.

That China has been politically and economically playing an important role in the world has great impact to regions all over the world, especially in East Asia. After the Cold War, Japan has gradually walked out of its past "one nation pacifism," actively participating in the international affairs under frameworks of "U.S.-Japan alliance" and the U.N. It is to fulfill its dream of becoming a "political great power." Therefore, Japan has also been playing an important role in the regional issues. On November 2002, North Korea decided to reactivate its uranium-enriching program. It has raised the tension in the region of East Asia; it has also disturbed international relations in the region. The U.S. expects China and Japan, two great powers in the Northeast Asia, intervene in the North Korea problem, hoping to solve the problem with multi-literal agreement. Can the North Korea nuclear crisis shorten the diplomatic distance between China and Japan, establishing the "military strategic partnership," or showing the radical paradox between the two countries? Examining interactions between China and Japan in the North Korea nuclear crisis can clarify the thinking of two countries' regional strategies and benefits of competition and cooperation in politic, security, and economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In dealing with the latest nuclear crisis in North Korea, which began in late 2002 and was still evolving, expectations on China have been high. In February 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush placed a call to Chinese President Jiang Zemin urging him to take a ‘joint responsibility’ to ensure a ‘nuclear-weapons-free peninsula’. As a major power bordering on the Korean peninsula and North Korea’s only remaining ally, China has a major stake in a peaceful resolution of North Korea’s issue. This study examines China’s relations with the Korean peninsula by focusing on North Korea’s nuclear crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea’s escalation of its nuclear program is posing serious threat for security of East Asia. In cope with the situation, the U.S. currently relies on diplomatic means as the trilateral party meeting in Beijing indicates. Though the Chinese influence over North Korea is significant, the outcome of diplomatic maneuver is not certain. Danger of regional conflicts can not be ruled out. How to settle the issue decides a political structure not only of the Korean Peninsular but also of East Asia as well as of the intercourse of the U.S.A. with the region. The U.S. may achieve the policy goal against a rogue regime and the process of the settlement will change the US- China relation as well which is the important element of the Pax Americana II. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

US Policy toward North Korea under the Bush Administration has been a failure in many ways, but most importantly, under its watch North Korea has tested a rudimentary nuclear device. The US currently has much at stake in the successful outcome of the Six ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally the United States has adopted sanctions based foreign policy approach to punish states that do not meet with international norms. The objective of these sanctions is to shock economically and politically opponents into accommodating new orde ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the onset of the Korean War in 1950, North Korea has faced sanctions from the United States. This external pressure has recently been both intensified and broadened in the aftermath of Pyongyangs nuclear testing in 2006, when the United Nations impo ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of two developments must transpire before a durable peace can be established on the Korean Peninsula. Either North Korea must be transformed or the United States and its allies South Korea and Japan must transform their policies toward North Korea. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the protracted hostility and mutual distrust between the United States and North Korea, the North Korean nuclear issue is finally expected to be settled by a diplomatic negotiation and a peaceful resolution. The negotiated settlement can be best understood and explained by a combined theoretical framework incorporating elements of both constructivism and game theory. Contrary to the common assumption that these two approaches are somehow inimical, they are neither incompatible nor contradictory. As a matter of fact, constructivists do not deny that people are rational, because they acknowledge that people have ends and make choices accordingly. Game theory, in this sense, can be a bridge to fill the gap between constructivism and rational choice theory. When it is combined with constructivism, furthermore, game theory offers a compelling explanation for US-North Korean relations surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue since the end of the Cold War. It also offers certain predictions regarding future outcomes of strategic interactions between two countries. This study suggests that changed preferences and payoffs in both countries since the end of the Cold War have finally led to cooperation and the negotiated settlement.Keywords: Constructivism, Game Theory, North Korea, The United States ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At times, scholars claim certain theories have universal application or fit the majority of relevant phenomena. This extends to the field of international relations. Realism, liberalism, constructivism, domestic approaches and their various offshoots are empowered to claim theoretical dominance across diverse events in world politics. Then, scholars who conduct case studies may employ one of these theories to explain events. The conclusions may or may not be compelling; however, I have not seen many instances where scholars invoke multiple theoretical perspectives in order to enhance an explanation of a particular case. An eclectic approach, ideally based on a pragmatic reflection of available theories, can serve this purpose. I attempted just this after researching both post-Cold War US North Korean policy and various theoretical approaches used in international relations. Two questions drove the investigation. One, why did the primary influence on US policy change from Kim Dae Jung?s March 2000 announcement of the upcoming inter-Korean summit to the conclusion of Bush?s DPRK policy review in June 2001? Two, what explains the extent to which Clinton and Bush differed with respect to North Korean policy? In order to answer these questions the study contains three sections following the introduction. First, there is a brief description of U.S.-DPRK relations from the beginning of the Cold War until Bush?s policy review. Second, the explanatory section defines the relevant variables and describes the theories which explain the influences on U.S. policy. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings and discusses some important implications. My sources include various books and articles devoted to theory, US foreign policy and Northeast Asia. I also used relevant newspaper accounts both to highlight certain details of past US Cold War policy on the Korean peninsula and to provide a more focused description of events during the Summit Glow. Before moving on, let me define Summit Glow. NY Times reporter Calvin Sims used it to refer to the positive conditions created by the inter-Korean summit. I then assume it lasted from March 2000 to June 2001 and refers to the atmosphere established by Kim Dae Jung?s Sunshine Policy plus the summit.The influences on US policy, whether direct or indirect, are as follows. The US-DPRK Cold War status-quo, defined as Washington and Pyongyang?s particular Cold War relationship, was the dominant influence on US policy until March 2000. I will also refer to it as simply ?the status-quo?. The status-quo also reduced the pro-engagement impact of the Summit Glow on US policy. After President Kim?s March announcement, again the dominant influence became the Summit Glow on US policy until June 2001. The Summit Glow acts as the independent variable on our two study variables, which are the North Korean policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations. Although the Summit Glow positioned US policy as pro-engagement, administration ideology and Congress further conditioned each policy within the boundaries of the Summit Glow?s influence. These two forces pushed Clinton toward more pro-active support and Bush toward more reluctant support. After June 2001, the Summit Glow faded as the prime influence. At the time, Bush announced his new North Korean policy which intentionally established conditions that reduced the probability of positive engagement. The attitudes underlying the old status-quo then basically returned to the peninsula, albeit in lighter form as we would later witness meeker attempts at engagement through the six-party talks. Three lessons stem from conducting this particular case study. The lessons highlight why structural realism, constructivism and history are vital to the explanation. The first is the power of the past. The Summit Glow injected a strong stimulant into peninsular relations but ultimately the transformation of U.S... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Though the security situation is improving in the Middle East, the US will not easily withdraw its troops. Meanwhile, security environment has rather deteriorated in East Asia. In view of the growing instability in Asia, Japan has revised Defense Policy Outline last December and it has been strengthening the alliance with the U.S.A as the recent DPRI shows. Furthermore, emergence of North Korea as a nuclear power, liquid political state in South Korea and deteriorating relationships with China are stimulating the Japanese public sentiment toward a more security conscious direction. In 1980, the so-called Ohira report asserted that Japan should not be involved too much into the affaires in the Asian Continent. Japan should, the author argues, take more care of geopolitical identities. Actually Japan has developed as a nation of the Rim Pacific Ocean consolidating the alliance with the USA (possibly with Australia). It also has enjoyed prosperous relationship with ASEAN nations and the countries surrounding Indian Ocean as a sea power. Japan should make more use of these assets when it deals with the continental giant. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]