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(Proposal for Panel: Electoral Rules and Electoral Change in Latin America) Electoral rules can be understood as an insurance mechanism against uncertainty in electoral outcomes. District magnitude in proportional representation systems, together with the seat-allocation formula and the drawing of district boundaries can be used as tools to reduce the uncertainty associated with elections. When choosing electoral rules, electoral designers establish the level of insurance against electoral defeats. Risk-averse designers will select rules where the damage of an electoral defeat will be minimized by the distortions produced by the electoral rules. Once electoral rules that insured against electoral defeats are in place, will risk-averse office-holders have any incentives to change them in favor of rules where voters have a greater influence on who gets elected? Using the case of Chile’s unusual across the board 2-seat proportional representation system, I argue that once an electoral set of rules that successfully insures against electoral defeats is in place, there will not be enough support among legislators to change the status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]