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This paper tries to look at the interactions between the U.S., Taiwan, and China in the period of 1987-1997. It will test two hypotheses that explain conflicts and cooperation between two regional rival states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Taiwan was the most conflictual issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Ross, 1995). How the dynamics of the “strategic triangle” consisting of the U.S., Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How is the U.S. “strategic ambiguity” policy to be explained? Neorealists may argue that there was a tacit agreement between Beijing and Washington that so long as cooperation was imperative, the status quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations was temporarily acceptable. Revisionists such as Robert S. Ross, however, hold a more sophisticated view that even in the midst of cooperation, the ongoing conflict required continuous negotiations and mutual adjustment between the U.S. and P.R.C. (Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, few study, if any, have provided theoretical answers to the questions that under what conditions the equilibrium of status quo holds, how the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan will affect the equilibrium outcomes of the game, and how the so-called strategic ambiguity policy is to be explained? By developing a game theoretic model, this paper will provide theoretical answers to those unresolved questions, drawing out both theoretical and policy implications. A historical examination of the interactions between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan since the Korea War will be done to further illustrate the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1972 US-China rapprochement was a watershed in the US-China relations. Since 1949 establishment of People’s Republic of China, the U.S. and China had always conflicted in international arena. They fought in Korean War and Vietnam War, which were major wars during the Cold War era. The 1972 US-China rapprochement clearly demolished the enmity between them, and open a new era of friendship that has lasted in contemporary century. The Communist giant, China, and the superpower, the United States, had led international détente mood in 1970s. In particular, their friendly relationship tranquilized the tension of Northeast Asia surround Korean peninsular. In fact, Two Koreas concluded the 1974 South-North Common Communiqué, which is paralleled to the Shanghai Communiqué between China and the United State in 1972. However, unlike the conventional wisdom on the 1972 US-China rapprochement, its implication to Northeast Asian countries is quite negative. The rapprochement dismantled the stable balance of power in Northeast Asia surrounding Korean peninsular. The U.S. withdrew U.S army from South Korea, and that shocked the Park Jung-hee regime of South Korea. Kim Il-sung regime in North Korea also could not be comfortable with China, which came to be a friend of the U.S. that is an archenemy of North Korea. In sum, the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement generated a security problem in Korean peninsula. That never contributed to any peaceful mood in confronting structure in Korean peninsula although two Koreas technically concluded the 1974 South-North Common Communiqué. Instead, that dismantled the existing balance of military power. Two Koreas had begun to spur their nuclear program due to their vulnerable security. I analyze the implication of the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement to the Korean peninsula. Why could the internationally common détente not lead any actual détente in Korean peninsula? That is because of the different perspectives between the big powers, China and the U.S., and small states, North and South Korea. Unlike the U.S. and China, the two Koreas understood the 1972 rapprochement as an urgent threat to their national security My analysis focuses on why the decision makers of China, the United States, and two Koreas differently understood and interpreted the 1972 rapprochement. That also contributes to understand why North Korea still clings to the nuclear development despite its desperate economic situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]