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This paper wants to explore the relationship between international debt and international relations. This research argues that international debt patterns, connected with trade, have an influence not only on economic relations, but on political ones as well. Reversely, political relations have an influence on how countries can use the instrument of debt for their own economic and political goals. The paper utilizes game theory models to explain debt/trade political relationship in two cases: the 1st Opium War between the UK and China, and the current economic relationship between China and the USA. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Washington and Beijing are currently buttressing their military presence in the Pacific region. This paper, utilizing realist and hegemonic theories, deals with how the United States and China will handle this potentially volatile situation. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an aggregate analysis of Congress's role in foreign policy, in particular U.S. policy toward China. That Congress has always been an active and influential actor in China policy makes such a study necessary and meaningful. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese foreign policy is changing to reflect the realities of a new world order, an order in which the United States is a hegemon with unsurpassed power and China seeks to successfully continue its “communism with capitalist characteristics”. In this world, China has wisely chosen not to compete directly with the United States, but to use the development of regional multilateral institutions to spread its influence while diluting that of the global hegemon. One poignant example of this policy is the ASEAN+3 forum and the ongoing development of an East Asian Security Community (EASC). Considering that China is a key member of ASEAN+3, it can serve as a powerful catalyst or obstacle to the development of an EASC. To what extent will China support such a security community? Why would it support a security community at all? To answer these two questions, this paper will present an overview of Chinese engagement with ASEAN+3 and the recent East Asian Summit, as well as explore what may be driving this increased multilateral engagement. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to look at the interactions between the U.S., Taiwan, and China in the period of 1987-1997. It will test two hypotheses that explain conflicts and cooperation between two regional rival states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Taiwan was the most conflictual issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Ross, 1995). How the dynamics of the “strategic triangle” consisting of the U.S., Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How is the U.S. “strategic ambiguity” policy to be explained? Neorealists may argue that there was a tacit agreement between Beijing and Washington that so long as cooperation was imperative, the status quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations was temporarily acceptable. Revisionists such as Robert S. Ross, however, hold a more sophisticated view that even in the midst of cooperation, the ongoing conflict required continuous negotiations and mutual adjustment between the U.S. and P.R.C. (Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, few study, if any, have provided theoretical answers to the questions that under what conditions the equilibrium of status quo holds, how the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan will affect the equilibrium outcomes of the game, and how the so-called strategic ambiguity policy is to be explained? By developing a game theoretic model, this paper will provide theoretical answers to those unresolved questions, drawing out both theoretical and policy implications. A historical examination of the interactions between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan since the Korea War will be done to further illustrate the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When a foreign policy program has failed, why do some states change that policy while other states continue to pursue the same unsuccessful program? I present a model that explains adaptability to foreign policy failure in terms of the interaction of the three levels of analysis most in the literature on foreign policy decision-making: the leader, the bureaucracy, and the public. I test this model with a large-n statistical analysis of foreign policy change and continuity over time. The results suggest that, while the interaction of leaders, bureaucrats, and citizens do affect foreign policy adaptability, it is the salience and content of particular foreign policy issues that determines how those interactions promote or preclude change. The findings, along with two case studies of China's and the US's policies towards African energy security, also offer support for the argument that we might do well to focus more research on issue areas rather than specific events or actor types when explaining international outcomes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why were anti-American protests allowed by the Chinese government in 1999 but prevented in 2001? I argue authoritarian leaders face incentives to allow anti-foreign protests in order to gain bargaining leverage in diplomatic negotiations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Indo-U.S. triangular relationships in the post-Cold War era since India's 1998 nuclear tests, with specific focus on Indian perceptions of its relations with the U.S. and China as well as its role in the strategic triangle. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What shapes and often reshapes congressional roll-call vote choices on the extension of Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status for China? The gradual engagement policy by the Chinese government in post-Tiananmen period has opened doors not only to American business interests, but also to religious groups and human rights activists. Few studies, however, deal with how those outside influences are translated into legislative outcome in the origin country including the United States. Building upon simple, conditional, and ordered logistic regression models, I estimate what determines vote choices by members of Congress (MCs) on the NTR extension for China in Congress. There are two main findings. First, partisan politics do not stop at the water’s edge, where party dynamics matter, along with constituency pressures and ideological preferences. Northern Democrats and new Democrats, for instance, use the NTR vote as a leverage to represent and promote their own group interests. Presidential party status is critical for vote changes in 2001. Second, a typical liberal-conservative conflict does not apply to a critical foreign policy issue such as NTR extension for China. With different motivations, liberal and conservative members of Congress vote together to disapprove NTR extension for China. The results imply that congressional politics of China policy play out not only around economic interests inviting less ideological divide in recent periods but also around non-economic issues such as human rights and religious freedom involving more ideological conflicts in the US Congress. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1972 US-China rapprochement was a watershed in the US-China relations. Since 1949 establishment of People’s Republic of China, the U.S. and China had always conflicted in international arena. They fought in Korean War and Vietnam War, which were major wars during the Cold War era. The 1972 US-China rapprochement clearly demolished the enmity between them, and open a new era of friendship that has lasted in contemporary century. The Communist giant, China, and the superpower, the United States, had led international détente mood in 1970s. In particular, their friendly relationship tranquilized the tension of Northeast Asia surround Korean peninsular. In fact, Two Koreas concluded the 1974 South-North Common Communiqué, which is paralleled to the Shanghai Communiqué between China and the United State in 1972. However, unlike the conventional wisdom on the 1972 US-China rapprochement, its implication to Northeast Asian countries is quite negative. The rapprochement dismantled the stable balance of power in Northeast Asia surrounding Korean peninsular. The U.S. withdrew U.S army from South Korea, and that shocked the Park Jung-hee regime of South Korea. Kim Il-sung regime in North Korea also could not be comfortable with China, which came to be a friend of the U.S. that is an archenemy of North Korea. In sum, the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement generated a security problem in Korean peninsula. That never contributed to any peaceful mood in confronting structure in Korean peninsula although two Koreas technically concluded the 1974 South-North Common Communiqué. Instead, that dismantled the existing balance of military power. Two Koreas had begun to spur their nuclear program due to their vulnerable security. I analyze the implication of the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement to the Korean peninsula. Why could the internationally common détente not lead any actual détente in Korean peninsula? That is because of the different perspectives between the big powers, China and the U.S., and small states, North and South Korea. Unlike the U.S. and China, the two Koreas understood the 1972 rapprochement as an urgent threat to their national security My analysis focuses on why the decision makers of China, the United States, and two Koreas differently understood and interpreted the 1972 rapprochement. That also contributes to understand why North Korea still clings to the nuclear development despite its desperate economic situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This project employs tools of political psychology to take a new look at a traditional puzzle in International Relations. According to conventional wisdom, when faced with the prospect of a nuclear exchange, states with nuclear arsenals are particularly cautious of their behavior during times of crisis or conflict. This nuclear peace, as it has been termed, is founded in traditional theories of deterrence and mutually-assured destruction. The often-overlooked alternative to nuclear peace is limited war, in which parties to a conflict mutually recognize that the nuclear option is untenable, and are therefore more likely to enter into a conventional conflict. The critical difference between these models of conflict behavior is the assumption of rationality during escalation. That is, nuclear peace theory assumes that a conflict, once begun, is unpredictable and uncontrollable. Limited war theory, on the other hand, allows for rational, step-by-step escalation, during which adversaries may choose to halt the process before a nuclear exchange takes place. This leaves us with a puzzle: under what conditions will states engage in nuclear peace versus limited war? As the existence of nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea become more and more probable, this issue is deserving of increased attention. In this analysis of crisis decision-making, I employ two case studies. The 1955 Taiwan Straits crisis, involving China and the U.S., is an example of successful nuclear deterrence. Threats by the U.S., particularly statements to the American public by Kennedy and Dulles, convinced the Chinese government to cease shelling of Taiwan and led to almost immediate de-escalation of the conflict. The other case I look at is the 1999 crisis in Kargil, involving India and Pakistan. An early spring incursion across the Kashmiri Line of Control by Pakistani troops led to a three-month mini-war between India and Pakistan. After weeks of escalation, including mass mobilization of the Indian Navy and the deaths of numerous combatants from both parties, the crisis de-escalated in July and both states retreated to pre-conflict positions in Kashmir. What led to the success of nuclear deterrence in 1955 that was absent during the limited war of 1999? Alternatively, what allowed India and Pakistan to enter a conventional war in Kargil that China and the U.S. were unable to employ in Taiwan? I contend that a structural or systemic explanation of conflict behavior cannot explain the conditions under which states would choose a strategy of nuclear peace versus limited war. Instead, we must look to decision-making theories from political psychology. Specifically, I draw upon theories of political taboos, schema/heuristics, and priming. These tools, traditionally used to explain American political behavior, are particularly well-suited to explain how states make decisions prior to and during periods of conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]