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(Proposal for Panel: Electoral Rules and Electoral Change in Latin America) Electoral rules can be understood as an insurance mechanism against uncertainty in electoral outcomes. District magnitude in proportional representation systems, together with the seat-allocation formula and the drawing of district boundaries can be used as tools to reduce the uncertainty associated with elections. When choosing electoral rules, electoral designers establish the level of insurance against electoral defeats. Risk-averse designers will select rules where the damage of an electoral defeat will be minimized by the distortions produced by the electoral rules. Once electoral rules that insured against electoral defeats are in place, will risk-averse office-holders have any incentives to change them in favor of rules where voters have a greater influence on who gets elected? Using the case of Chile’s unusual across the board 2-seat proportional representation system, I argue that once an electoral set of rules that successfully insures against electoral defeats is in place, there will not be enough support among legislators to change the status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effect that support for the political government and several other political factors have on citizens' attitudes towards police in three Latin American countries and the United States. Traditional views hold that citizens’ attitudes toward the police are driven by local concerns. We contend that the failure to examine the police in a political and comparative context has contributed to a lack of understanding of the role of the police in relation to the overall political system. Using data from Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and the United States, we test whether citizens’ attitudes toward the police are related to their attitudes toward the national government. We find that attitudes toward the police and the national government are linked, and this linkage is responsive to the influence of national election campaigns in varying degrees. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]