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The purpose for this research paper is to investigate the reasons behind the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) initiation of democratization in Taiwan in using the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico as comparison. The KMT should be consider as one of the rare hegemonic ruling party in the world to survive democratic transitions intact, even though the nature and structures of the party have been changed tremendously through democratization. The PRI possess the same qualities. However, the reasons for initiating liberalization of the two parties were somewhat different. Ultimately, four explanatory factors (two internal, two external) emerged as the main contributors to the democratization process in Taiwan. They are: first, the development of Taiwanese identity different from that of the Chinese; second, the political demands and activism of a growing middle class due to the economic success; third, the changes in United States foreign policy towards the encouragement of democratization; and fourth and most importantly, the competition with China for support and the recognition from the international community and the need for the Taiwanese government to enhance its appeal to international supporters, particularly the United States. In addition, while the four factors mentioned above all contributed to the KMT-led democratization in Taiwan, the influence of the United State’s foreign policy in the Fast East and its support of democratic states should be considered the most significant factor contributing to the democratization in Taiwan. In sum, the hypothesis proposed by this research paper is that the accumulation and interaction of all four factors made democratization in Taiwan and the end of the KMT one-party dominance inevitable, with the external pressure from the U.S. essentially playing the most significant role in impelling the KMT elites’ decision to liberalize, adopt electoral reform and stop the persecution of the opposition. The theoretical approaches of the paper are as the following: this paper will adopt the definition of “democracy” provided by Linz and Stepan (1978) to serve as guidelines for whether there is democracy in both Taiwan and Mexico. The definition from Linz states that the criteria of democracy are: “ [The] legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, free speech, and other basic freedoms of person; free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the political community. Practically, this means the freedom to create political parties and to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without excluding any effective political office from direct or indirect electoral accountability” (Linz, 5). The paper will also posit that Lipset’s take on modernization theory (1959) holds valid in the case of Taiwan. The economic success in the 1970s and 1980s created a large, well-organized middle class that in turn demanded more political freedom, equality and liberalization. In addition, the paper also addresses Linz and Diamond’s (1989) claim that the genesis and maintenance of democracy is ‘greatly facilitated by values and behavioral dispositions, particularly at the elite level, of compromise, flexibility, tolerance, conciliation, moderation and restraint” (Linz, 12). The methodology use by the paper will be comparative analysis on both the KMT and the PRI’s initiation to liberalize. The paper will also provide historical analysis on the nature of the KMT and its 50-year dominance on Taiwan. Lastly, the paper analyzes voter turn-outs and the results of the 2000 presidential election, which validated the consolidation of democracy in both Taiwan and Mexico. Maybe it is because of the geographic distance; Taiwan and Mexico are not often compared and studied together. Even though there are great differences between the KMT and PRI authoritarian regime, the end result of democratization and the eventual ousting of both parties from power were the same. The paper hopes to shed light on the reasons behind an elite-led liberalization by comparing two difference cases with the same end results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan has become one of the major weapons importers in the past ten years and is likely to continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Constrained by an inadequate military technology base and increasing threats from China?s rapid arms upgrading, Taiwan?s primary approach to maintaining its defensive capability has become the acquisition of weapon systems from abroad, especially from the United States. However, recent open policy debates on arms procurement have exposed Taiwan?s longstanding problems in relation to the legitimacy of procurement policy making, which in turn has delayed weapon acquisition process. This paper closely examines Taiwan?s policy process in relation to the purchase of Kidd-class destroyers from the US Navy, which provoked unprecedented and heated domestic debates and disputes between the US and Taiwanese governments. Drawing on the notions of science and technology studies, this article analyzes the evolution and nature of the technology controversy in the case of the acquisition of the Kidd destroyers and in the context of Taiwan?s democratizing policy process. It argues that the technological rhetoric taken up by policy actors for policy advocacy is often not as rational and accurate as it appears. In fact, military professional judgments and technological rhetoric in the policy process tend to be manipulated and fluid. It is therefore found that Taiwan?s current arms procurement decision, which is almost initiated and dominated by the military services and their own assessments, has failed to gain appropriate legitimacy. In the initial stage of the acquisition of Kidd destroyers, the military proposal approved by the US left no alternative for domestic policy deliberation. The pressure of the acquisition schedule and legislative scrutiny easily drove the military to set the accomplishment of arms deal as a goal without carefully contemplating the accountability of internal assessments and policy alternatives. The present paper suggests that legislative deliberation should be applied to the early phrase of Taiwan?s procurement policy-making, so that alternative solutions and measures can be discussed and analyzed. The research also points to the need for the US, as a major supplier of arms to Taiwan, to pay more attention to and have more patience with Taiwan?s domestic response to weapons offers so as to maintain American long-term interests in the region. Given the growing number of civilian policy actors in the area of Taiwan?s defence policy, an acquisition process cannot be streamlined unless its policy legitimacy is secured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cube Law is a benchmark for the relationship between seats and votes for elections under the first-past-the-post system. Mathematically, there are two assumptions underlying the Cube Law: that the distribution of vote share at the district level is normal and that the standard deviation of the distribution is of a certain magnitude. While the first assumption is not unusual, the second begs an explanation why the standard deviation would be large enough to sustain the Cube Law. In this regard, scholars generally point to contagion or clustering in voting behavior.In this paper we argue that spatial autocorrelation can help explain the extent to which the relationship between seats and votes conform to the Cube Law. We demonstrate mathematically that an increase in the spatial autocorrelation in vote share indeed leads to an increase in its standard deviation. Empirically, we propose to investigate recent legislative elections in Taiwan and see how the spatial autocorrelation and standard deviation of vote share are related to each other and how they affect the relationship between seats and votes. We believe this project will enhance our understanding of the Cube Law. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to look at the interactions between the U.S., Taiwan, and China in the period of 1987-1997. It will test two hypotheses that explain conflicts and cooperation between two regional rival states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Taiwan was the most conflictual issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Ross, 1995). How the dynamics of the “strategic triangle” consisting of the U.S., Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How is the U.S. “strategic ambiguity” policy to be explained? Neorealists may argue that there was a tacit agreement between Beijing and Washington that so long as cooperation was imperative, the status quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations was temporarily acceptable. Revisionists such as Robert S. Ross, however, hold a more sophisticated view that even in the midst of cooperation, the ongoing conflict required continuous negotiations and mutual adjustment between the U.S. and P.R.C. (Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, few study, if any, have provided theoretical answers to the questions that under what conditions the equilibrium of status quo holds, how the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan will affect the equilibrium outcomes of the game, and how the so-called strategic ambiguity policy is to be explained? By developing a game theoretic model, this paper will provide theoretical answers to those unresolved questions, drawing out both theoretical and policy implications. A historical examination of the interactions between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan since the Korea War will be done to further illustrate the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent year, there have been significant developments in the peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, which is critical to the international relations in East Asia. In addition, the interaction among mainland China, US, and Taiwan is increasing as they are becoming more active in regional multilateral institutions. This situation raises the puzzle that whether institutions, economic interdependence can facilitate peace and stability among China, Taiwan and the United States. If the answer is yes, what are these causal mechanisms? Liberal theories of international relations emphasize the role of international institutions on fostering cooperation by reducing obstacles. such as uncertainty and transaction costs.. that stand in the way of mutually beneficial agreements between states. In addition, they also hold that interdependence decreases the incentives for conflict and war because states become reluctant to disrupt or jeopardize the welfare benefits of open economic exchange. This paper unifies these theoretical insights to explore the role of economic interdependence, institutions on the stability and cooperation between mainland China, Taiwan, and the U.S. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to formulate a new model to explain Taiwanese movement in the US by analyzing a transnational network established among intellectual communities in the US and the island to sustain the force of the movement. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic ambiguity (SA) is the policy that the US does not explicitly state whether it will come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack by the PRC, hence deterring both sides from reckless moves. The argument claims that structural realism is insufficient to account for why the Truman administration chose SA over other policy options. Identity serves as a cognitive script for leaders to interpret threats, construct national security intersts, and select policies. SA is chosen and consistently implemented because it resonates with the Wilsonian internationalist identity. Identity can perform a signaling function to other states. Given Washington's pivotal role in maintaining peace between Taipei and Beijing, Wilsonianism reveals US's firm resolve to defend Taiwan's democracy while engaging in free trade with China, revealing that it aims for a peaceful resolution and that neither side should feel suspicious about US's intention. The case studies examine the 1949-50 Truman administration's Taiwan Strait policy. Process-tracing and Mill's methods of agreement and difference will be used to illustrate the effect of Wilsonianism on Truman, Acheson, Dulles, and Rusk, and their preferences for SA over other policy approaches. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the study is to define circumstances to facilitate or impede economic voting. Utilizing the information processing approach, I expect that economic voting is weaker in Korea and Taiwan than in the U.S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]