Search

Various media and academic sources alleged the politicization of United States intelligence leading to the 2003 Iraq War. However, two government bodies tasked to investigate the overall intelligence prior to the Iraq War, the Senate Select Committee and the Silberman-Rob Commission, concluded that intelligence was not politicized prior to the war. These conflicting views create a puzzle. Was intelligence politicized prior to the Iraq War or was it not? This question addresses the larger issue of the nexus between the intelligence community and decision-makers in the U.S. foreign policy-making process. Recognizing the intelligence community as an important actor in foreign policy-making, this paper first examines the meaning of intelligence politicization within the existing academic literature. Building upon Alexander George's framework of trade-off dilemmas in Presidential decision-making, it places existing concepts of intelligence politicization into an adapted framework that accounts for both policy-makers and intelligence professionals. The paper then uses this framework to assess the specific case of the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, analyzing the period between the 9/11 attack and the start of the 2003 war. It most specifically scrutinizes the official reports issued by the above investigative bodies and concludes that intelligence politicization did indeed occur prior to the Iraq War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both in its rhetoric and in its practice, the George W. Bush administration has pursued policies consistent with a grand strategy of primacy. Its policy actions toward Iraq reflect that orientation. However, in the context of its ongoing commitment to Iraq, the United States also has been confronted with a variety of other ongoing and emerging policy problems, including, but not limited to North Korea, Iran, ballistic missile defense, Darfur, and global climate change. As the Bush administration has sought to formulate consistent policies toward these other issue areas, it has become increasingly clear that in light of continued operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in the context of the on-going war on terror, current capabilities of the US have seriously constrained the ability of the US to effectively pursue policy options consistent with an overarching strategy primacy in these areas. This paper will examine the ways in which current US conventional force structure has been and remains inadequate to meet the requirements for a unilateral approach in addressing additional problem areas. The paper will also examine the extent to which various aspects of the US fiscal position have acted as a practical limit upon an effective grand strategy of primacy. In combination, these two constraining factors increasingly may force the US and the Bush administration to shift to a strategy of selective engagement or cooperative international engagement, regardless of its rhetorical position. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++I would also be willing to serve as a discussant for papers in the areas of American foreign policy, international law, or international relations theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]