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Digital Economy is attracting focus in many antitrust jurisdictions around the world. Industries related to digital content, digital platforms and the Internet are at the centre of this focus. This paper articulates the need and extent of antitrust surveillance over Digital Economy (DE) on the touchstone of Abuse of Dominance and Anti-competitive Conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Managerial sciences are generally considered to be the art of efficiently running business. Their influence, though, extends far beyond the corporate sphere, and they play an important part in public administration and in particular in its dialog with society at large. Here, from the viewpoint of historical institutionalism, we document one of the earliest successful examples of the wider application of management science: the 1914 antitrust rules (the Clayton Antitrust and Federal Trade Commission Acts) from the perspectives of economic scholars as technical experts, the early years of the Wilson administration, and the spheres of business and society. The societal debate about business and efficiency and the successive implementation of scientific managerial ideas in the administrative sphere, saw management science permeate the whole of American society and become an almost irrefutable aspect of everyday life and representations, thereby enabling it to spread well beyond the boundaries of the firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the interaction between tax evasion and tacit collusion. We show that the possibility of evading taxes generally influences the incentives to form a cartel. We establish that whether tax evasion increases or decreases the set of circumstances allowing stable collusion depends on (1) the relation between the benefits of tax evasion and legal after-tax profits and (2) effective enforcement of antitrust laws. In considering variations in tax enforcement and antitrust enforcement, we find that stricter tax enforcement may actually increase the level of tax evasion, as it may promote the cartelization of industries. In contrast, stricter antitrust enforcement lowers incentives for cartelization, thereby possibly reducing tax evasion at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers an interim assessment of the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC). It approaches this task from three perspectives: (1) a descriptive review of MCC's origins and development of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, under which MCC qualified for limited exemption from the antitrust laws for the purpose of collaboration, as defined, in research and development; (2) an empirical study of what is new and distinctive about MCC; and (3) an assessment of its future prospects as a private corporation and as a de facto instrument of U.S. foreign economic policy. Market and institutional models of the foreign trade arena are employed to aid in the evaluation process, as is McKenna's model of the stages of product creation. MCC's future is viewed as uncertain and controversial, in part because its creation, structures, and goals reflect many of the issues associated with the ongoing debate on the appropriate nature of business-government , relations in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The boundary between science and religion has long been a site for cultural and professional conflict. We examine the testimony of scientists at the Scopes "Monkey Trial" in 1925 and at the McLean "Creation-Science" trial in 1981 -82. The two trials were public occasions for scientists to present ideologies of science that legitimated their professional claims to cognitive authority, public financing and control over part of the public school curriculum. The rhetoric of scientists at each trial was directed toward a separate professional goal: at Scopes, scientists differentiated scientific knowledge from religious belief in a way that presented them as distinctively useful but complementary; at McLean, the boundary between science and religion was drawn to exclude creation scientists from the profession. Both goals-(1) differentiation ofa valued commodity uniquely provided by science, and (2) exclusion of pseudoscientists-are important for scientists' establishment of a professional monopoly over the market for knowledge about nature. Each goal, however, required different descriptions of "science" at the two trials, and we conclude that this ideological flexibility has contributed to the successful professionalization of scientists in American society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]