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This paper examines the aims behind the incorporation of competition rules into the European project and studies how the development of the doctrine has been molded to the specific circumstances and outlooks encountered in postwar Europe. It argues that the objectives of competition law in the EU go beyond economic or legal standards that are applied in individual cases; rather, competition law and policy have been calibrated to contribute to allowing the EU project to harness the benefits of an open capitalist economy within the context of a democratic European society. The analysis aims to demonstrate that while Ordoliberal thinking played a role in the development of European competition law and policy, there were several other social, political, and macroeconomic influences at play as well. As such, the strain that competition policy has come under is a result of attempts to use competition policy to balance several public policy objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article advances several reasons why EU competition policy on vertical restraints has been a failure. First, the distinction between price and nonprice restraints is inconsistent, since the economic effects of both practices are similar. Second, EU competition law creates a number of inefficiencies that cause a negative impact on social welfare; an example is the ban on absolute territorial protection that does not allow a full protection from free-riding. Third, it is doubtful that the inefficiencies of EU competition law can be justified by the market integration goal, since the rules may turn out to be ineffective in reaching this objective. Fourth, EU competition law on vertical restraints has created negative side effects: it has put an end to experimentation and innovation of competition rules at the member-state level and induced private interests groups to spend a lot of effort in lobbying national regulators. The example of resale price maintenance for books serves as an illustration of the latter problem. Several of the above pitfalls have been indicated by Richard Markovits in his treatise on U.S. antitrust law and EU competition law. These criticisms are supported in this paper and further expanded by a discussion of additional errors that have made the EU competition rules on vertical restraints a policy failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the pharmaceutical industry, originator companies researching and developing new medicines typically obtain a range of patents to protect these medicines against generic competition. On the other side, generic suppliers seeking to enter the market will often challenge the validity of these patents or may simply launch their products, forcing the originators to bring litigation to enforce their patents and prevent the generics' entry. In the context of the corresponding litigation, the originators and generic suppliers often decide to enter into a settlement. While the settlement terms will vary from case to case, a number of settlements have involved a payment made from the patent holder (the originator) to the accused infringer (the generic supplier) in order to settle the dispute (reverse-payment patent settlements). Against this background, this paper seeks to analyze the compatibility of such settlements under U.S. antitrust law and EU competition law drawing on recent cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the role of efficiencies in the assessment of monopolistic processes in the European Union (EU). It outlines the Guidance Paper on Abusive Exclusionary Conduct which was adopted by the European Commission (EC) to facilitate the assessment of monopolistic practices. It highlights the process of the EC in identifying enforcement priorities to regulate competitive practices under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).