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Despite considerable research analyzing European Union (EU) citizens’ attitudes toward enlargement, there is no scholarly consensus on what drives opposition to the accession of a particular country. To fill this gap, this paper adopts a comparative approach to examine the determinants of attitudes toward the membership of twelve candidate or potential candidate countries to the EU. Using 2005 Eurobarometer survey data from the EU-25, we examine the relative explanatory power of two leading theories—utilitarian and identity—in explaining public opposition to EU enlargement. Our results reveal that, across models, subjective variables capturing material and identity threat perceptions have a more consistent impact on enlargement attitudes compared with objective indicators. While fears of higher EU budget contribution and evaluations of national economic conditions are the most consistent utilitarian predictors of respondents’ opposition to entry of potential EU members, attachment to European identity and fears about the loss of cultural identity are the two most powerful identity-related predictors of public opposition. Contrary to expectations, religious attachment plays a limited role in shaping public opposition. Only Turkey elicits strong and uniform opposition from all religious groups, including atheists, agnostics, and seculars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Eurozone crisis that erupted in 2008 has raised sincere doubts about the durability of political and financial linkages among its member states. This paper associates the resulting political-economic stasis of the Eurozone with the coevolution of the financial and monetary system at the European scale. The argument builds on insights from financial geography, cultural political economy, and sociology of finance. It focuses on the idea that financial market rationalities, which fluctuate over time and space, are socially constructed through an interplay of acts of 'bricolage' by state and market actors. We relate these rationalities to the main European initiatives regarding financial and monetary integration since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. By tracing the geographical patterns of cross-border lending of European banks in the period 2003-10 we observe that two radically different rationalities of 'sound investment' have dominated before and after the crisis. In the precrisis conjuncture of convergence, the Eurozone seemed to develop 'according to plan' where the financial system appeared beneficial in terms of equalizing development. However, since the crisis there has been a conjuncture of 'contagion' in which country-level specificities increasingly determine creditworthiness. Meanwhile, we observe that European policy makers try to refit the monetary system to this new market rationality to make the European scale 'perform' again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does income inequality increase political backlash against European and global integration? This paper reports research suggesting that it can. The article analyses party opposition to and support for trade openness, European Union integration and general internationalism of political party platforms in advanced industrial democracies between 1960 and 2008. It finds that inequality tends to increase anti-globalization positions of parties, net of pro-globalization positions, an effect that does not significantly differ across party families or levels of actual globalization. This effect, however, does depend on, and is diminished by, generous redistributive policies. These findings clarify socio-economic conditions underlying the backlash against political and economic globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]