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China is considered as a significant development partner in Nigeria; yet relations between the two countries have been marked by episodes of oscillations. This paper engages three interconnected questions: (i) What is the history of Sino-Nigeria relations? (ii) How has Nigeria’s political elites and ordinary Nigerians reacted to Chinese presence? (iii) To what extent is Sino-Nigeria relations beneficial to Nigeria? This paper while identifying and discussing the benefits and underbellies of Sino-Nigeria relations, draws attention to aspects of the relations less discussed in the literature. It concludes that beyond the more popular yet simplistic Janus-headed explication of Sino-Nigeria relations as positive or negative, significant focus is needed to understand the instabilities capable of impacting on the developmental potential of China in Nigeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the conventional wisdom that Chinese involvement cannot transform Africa’s economy for the better so as to end much of the poverty and also to spark high speed growth, this paper finds that China is already in the process of transforming Africa. While the conventional wisdom sees corrupt regimes and weak state capacity in Africa frittering away Africa’s opportunity to rise by plugging into Chinese dynamism, China is found in this paper already to be exporting entrepreneurial talent to Africa and to be dynamizing the African economy through East Asian practices. Chinese can bring industry to Africa much as Japan brought it to Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Africa could therefore be incorporated into Asian economic dynamism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of PRC leaders' public communication with respect to Taiwan from 2003 to 2013 shows the presence of three conflict frames: aspiration, process and image. Chinese leaders most often use the process frame to convey the preferred process through which both sides could find a common ground. These messages are reinforced by rhetoric about China's capacity, resolve and sincerity to reach out to Taiwan for peaceful solutions. Communication of China's own aspirations of national unification is usually less visible. However, it becomes more prominent when the Taiwanese are not the intended audience, indicating its utility in rallying internal support. Using these frames as broad parameters, the paper discusses how they may have influenced policy actions toward Taiwan in the early days of the Xi administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China's comprehensive national power grows, its efforts to reduce the 'China threat' perception have become more challenging. In line with the Chinese leadership's current theme of peace and harmony in China's foreign policy line, Chinese scholars have been highlighting the same theme in their research on China's traditional strategic culture. Their research criticizes Western cosmopolitanism and praises the peaceful nature of China's traditional 'tianxia' concept. The exploitation of traditional strategic culture to provide re-assurance to the international community has now been raised to the official level, as reflected by the White Paper on 'China's Peaceful Development' released by the State Council's Information Office on September 6, 2011. This probably means that it will be a major element of China's public diplomacy for the foreseeable future. These efforts, however, may not have a significant impact because of rising nationalism in the region and the moderate escalation of existing territorial disputes involving China and its neighbors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Western legitimacy theories have mostly focused on the nation-state and the domestic aspects of political legitimacy. However, with the acceleration of globalization, a dimension of legitimacy has come into view that has previously been largely neglected in political science: the international dimension. While the interdependence of nation-states at the global level might put some constraints on the (re)production of legitimacy domestically, it simultaneously allows them to leverage their global standing to gain legitimacy abroad and at home. China is the most prominent example of the growing importance of this dynamic link between internal and external legitimacy. The paper starts with a critical reflection on the prevalent Western legitimacy theories. Based on these reflections, it introduces a new approach which aims to differentiate analytically between internal and external legitimation strategies and to examine the two-level logic linking the two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the Chinese quest for energy resources in Latin America, arguing that the strengthening of relations in this sector can only be explained by a conjunction of interests on both sides. Looking at the presence of Chinese national oil companies in the regional energy sector, we show that China’s incursion has allowed the region to shift its traditional energy partners, introducing a factor of change into economic and political relations with geopolitical implications for the regional arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Along with the further implementation of the 'One Belt, One Road' initiative and the promotion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the construction of the CPEC will likely face challenges owing to differences between China and Pakistan in politics, economics, culture, religion, language, customs, environmental management systems, environmental protection laws, social management systems, and social management regulations. To address potential environmental and social risks associated with Chinese enterprises as they invest in the CPEC region, this paper examines previous studies addressing topics such as the environmental and social safeguards of international institutions and Pakistan's domestic environmental and social management requirements. We then systematically identify the environmental and social risk factors involved in CPEC construction, which cover risks regarding water, air, soil, noise, biodiversity, politics, economics, culture, technology, and individuals. By establishing and calculating these risks and using a multi-fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model, we found that noise and individual risks belong to a medium risk category, while others belong to a higher risk category. In view of these risks, the Chinese government must create a friendly and peaceful environment for Chinese enterprises to invest in the CPEC region, and Chinese enterprises must adopt a development strategy of strength and capacity building and establish enterprises capable of addressing environmental and social issues during the investment process. All stakeholders must understand that if no determined and diligent steps are taken, CPEC construction might be doomed for failure from the start. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise as a global power corresponded with a diminution of Taiwanese diplomacy, which has left Central America as the last region to host a continuous bloc of countries that recognize the ROC. In this article, we argue that China's success in gaining diplomatic recognition from Taiwan's former allies has largely resulted from China's economic policy, specifically its promises of large-scale infrastructure projects and the integration of Central American economies with Chinese markets. However, there are limits to how far China has advanced in gaining full recognition from the region. The competing political and economic interests of China, Taiwan, the United States, and the Central American countries themselves, continue to influence patterns of diplomatic switching. More specifically, we argue that the threat of punitive measures from the United States combined with a turn in Taiwanese diplomacy toward assistance efforts to combat Covid-19 may deter future switching in the short to medium-term. Our analysis offers case studies of four Central American countries (Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador and Nicaragua) to illustrate the multi-year processes by which China's economic strategy leads to diplomatic switching and examine the paths ahead for the remaining holdouts facing the prospect of economic and political penalties by the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building foreign policy theories with Chinese characteristics has long been an aspiration of Chinese scholars, but has not resulted in much globally recognized achievements to date. This review essay begins with an overview of the obstacles to reaching this goal: confusion over the concept of theory, over-emphasis on policy prescription, confusion between the subject and object of study, restrictions on access to research materials, and lack of methodological diversity. To overcome these obstacles, we argue Chinese scholars should bring Chinese foreign policy studies (CFPS) into the larger field of comparative foreign policy analysis (FPA), and take advantage of FPA's rich arsenal of methodological tools and theoretical lenses to conduct insightful and rigorous analysis and theory building. Such an effort will not only facilitate the construction of foreign policy theory with Chinese characteristics but also contribute Chinese wisdom to FPA theory building, making it a truly global field of study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study seeks to explain the profound discord currently observable in elite political discourse on Chinese investments in many host countries. Using Argentina as a case study, a combination of quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis was employed to analyze parliamentary speeches on a controversial space-monitoring station built there by China in 2015. The study finds that the competing discourses about China in Argentinean politics draw primarily on locally embedded contexts and the region’s particular historical experiences and geopolitical position. These local narratives are used in different ways by both sides of the debate to support contradicting positions on relevant issues. Questions of regional hegemony, center-periphery relations, national autonomy as well as Peronist and anti-Peronist ideologies are being drawn on by elite politicians in an attempt to cope with the deep uncertainty about what China’s increased engagement means for the country and to compensate for the lack of predictability about China’s behavior in its future role as a major global power. Ultimately, however, Argentina’s elite politicians end up in a dilemma in which these narratives and historical memories can be spun in both ways to either support or reject a controversial investment project to go ahead on domestic soil that is, at the same time, a symbolic test for the potential depth of the future relationship with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The turnover of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership at the 18th Party Congress provides an opportune time to examine the future of US-China relations. Characterized by a blend of competition and cooperation, this relationship generally has been stable. The South China Sea (SCS) dispute, however, has the potential to fracture the relationship partly because of China's conflict with the Philippines, a close American ally, over the Spratly/Nansha Islands. A study of the Spratly/Nansha Islands dispute provides one way to weigh the prospective impact of China's leadership transition on China-Philippines-US relations and thus China-US relations. This article contends China's leadership transition exacerbates the dispute and creates problems for China-Philippines and China-US relations, but that domestic and international interests will drive China and the US to contain the risk of serious conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift of power engendered by the rise of China will not only change the current international configuration, but will likely lead to a shift of the power centre of the world from Europe to East Asia. Nevertheless, neither the change of the international configuration nor this transfer of the power centre of the world will inevitably bring about the change of the international system. The international system consists of three components including international actors, international configuration and international norms. If a qualitative change of one of these components were treated as a qualitative change of the system, it would not be possible to distinguish the difference between the components and the system nor to determine the relationship between them. A minimum of a qualitative change of at least two components must be observed to be defined as a qualitative change in the system. Because the rise of China is the main engine changing the international configuration, it will be faced with increasing pressure from the system. Thus, China has to adopt a foreign strategy in accordance with its international status and policy for wining more strategic partners and constructing new international norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a sharp intensification of the relations between China and Brazil. The two countries deepened their commercial links and, as a result, Brazil became China's largest trading partner in Latin America. They have also further improved the quality of their political cooperation by setting up, for the first time, high-level bilateral institutions. Both countries have also been working together within multilateral institutions and mechanisms. The economic causes and impacts of this phenomenon have been widely discussed, but little however has been said about its specific political and strategic dimensions. In order to fill this gap, this article suggests an analysis that looks at the historical context of the relationship between China and Brazil, and sets up an enquiry into the most relevant domestic actors and at the strategic meanings behind their partnership. The goal here is twofold. Firstly, to analyse the role of domestic actors in the intensification of this partnership. Secondly, to discuss to what extent this intensification may be seen as evidence of any strategic interest of China and Brazil to put in place a more proactive, wilful and global foreign policy intended to shape globalisation and the world order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China, as host of the six-party talks first convened in August 2003, has been one of the major players in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis that began in October 2002. China's role in the talks has helped to start shaping a stable regional security architecture in Northeast Asia. Beijing's leadership in building a new security regime in the region suggests a change on Chinese perspectives regarding its role within the broader East Asia's regional security architecture. After years of passiveness with regards to involvement in security regime building in the region, China has evolved into an active leader seeking to shape a more institutionalized security. Despite the obstacles to building a functioning regime in Northeast Asia, China seems poised to continue working towards creation of a more stable and institutionalized security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines whether there is reciprocity between the legitimating effects of China's regime at home and abroad and how global governance and legitimacy interact in the case of China. This is done through an analysis of Chinese climate politics and China's engagement in international climate negotiations and governance, especially its behavior during and after the Copenhagen Climate Summit in December 2009 and the Chinese regime's efforts to legitimate this behavior. While China's role in international climate governance was disputed at the Copenhagen Summit, China contributed constructively to brokering a deal with significant implications for a new climate governance architecture suiting China's preferences and being aligned with China's core interests. China defended the procedural logic of the current global climate governance framework and managed to contain institutional change. Based on Anthony Giddens' proposition about 'radicalism at the centre', it is argued that China's national and international discourse on and actions associated with climate change and the international negotiations about the new climate governance architecture seem to be able to reinforce each other and may well have a mutual legitimacy augmenting effect for the 'radicals at the centre' of the Chinese regime, provided that they ensure consequential logic through targeted reduction of GHG emissions and a 'green transformation' of the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While, historically, sovereignty is what Europeans invented and what the Chinese were forced to accept, today it is what Europeans try to bury and what the Chinese hold dear. A conceptual gap on sovereignty clearly exists between China and Europe which more often than not exerts a negative impact on their relationship. It breeds misunderstandings and disputes, makes it more difficult to reach agreements on many bilateral issues, and complicates China-Europe cooperation in third countries. But the conceptual gap on sovereignty does not prevent China and Europe from building a strategic partnership. Given that strengthening or weakening national sovereignty means totally different things to China and Europe, the two parties should jointly and proactively manage their divergence on sovereignty issues by mutual avoidance, mutual assurance, and mutual accommodation, in order to unlock sovereignty-related impasses in China-Europe relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes a thematic approach to review the existing literature (in both Chinese and English) of environmental politics in the broad context of China studies. Examined themes include state and environmental governance, public awareness and environmental social activism, and environmental foreign relations. Findings and arguments are assessed with two important questions in mind: What differentiates the environmental arena from Chinese politics in general? What new insights into Chinese politics can be gained from case studies of environmental protection? Scholarship on environmental politics contributes not only empirical findings, but also critical challenges to the conventional knowledge and frameworks of Chinese politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, Northeast Asia’s security situation is changing rapidly. North Korea is reviving and China’s power is growing at an alarming rate. While the U.S. continues to suffer diplomatically and militarily in the Middle East and from international terrorism, China’s and North Korea’s power is likely to futher increase, polarizing the Northeast Asian security structure, with South Korea, Japan (and Taiwan) all allied with the U.S. versus North Korea allied with China. The liberal democracies should pursue peace with North Korea and China to preclude the situation from aggravating, but should be ready in the longer term to meet, in diverse ways including strengthening their alliances, the challenges posed by rising powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last century there has been a huge number of Western intellectuals visiting China and their Chinese counterparts visiting the West, the Westerners coming here to teach whereas the Chinese going there to learn. The asymmetry in cultural exchange has been caused by their conception of each other’s scholarship: the Western learning has been regarded as universal whereas the Chinese specific. This imbalance has resulted in a strange situation: the Chinese specialists of the West are the cream of the Chinese intelligentsia while the Western sinologists on the margin of the Western academia, and, therefore, the Chinese understanding of the West has to be as accurate as possible while the few cases of Western receptions Chinese influence have all been based on gross misinterpretations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]