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From 1939 to 1945 the Imperial Japanese Navy made heavy use of a series of additive cipher systems generically named JN-25 by the cryptanalytic unit of the United States Navy. Most of these consisted of a code-book assigning a five-digit ‘group’, always a multiple of three, to each word or phrase in a very long list and encrypting these by ‘false’ (non-carrying) addition of a five-digit group (‘the additive’) taken from a long table of essentially random such groups. These ‘false sums’ were transmitted, usually by radio, to the intended recipient. The American jargon for these was GATs, or groups as transmitted. (Note 1 given after the main text discusses changes in the source of additives introduced in the later stages of the Pacific War. This is not relevant to the mathematical consequences of such use of only multiples of three, which is the main theme of this paper.) The author's earlier paper explains how this use of multiples of three provided a route for relatively rapid recovery of the additive and, thus, the decryption of intercepts. Another quite different and rather surprising source of insecurity inherent in this use of multiples of three was noted only in 1943 and became the basis of a process code-named ‘Mamba’ needed in 1944. This paper explains one consequence of the statistics underlying Mamba: the use of multiples of three in JN-25 codebooks betrays itself very quickly. Note 2 mentions other aspects of Mamba. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the 1950s and 1960s, the modern Japanese state employed overseas cultural promotion as a way to maximise its interests and image not only in international contexts but also at home. By juxtaposing the Takarazuka Revue’s performances in the United States and Japan during the postwar period, this paper argues that the overseas promotion of this Japanese theatre troupe both depended upon and reinforced the Japanese populace’s nationalistic pride in its culture. The paper also addresses the ways in which the Japanese government used Takarazuka’s theatrical presentations as a means of pursuing its domestic and diplomatic agendas: improving Japan’s international position by proposing shared aspects of popular culture with the US and increasing its sense of nationalism by propagating cultural pride. In doing so, the paper explicates the ways in which Japanese popular cultural considerations interfaced with political concerns in the shaping of postwar Japan’s national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines popular representations of Japan and China before and during the war, assesses the ideas of key figures from the press, and considers the ways in which media and policy interacted through the influence of opinion leaders. These prepared the way for the ‘soft’ peace relying on Japanese cooperation that would become the basis for a new alliance between America and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

From 1931 to 1941, when China and Japan were at undeclared war, China's propaganda was fairly well-circulated in America through her American friends who played a leading role in shaping American opinions on the Far Eastern crisis. But the United States State Department maintained a neutral stance toward the Sino-Japanese conflict until after 1939 and considered the pro-Chinese opinion not so much a national consensus for policy consideration as a partisan view propped up by propaganda groups. Thus, the State Department guarded its Asian policy from the pressure of propaganda activities and partisan opinions on the Asian conflict, whilst utilising them occasionally as tools of diplomacy toward China and Japan. This article examines the State Department's attitude toward public opinion and propaganda on the Far Eastern conflict from 1931 to 1941 to illustrate how American officials handled partisan opinions on a foreign crisis when most of the information on foreign policy was privately initiated and circulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sun Tzu asserts that true success is not winning every battle fought, but subduing the enemy's will without fighting at all. The author asserts that the U.S. planning efforts for post-WWII Japan from 1942 to 1945 reveal a unique period where military and political planners actively pursued a greater understanding of the role an enemy's will-to-fight plays in conflict. The historical record reveals an iterative - and often heated - discourse among experts in diplomacy, governance, political culture, anthropology, and military intelligence. Consequently, Allied commanders entertained and ultimately executed a war plan for the occupation of Japan with fewer forces and less fighting than called for by the alternative plan for invasion. The fundamental difference in the two plans - an assumed effect that safeguarding the Imperial Institution would have on the Japanese people's will-to-fight. In the end, meaningful discourse enabled Allies to target the enemy's will separately from their means, enabling conditions where subduing the Japanese will required the Allies not to fight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the opening stages of the Pacific War, between December 1941 and spring 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army appeared unstoppable. US forces in the Philippines, despite their efforts, could not hold out against the enemy advance, and by April the last vestiges of their resistance at Bataan and Corregidor became untenable. The intelligence obtained during the initial encounters provided the US defense establishment with undeniable reasons to conclude that Japanese ground forces possessed a high level of tactical skill, and assessments of the Imperial Japanese Army tended to exaggerate the latter's capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses U.S. military intelligence on the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) between 1919 and 1941. The U.S. military intelligence view of the IJA in the time before the outbreak of the Pacific War was that, while it was the best army in Asia, it was still inferior to any modern army. The article discusses the failings of U.S. intelligence gathering, both in effort and approach. Also discussed is the IJA's actions in invading, or engaging militarily, their Southeast Asian neighbors.

Discusses various issues involving Andres de Ariola's trans-Pacific voyage in 1694/95 and the contested discovery of the Marcus Island. Topography and vegetation of, and Spanish geographical knowledge about, Marcus Island; Topography and vegetation of, and Spanish geographical knowledge about, Wake Island; Topography and vegetation of, and Spanish geographical knowledge about, Laysan Island or Hawaiian Leeward Islands.