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Before the Lomé Convention (1975) was signed between the European Economic Community (EEC) and 46 African Caribbean and Pacific States, the EEC member states had to deal with the African members of the Commonwealth. Among the Six France was in a peculiar position, wishing to maintain a special relationship between the EEC and the French-speaking African states and to enlarge its relations with other regions of the Third World. This article, based on an examination of the French Foreign Ministry Archives and the Papiers Foccart, aims to investigate the prehistory of the relations between the EEC and the English-speaking African states. It analyses the French role in the debate, outcomes and consequences of the first agreements signed by the European Community with Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. To this aim it will focus on the negotiations between the EEC and the African states, but also on the debate which took place in some international organisations on the Yaoundé Convention, in order to understand to what extent these discussions paved the way for the evolution of the EEC Development Policy during the 1970s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At 10:30 in the morning on 28 June 1992, a Dauphin helicopter landed at Sarajevo airport carrying a precious cargo: the French president, François Mitterrand. Since the beginning of the Bosnian War, Bosnian Serb forces had controlled the airport and restricted the delivery of humanitarian aid to the city’s destitute population, which formed an important cornerstone of their siege strategy. In reaching the airport, the president secured its re-opening and, with it, the commencement of one of the longest humanitarian airlifts in history. However, Mitterrand’s visit also had implications and significance beyond the Bosnian capital. The visit secured humanitarian intervention through the United Nations as the international community’s modus operandi for conflict resolution in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Through its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council and enthusiastic engagement with humanitarian intervention, France would shape the intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina and thus continue to justify its position amongst the world’s Great Powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two decades later, the Rwandan genocide has been broadly analysed and, to a certain extent, so has the French response to the genocide. Nevertheless, even though the literature covers extensivelyhowthe French executive responded to the genocide, it remains confusing when it comes to explainingwhyit responded in such a controversial way, since two—somewhat contradictory—accounts have been put forward. In order to address this lack of clarity, the article analyses these main accounts and concludes that they both present key weaknesses that prevent us from fully understanding France’s controversial response. Building on Prunier’s testimony, this article suggests a third explanation by arguing that the ‘Fashoda syndrome’ had a strong influence on President Mitterrand and should be taken into account more consistently, not only when studying the French response in Rwanda, but also Mitterrand’s foreign policy in Africa more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article looks at an episode which though it happened in Tunisia had a direct link to the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), and thus propelled the war to an international conflict that pitted the Western powers, namely; France, Britain and America against each other. By the time the incident occurred the Algerian War had been going on for just over three years with the French seemingly gaining the upper hand. This article endeavours to show how this incident complicated the Algerian conflict and how the episode was viewed internationally, especially from the British Government and media perspectives both had keen interest on the Algerian conflict as a result of their own empire in other parts of Africa. The article is based largely on archival research at the Public Record Office at Kew, (England) and Newspaper archives at Colindale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the relationship between France and Algeria in the immediate aftermath of Algerian independence. In 1963, Algeria repeatedly breached the Evian Accords, and continuously threatened France's national interests. Yet, French policymakers accommodated Algeria's reassertion and even rewarded it with a generous coopération package. I will argue that this remarkable discrepancy was due to Gaullist France's belief that association with its former colony would benefit its image and influence in the Third World. Algeria at the time enjoyed significant prestige in Asia and Africa, and this was precisely the arena where France was keen to deploy its leadership in order to enhance its independence from the two superpowers. This perception detracted Paris from the cool-blooded pursuit of ‘realist’ state interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 1971, two Canadian unionists travelled to New Caledonia on a technical mission of assistance to the territory's unions. At the airport in Nouméa, however, the territorial authorities refused the unionists entry. For the French government, the interest of the United Steelworkers of America in New Caledonia represented a threat to the stability and competitiveness of the territory's nickel industry. The visit was also seen as a manifestation of growing American influence on New Caledonia's economic and political development at a time when the French were increasingly concerned about the territory's attachment to France. Yet efforts by the territorial authorities in Nouméa to prevent the visit were complicated by other French and Canadian concerns. Neither Canada nor the metropolitan government of France wanted an international incident that might jeopardise France–Canada relations, which were improving slowly after several years of acrimony. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates France's policy towards the Arab world and the Middle East at a critical juncture: the first oil crisis. Based on largely untapped archival records, it demonstrates that concerns over declining power spurred Georges Pompidou's government to Europeanise this policy, taking advantage of the anxieties unleashed by the Arab use of oil as a political weapon. It also sheds light on the intricate links between the transatlantic relationship, relations between the superpowers, the Middle East conflict and Franco-/Euro-Arab ties. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Community Games [Jeux de la Communaute] took place in Antananarivo between 13 and 19 April 1960. This international sporting event was based on the model of the Olympic Games and was the first one to bring together all French-speaking African nations, i.e. the states which were part of the Community, as well as the French overseas departments and territories. How did these games turn out as African athletes were in the spotlight for the first time when competing against French sporting teams? It is important to focus on the role of sporting events within the framework of international politics. This competition, which was totally imbalanced as far as the respective strengths went, was a relevant indicator of how political and diplomatic relations were shifting between France and its African colonies and Madagascar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article has two main theses: first, that from 1958 to 1967—Charles de Gaulle's presidency—there was a typical patron-client relationship between France and Israel that lasted until the Six Day War. It challenges the frequent claim in the literature that relations between Israel and France did not essentially change after de Gaulle's rise to power. Second, it argues that the basis on which this relationship was founded was rocky from the start since as a client, Israel was not ready to accede to French demands that it restrain its security policy to conform to key French interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Ping-Pong diplomacy of the early 1970s and the readmission of the People's Republic of China to the IOC in 1979 at a time when the Chinese Government was moving towards economic reform, Europe has watched closely the growth of China and its economic challenge to the USA and indeed other powerful economies. The European perceptions of, and reactions to Chinese successes have been contradictory. On one hand, much has been done by Europe to be included in the economic great match, for instance the strategic partnership between China and France forged on the initiative of President Jacques Chirac in 1997. On the other hand, concerns have been often expressed about other aspects of the Chinese society. Consequently, contradictions have been apparent in responses to Chinese sport successes and bids for the Olympic Games. Criticism had nowhere been stronger than in France, the self-proclaimed country of Human Rights. The Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 had an immense impact in France, where the bicentenary of the French Revolution had just been celebrated. This criticism culminated recently in Segolene Royal's official demand for a Boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games during her campaign for the French Presidency, in 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the political and social development in the Fifth French Republic during the regime of Charles de Gaulle. It explores de Gaulle's views that led him to oppose the European Defense Community (EDC), particularly his views regarding France's independence from external control. Moreover, it examines the legacy left by de Gaulle in European policy, which according to the author is simply a set of behaviors and belief designed to create the illusion of control.