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This article maps the behaviours of two middle powers, Australia and Indonesia, as a response to the emergence and evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept. The background for this analysis is the emergence and development of the 'Indo-Pacific' concept as a response to crises of legitimacy enveloping the region and how countries in the region, including middle powers, respond to it. Using a minimalist definition which I have developed of a middle power as a country with a middle level of power capabilities and a penchant for cooperation, this article develops a framework based on two dimensions of outcome (ranging from status-quoist to reformist outlooks) and process (ranging from Lockean to Kantian strategies) to facilitate a more open-ended approach towards looking at middle-power behaviours beyond the common categorisation of traditional/emerging, and Western/non-Western. Using Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and 2023 National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, and Indonesia's 2015 Defence White Paper and 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, this article concludes that while Australia is exhibiting a status-quoist/Lockean approach, Indonesia is demonstrating a reformist/Kantian approach towards the Indo-Pacific. The outcome-process dimension framework developed in this article is useful as a tool to map other middle power behaviours in various contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given current emissions trends an increase in global temperatures in excess of 2°C is highly likely in the coming century. In this context, it seems increasingly probable that states may consider solar geoengineering as a stop-gap climate response. Solar geoengineering refers to measures that aim to alleviate some measure of global warming by intentionally increasing the amount of the sun's energy that is reflected into space. Currently the two most discussed solar geoengineering techniques involve either marine cloud brightening or dispersing aerosols in the stratosphere. These techniques could be relatively inexpensive, are within the technological capacities (after a brief period of development) of technologically-advanced countries, and could have an almost immediate impact on temperatures. Yet, while solar geoengineering might potentially be utilised to manage some climate-linked security threats, it itself would create new security challenges. Consequently, this paper explores potential international security implications for Australia if a regional state, or group of states, initiates a solar geoengineering program. We conclude that since solar geoengineering is unlikely to become a first-order international issue, disputation over solar geoengineering will likely reflect, or act as a proxy for, wider patterns of state interaction. However, scenarios in which China and the United States take different positions, or in which there are divisions among regional powers, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, India and Singapore would pose the greatest threat to Australia's national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australian policymakers have always harboured a desire to ‘punch above their weight’. On occasions they have succeeded. At a time when Australia's strategic, economic and environmental future is inextricably bound up with that of its immediate neighbours and the wider world, there are compelling reasons for hoping that they still can. This paper explores some of the most important aspects of Australian foreign policy during the Rudd era and asks whether the Australian government can play a constructive—even an exemplary—role in finding solutions for some of the planet's most pressing problems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Debate within Australia regarding the bilateral relationship with China is complex, contentious and often lacks clarity. Informed by basic international relations theory, we identify two dividing lines within this debate. First, whether understanding China's behaviour is most effectively done through a unitary actor framework, or whether it is essential to look inside the 'black box' of the Chinese party-state. Second, whether one is more concerned about the 'Thucydides trap' or 'Munich'—that is, are the consequences of an overreaction or an underreaction more concerning when interpreting China's intentions and responding to perceived threats. These dividing lines generate four ideal-type policy viewpoints that we label Balancers, Hedgers, Engagers and Reformers, and apply in the Australian context. We then overlay our framework onto the public debate in Australia, selecting a specific bounded case study: commentary and analysis concerning China's behaviour throughout the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, in particular responding to Australia's call for an international inquiry. Our objective is to progress an often circular debate by offering an accessible frame that clarifies and synthesises fundamental disagreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the most recent volume in the series of archival document collections on the history Australia's external affairs, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, covering the years 1920 to 1930. It focuses upon two main themes of central importance to the Australian global presence in that decade: the organisation and purposes of the Empire-Commonwealth and the impact of the League of Nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Recent commentary on India–Australia relations has defined the relationship as ‘natural’ and based on ‘shared values’ and ‘shared history’. The relationship has simultaneously been considered ‘neglected’. The paradoxical juxtaposition of a natural/neglected partnership is yet to be adequately explained. We consider the historical construction of liberalism in both states as a facet of state identity to argue that, far from creating a natural relationship, differing liberal identities have served to keep these two states apart. This is illustrated through case studies of divergent opinions over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and the rise of China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Australian Journal of Political Science is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

While foreign policy featured prominently on the Australian political agenda in late 2014, the manner of Australia's engagement with the world challenges the idea of a ‘pivot’ from domestic politics to foreign policy. In particular, the government demonstrated a tendency to prioritise domestic political considerations, in particular public opinion, in its dealings with the outside world. This was evident across a range of issue areas: from the ‘internationalist’ agenda of asylum, climate change and aid to more traditional concerns such as bilateral relations with Indonesia and international security. This article explores these dynamics and asks what implications this has for both Australian foreign policy and theoretical accounts of the role and desirability of public engagement with foreign policy in international relations thought. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article talks about Australia as a "soft power" and role of Australia in the international affairs. Topics discussed include Australian foreign policy, meeting of the Group of 20 (G20) leaders in Brisbane in Queensland, Australia, in the year 2014, which was also a gathering of countries from the southern hemisphere, and Australia's relations with the U.S.

In 2011, Australia communicated a clear choice about its strategic future. It would continue to cleave tightly to the US alliance, expand its military links and work to advance the USA's conception of regional order. Given its economic interests, why has Australia bound itself to the US alliance? What lies behind this strong commitment and what would it take for Australia to change its relationship with the USA? This article presents an analysis of the current state of the US–Australia alliance and argues that Canberra's pursuit of close relations with the USA reflects the interaction of a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of the alliance with a set of resolutely political factors that have produced the current policy setting. The article first assesses the security cost and benefit behind the alliance. It then argues that the move also derives from the strong domestic support for the US alliance, a sharpened sense that China's rise was generating regional instability that only the US primacy could manage and the realisation that the economic fallout of such a move would be minimal. It concludes with a brief reflection on what it might take to change the current policy settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia faces a complex set of dilemmas in foreign, defence, and economic policy. Australian governments have traditionally relied on the United States to underwrite the country's defence policies, and have regularly demonstrated loyalty to the bilateral strategic alliance. Yet, Australia's economic security has become more dependent on China, a country with which the US has a competitive relationship. This article first reviews theories of competition among great powers. It then analyses key factors that are shaping the region and the Australian policy environment. It is argued that Australia may have much to gain from acting collaboratively with other middle powers within multilateral institutions. In this context, Australia may also benefit from a more robust recognition of its own distinctive national interest. 澳大利亚面临外交、防务、经济政策上一系列的复杂难题。澳政府以往一直是依赖美国为澳国的防务政策签字画押，而且一直对双边战略联盟忠诚不二。但澳大利亚的经济安全却更依赖同美国有着竞争关系的中国。本文梳理了有关大国竞争关系的各种理论，分析了构成地区以及澳大利亚政策环境的诸多因素。作者认为，与中等强国进行多边体制内的合作，会让澳大利益受益非强。坚定不移的强调自己的国家利益，对澳大利亚也是有益的。 [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

When the talks for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) were launched in 2010, there appeared to be a coincidence of interests between the American and Australian governments in negotiating a high-quality, ‘21st-century’ trade arrangement that would multilateralise the bilateral and minilateral trade agreements that have proliferated in the Asia-Pacific region in the last 15 years. As the negotiations progressed, however, a divergence between American and Australian interests became apparent. Protectionist interests in the United States have prevented the administration from improving on market access agreements in the current preferential trade agreements with TPP partners, thereby undermining the multilateralisation objective. Some of the elements of the US template for 21st-century trade agreements, notably enhanced protection for intellectual property, and the inclusion of investor–state dispute resolution, clash with Australian trade priorities. Moreover, the central role of the TPP in the US ‘pivot to Asia’ has led to perceptions that it is part of a strategy to encircle China: consequently the TPP may force Australia to make the very choice between China and the United States that the government wishes to avoid. 当2010年启动跨太平洋伙伴关系时，在谈判高质量、“21世纪”的贸易安排时美国和澳大利亚政府的利益似乎走到了一起。这种贸易安排会使过去十五年里亚太地区繁荣的双边及微关系多边化。在谈判进行的过程中，美澳之间的分歧却变得明朗了。美国的保护主义利益集团阻碍政府在现行的与亚太伙伴的最惠贸易协定中改善贸易准入协定，因此损害了多边化的目标。美国21世纪贸易协议的模式，明显加强了知识产权的保护，而且包含了投资者—国家争端解决的内容，与澳大利亚贸易优先的考虑发生了冲突。但亚太伙伴关系在美国重心移往亚洲的计划中至关重要，让人觉得就是包围中国战略的一部分。因此亚太伙伴关系会迫使澳大利亚在中美之间做澳政府并不愿意做的选择。 [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article critically evaluates Australia's ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, encapsulated in the three pillars of the Labor government's foreign policy platform. It notes that each pillar has been accorded specific roles in the implementation of Australian foreign policy and makes particular reference to the government's preference for multilateral engagement. The article subsequently demonstrates that such an agenda actually impedes a creative approach to key issues such as trade, climate change and non-proliferation challenges, as well as Australia's participation in Asia-Pacific order-building. It then offers some suggestions for a more flexible posture that is not inconsistent with past Labor approaches, but which also better appreciates regional and global complexities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay considers the Australian approach to Asian regionalism during the tenure of the government led by John Howard. Its main focus is the official Australian policy towards ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asian Summit. The Howard-Downer administration exhibited a degree of scepticism of the various institutional and norm-oriented embodiments of 'Asia' and evinced a preference for bilateralism (first economic but later strategic bilateralism) but was prepared to make some contribution to the improvement of wider regional governance practices. In the context of the continuing economic and strategic rise of China, and despite taking great trouble to facilitate mutually beneficial trading relations, the Howard government nevertheless pursued the institutionalisation of defence cooperation with Japan. Given the relentless impact of globalisation, it is unclear how far these policy priorities can be maintained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following its time-honoured ‘great and powerful friends’ foreign policy tradition, Australia has been cultivating close ties simultaneously with the United States and China. Yet, as a rivalry between the two powers apparently looms large, Australia faces an acute dilemma. While the rise of China and the question of Taiwan are often cited as main causes of US–China discord, this article argues that the American neoconservative policy on China, underpinned by a belief in both military strength and moral clarity, is integral to this growing competition and is, by extension, partly responsible for the emergence of Australia's predicament. To avoid such a difficult choice, the article suggests that Australia should strive to curb the policy influence of neoconservatism both in the United States and at home by pursuing a more independent foreign policy, making clear its strategic postures on US–China relations, and helping establish a trilateral strategic forum between Australia, the United States, and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]