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China's defense white papers have long been dismissed as lacking substance and offering little useful information on China's real strategic intentions and military capabilities. Nevertheless, since 1998 Beijing has continued to issue defense white papers on a regular two-year frequency. Indeed, in recent years it has accorded greater importance to these documents. This paper argues that China's defense white papers warrant more attention than they have received so far. An examination of the making of the white papers, the functions designated for these documents and their evolving content and structure reveals not only the different nature and purpose of the Chinese white papers compared with their counterparts in Western countries, but also important changes and continuities in China's strategic outlook and its evolving perceptions of the role of the use of force in the context of the country's re-emergence as a major player in international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research note discusses the 2009 Defence White Paper, particularly its focus on the potential threat the Chinese military might pose to the security of the Asia-Pacific in the foreseeable future. It also examines Chinese responses to the White Paper's main theses. It concludes that the White Paper marked a departure from the Howard government's policy of de-emphasising differences in Canberra's dialogue with Beijing and, by re-affirming commitment to the alliance with the United States (US), delineated the limits of Australia's partnership with China. However, its poorly substantiated predictions regarding the rise of China's power, the US economic and military decline and Beijing's geostrategic objectives raise doubts about the Rudd government's capacity to formulate a coherent vision for the future of Australia's relations with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article enquires into the connections between gender and discourses of the nuclear weapons state. Specifically, we develop an analysis of the ways in which gender operates in the White Paper published by the UK government in 2006 on its plans to renew Trident nuclear weapons (given the go-ahead by the Westminster Parliament in March 2007). We argue that the White Paper mobilizes masculine-coded language and symbols in several ways: firstly, in its mobilization of techno-strategic rationality and axioms; secondly, in its assumptions about security; and, thirdly, in its assumptions about the state as actor. Taken together, these function to construct a masculinized identity for the British nuclear state as a “responsible steward.” However, this identity is one that is not yet securely fixed and that, indeed, contains serious internal tensions that opponents of Trident (and of the nuclear state more generally) should be able to exploit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes Australia's 2000 Defense White Paper. Development of a Defense Capability Plan on the basis of through-life costing, including personnel, operating, support and upgrade costs and initial investment; Setting realistic targets; Incorporation of short term, crisis-management tasks and the potential for deployments into the Asia-Pacific; Defining Australia's role; Limitations of the defense policies.

The author comments on Australia's Defense White Paper entitled "Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030," which was released in May 2009. It is suggested that Australia's new defense policy was created in response to the rapid speed of globalization and increasing economic interdependence, as well as the declining power of the U.S. The author also argues that the policy document is beset with contradictions and there are no details of immediate challenges.

The article discusses various issues related to China's evaluation of adjustment to the U.S. security policy since September 11, 2001. China is watching the U.S. change of defense doctrine, especially regarding nuclear strategy. Currently China believes that the U.S. will continue its nuclear as well as conventional forces modernization, especially with precision attack capabilities, as a part of its Revolution in Military Affairs. Certainly, China is advancing its own modernization in nuclear weapons arsenal, information warfare commanding and the capability of precise delivery of its own munitions. China is determined to avoid a major confrontation, vis-a-vis Washington, at least in the next two decades and is trying to deepen the current Three-C's relationship with the United States.

This paper examines Azerbaijan's decision to go to war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. It aims to unveil the lessons Azerbaijan learned from the reaction of major regional actors in the South Caucasus to rising tensions in Armenian–Azerbaijani relations from the mid-2000s to the 2020 July border crisis. The paper argues that the consistent unresponsiveness of the international community emboldened Azerbaijan to proceed with its war preparations. It shows that Azerbaijan perceived the attitude of regional powers as inability and/or reluctance to interfere in the conflict, and this created a permissive environment for an all-out war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis paper provides an in-depth analysis of Japan’s evolving cyber defense capabilities and explores its future challenges. National security has transformed in the twenty first century, with cyberspace becoming a key conflict domain. Japan, like other nations, has adapted to these changes. In 2022, the Japanese government introduced its active cyber defense concept. The National Security Strategy of 2022 stated the government’s posture for active cyber defense, which pre-emptively neutralizes adversary computers. This marked a turning point in Japan’s security and defense. This strategic shift, which occurred notably between 2000 and 2022, exemplifies Japan’s transition in the cyber domain. The scope of protecting cyberspace has evolved from primarily safeguarding civilian infrastructure to adopting proactive measures. This evolution is analyzed in the paper, which contrasts Japan’s approach with Western nations’ military-driven cyber policies. Additionally, the multifaceted challenges and opportunities arising from this paradigm shift in cyber capability development are explored. The analysis encompasses key aspects, including the policy formation, international cooperation, budgetary allocations, and the progress of organizational structures regarding the cyber domain. Furthermore, the study explores Japan’s future trajectory in cyber defense, with a particular focus on its role within the ‘Multi-Domain Defense Force’ and the dynamics of the Japan-US alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is about the defense strategies and plans set by Australia in the 1987 White Paper. The author mentioned the dimensions of the crisis that faced the defense establishment of the country and the ways used by the Minister of Defence and his advisers to address the issue. He implied that the current area of operations of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) should be compressed to make greater use of civilian technologies and assets. A discussion about the dimensions of the issues the Australia's defense establishment is now facing is also presented.

Copyright of Australian Journal of International Affairs is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the weeks before it declared independence, the Continental Congress was already at work building the institutions it would need to maintain the new republic. In June 1776, a committee was appointed to explore linking the 13 provincial legislatures in a Confederation. Another was tasked to consider how the United Colonies, soon to become the United States of America, could protect itself against Great Britain by striking treaties with European powers. But before these committees were formed, the Congress first appointed a "Committee on Spies" to deal with a chronic problem: how the law should treat "persons giving intelligence to the enemy, or supplying them with provisions." The resolutions that were the Committee's answer re-defined the law of treason, substituting a new notion of American sovereignty in place of the allegiance that had been owed the British monarchy. They drew a bright line between those lukewarm or hostile to the Revolution, and the new American identity embraced by its supporters. And they placed limits on the military's ability to try civilians charged with spying by court-martial, setting a precedent for American military justice. This paper argues that the impact of the Committee's work has been under-examined, as has been its influence on George Washington and the evolving American policy of military deference to civil authority in matters of justice. It explores how the Committee's "Resolves" prompted the creation of new treason statutes in nearly all the United "States," which in turn prompted hundreds of prosecutions. The paper revises scholars' views on how and why the Spies Committee was formed. It traces the Committee's contribution to language incorporated by the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution's article on treason, drafted 13 years later by a scholar who had been a Spies Committee member. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Sudan's decade-old defence policy is dated. In this article, Brian Adeba argues that a new defence policy which is tethered to a national security framework that accounts for evolving security challenges and addresses missed opportunities for professionalising the Sudan People's Liberation Army is necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a close US ally, Australia is often seen as a recipient of US extended deterrence. This article argues that in recent decades, Australian strategic policy engaged with US extended deterrence at three different levels: locally, Australia eschews US combat support and deterrence under the policy of self-reliance; regionally, it supports US extended deterrence in Asia; globally, it relies on the US alliance against nuclear threats to Australia. The article argues that in none of these policy areas does the Australian posture conform to a situation of extended deterrence proper. Moreover, when the 2009 White Paper combines all three policies in relation to major power threats against Australia, serious inconsistencies result in Australia's strategic posture—a situation the government should seek to avoid in the White Paper being drafted at the time of writing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Defense ministers have not received the scholarly attention commensurate with the resources they command in national executives. This paper develops and tests propositions regarding the behavior of different types of defense ministers (military, pure experts, partisan experts, and purely partisan). Blending organizational theory and military psychology, our analysis investigates ministerial turnover in defense portfolios and relations with the legislature and the branches of the armed forces. Propositions are tested using a combination of original and secondary data on Portugal (1976-2015), an ideal case for this study, as well as cross-national evidence. Our findings indicate that military ministers from the army are associated with a higher army budget and larger land force, less accountability vis-à-vis the legislature, and a longer tenure in office. Experts, overall, are associated with a higher-quality army and a lower tenure in office, with mixed results for parliamentary accountability, depending on the type of the expert. These results have significant implications for the study of defense policy, civil-military relations, and cabinet politics, particularly in consolidating democracies featuring a relatively high share of either military officers or experts heading the defense ministry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy ideas are often crafted in international fora, such as international organisations, multilateral institutions, and high-level summits. However, whether and how ideas will eventually inform policymakers at the domestic level remains an understudied subject. This paper contributes to this debate by tracing the domestic consolidation and eventual erosion of ‘Crisis Management’, a policy paradigm that emerged after the end of the Cold War and became dominant among NATO members in the 2010s. We investigate Germany and Italy as two case studies that followed two distinct trajectories. Policy elites suddenly adopted the paradigm in Italy and built a broad consensus on it. In Germany, crisis management has emerged lately and remains contested, as the territorial defense has maintained legitimacy among elites. Understanding the mechanisms underpinning such trajectories is the key to uncovering whether a consensus on a new version of territorial defense as a dominant paradigm will consolidate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While much scholarship takes austerity-driven spending cuts as evidence of policy change, this paper shifts the focus to interrogate whether these budgetary cuts lead to actual policy change and if so how. Scholarships on institutional change and public policy illuminate how state actors mediate policy change through coping strategies, i.e. strategies by which state actors try to minimize budget decreases' negative impacts on policy. Taking French Defense Policy as an unlikely case of policy change, we show that state actors have adopted three types of coping strategies to minimize the spending cuts' impact: compensation, delaying, and re-categorizing acquisition procedures. These coping strategies have however contributed to a process of incremental change, which most of time is non-cumulative and creates additional policy problems. This article contributes to a better understanding of change underway in defense policies, but also more generally to literatures pertaining to austerity and policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the strategic dimensions concept and content analysis of nine key defence white papers published between 1957 and 2010 to assess which factors most influence declaratory policy. The paper also notes that the development of defence policy has been accompanied by the “muddling through” vs. decisive choice debate which reflects the tensions within policy between the thesis of strategy and the antithesis of fiscal parsimony. The paper maintains that defence policy is ultimately contingent upon external threats and it is these, rather than the desire to economise, which are the key policy drivers. It concludes that this extrinsic factor will determine the outcome of the next SDSR and though this is not necessarily incongruent with the desire to economise, events may prove otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The principles and formalities of modern U.S. Defence planning stem from the 1960s and have largely served well. This paper, however, is about the special challenges that arise when major changes have been needed, some even transformational in character. It discusses how changing realities, independent studies and analysis, events, leaders, and political processes have led to changes not easily instigated within normal processes. Several examples are discussed for the period 1976-2016. Today, the United States and allies again face major challenges that require major military changes. Those have not yet been decided, much less accomplished. The paper draws on lessons from earlier periods to identify obstacles to and mechanisms for change. The last section focuses on defence analysis, which has sometimes been an obstacle but can be part of the solution. The paper urges a new ethic for analysis and the analysts who perform it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) represents an institutionalized attempt by European Union Member States to respond to the security challenges they confront. This paper discusses the evolution of this policy through the lens of political integration and international relations theories. The analysis integrates both the supranational and the national level, and demonstrates that European institutions have extended their privileges and sphere of influence with increasing organizational mandates. At the same time, participation by various levels in the creation of European security policies has evolved, and the inter-governmental level is often recognized as dominant. However, the question remains open whether this evolution of policy might be properly explained by several influential political theories that have shaped the European integration and security architecture in recent decades. Aspects of the CSDP institutional setting (its creation, goals and role) and the explanation of why security and defense policy is a complex dilemma of the integration process are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 27 June 2000, the Howard Government released a public information paper on defence which set in train a process of public consultation in which the people's views were sought on a range of defence and defence-related issues. This paper examines why the Government chose to go to the people, how and by whom the community consultation was conducted, who was consulted and listened to, and how what was heard at the public meetings component of the process was both interpreted and reported. The paper concludes that the public consultation process was more about politics than policy; it is inappropriate for the Government to claim or imply that it has heard from the 'Australian people' or even 'the majority of the community' on the issues raised; and the consultation process and its outcomes are not entirely risk-free for the Government and the defence establishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Defence and Security Procurement Directive (DSDP) is the first supranational policy in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and represents a departure from the standard understanding of the CSDP as intergovernmental. Whilst the member states were initially against such an initiative, the Defence Directive was eventually proposed in the Council in 2007 and accepted in July 2009. This paper examines why European Union member states changed their position on the proposal for a DSDP between 2004 and 2007. The analysis builds upon two hypotheses that aim to account for this change in position. Providing new insight into the views of the member states, the study finds that the member states accepted the Directive due to a sense of obligation to respect internal market rules, and further discusses the theoretical implications of these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper argues that Ireland has been a consistent contributor to peacekeeping since 1958 and examines how the nature of Irish participation has evolved. The maintenance of an effective UN forms a key objective of Irish foreign policy within which peacekeeping and a policy of military neutrality have come to play a central role. In 1993, Ireland revised the legal basis for participation. This brought about a fundamental change in policy, after which participation in peacekeeping not specifically of a police nature was permitted. Ireland displays evidence of both self-interest and altruism in relation to peacekeeping. Unlike many other European countries, it did not ‘withdraw’ from engagement during the 1990s. Despite greater clarity around decision-making processes in recent years, it is still difficult to discern a clear Irish policy strategy. Challenges identified for the future include the changing nature of UN peacekeeping, budget limitations and downsizing of the Defence Forces, legal obstacles to participation in non-UN approved missions, risk assessment, national caveats and a lack of clear doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper challenges the notion that Chinese maritime coercion in the East and South China Seas (ESCS) is best described as a grey zone strategy. The 'grey zone' notion raises two issues. Conceptually, it adds little to the existing literature on maritime coercion. Practically, it creates confusion over the understanding of maritime coercion by blurring the distinction between military and constabulary activities. The paper articulates this difference to elucidate the functional correlation between Beijing's strategic objectives and maritime claims. Within this context, the grey zone construct is particularly problematic since it uncritically assumes that the use of force is designed to remain below the threshold of war. By contrast, the paper argues that Chinese maritime claims to control 'rights and interests' are a function of a broader strategic intention to project military power within and beyond the confines of the ESCS, whilst preventing others to do the same. Thus, Chinese maritime coercion (military and constabulary) increases strategic competition and the risk of war, and is therefore better described as part of a 'hybrid' strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the main determinants of French defense spending over the period 1958–2017. To estimate the determinants of defense spending, the demand defense literature considers both economic and strategic factors such as conflicts, threats, and alliances. Our approach is original because we focus on strategic factors, including proxies for an alliance's membership and external threats. In addition, we include transnational terrorism as a proxy for internal threats. We find that defense spending is positively related to the gross domestic product, North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership, military operations abroad, and external threats and negatively linked to the population as a proxy to public service needs. These results are robust to changes in specifications and shifts in defense policy observed after 1991. This contribution underlines that the fundamental determinants of defense policy in France are economic conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily - its level of ambition - and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States military Civil Affairs community desires to increase its relevance to future operations and missions of the U.S. Army as part of the joint force. To do so, it must adapt to the changes and challenges of the dynamic and uncertain operational environments in which the joint force operates. One key component of these environments concerns the ability of the joint force to reestablish and maintain security in the wake of crises and catastrophes. This paper demonstrates that the concept of security itself has evolved and continues to do so in ways that require fundamental changes in the ways and means that the Civil Affairs community goes about its security tasks. Prominent among these changes is the fracturing of the concept of security into specialized forms, especially Human, Environmental and Informational Security. This paper provides some possible adaptations that the Civil Affairs community can make to accommodate these changes in the security environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2015 South African Defence Review set out to reverse the deterioration of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) capabilities. Within the South African Department of Defence (DOD) this deterioration is expressed mainly in terms of a decreasing defence budget, subsequent declining conventional capabilities and obsolete prime mission equipment. Contemporary research and defence expert debates on this theme, point out the disjuncture between policy ends and the available means, with scepticism for an increased defence budget given the DOD’s lack of internal reform and strategy adjustment. One question that remains largely unanswered in the literature regarding the decline of the SANDF, is why both the policy-makers and the SANDF have remained focused on the primary role of the military (defending territorial integrity) accompanied with an unaffordable conventional force design? This question relates to the aim of this paper and is explored by revisiting initial defence policy decisions and compromises that were made in the 1990s. It is argued that the primary role of the SANDF and its conventional force design suited the interests of both the politicians and the military, but that the drawbacks thereof have harshly caught up with the DOD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors have over 50 years' experience of working on defence in Central and Eastern Europe. They have been intimately involved in trying to reform over 10 national defence organisations including Ukraine. During this work, they often faced intractable resistance and scepticism or conversely, apparent unbounded support, but following this, a complete lack of any actual implementation work by officials. This paper addresses some of the findings and observations identified by the authors that appear to cause these responses and the consequent failure of reform. A new research approach has been taken by using the business and culture tools from Schein, Hofstede and Kotter to try and unravel the underlying causality of that failure. The second part of the paper produces a new process for change based upon the research conclusions to help other advisers and consultants working on reform in the post communist defence arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC, al-Qaeda and other extremist Islamist groups have become a focal point of international security debates. Drawing on the ‘levels of analysis’ theory of international relations, this paper examines the root causes of the emergence of al-Qaeda in an integrative framework which organizes the individual, group, and international level causes of this organization in a single account. This paper not only includes causes, correlations, and explanations at all three levels but also considers the significant impact of the relationship among causes belong to different levels on the emergence of al-Qaeda. Drawing on this theoretical framework, I argue that individual jihadis’ ‘quest for significance,’ Salafi-Jihadism as a group ideology, and the sole great power’s post-Cold War foreign and military policies in the Muslim world factored into the rise of al-Qaeda. Although the empirical basis of this research includes a single case study, the method used in this paper has possible implications for studying more similar cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses neutrality as a changing concept in international relations; the origin and characteristics of Serbia's military neutrality; as well as the country's general economic background and its defence spending. The paper also compares Serbian defence expenditure with the defence expenditure of the European members of the North American Treaty Organisation (NATO), members of the Eurasian and Russia-based Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and traditionally neutral countries in Europe. The paper explores how Serbia's current policy of military neutrality, while maintaining operational links with other military organisations in Europe, has had a positive impact on the Serbian economy in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Modern Italian Studies is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Today, China is the only one of five original nuclear weapon states that is increasing its nuclear arsenal. According to some estimates, the country could “more than double” the number of warheads on missiles that could threaten the United States by the mid-2020s. Earlier this year, China published a defense white paper, which repeated its nuclear policies of maintaining a minimum deterrent with a no-first-use pledge. Yet China has yet to define what it means by a minimum deterrent posture. This, together with the fact that it is deploying four new nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, invites concern as to the scale and intention of China’s nuclear upgrade. The authors estimate that China has a total inventory of approximately 240 nuclear warheads. Reviewing one of the world’s most opaque nuclear forces, they assess the country’s land-based missiles, submarines and sea-based missiles, and cruise missiles. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Contrary to expectations, Russia failed to overrun the Ukrainian defense despite its apparent preparations for the 2022 invasion. This paper delves into the unexpected outcome, attributing it to the Russian army's inadequate combat effectiveness. It, in turn, was triggered by President Vladimir Putin's coup-proofing strategies, namely granting large payrolls and funding for the military; tolerating lucrative dealings and corruption; establishing military fiefdoms; counterbalancing; rotation and purges of politically disloyal officers; and micromanaging military campaigns. Cumulatively, these policies curtailed military autonomy, accelerated promotions of inept loyalists, limited interbranch cooperation, provoked high attrition rates, and spread norms of coercion toward military personnel, making the Russian army's performance suboptimal during combat. Discussing the issue, the article advances four plausible explanations for why Putin resorted to coup-proofing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conceptual debates in terrorism research tend to understate the role that private companies play in countering terrorism, and rarely offer workable solutions around how the ‘terms of engagement’ between industry and the public sector could be improved in this field. This paper addresses this by considering the opportunity presented by the appointment of a ‘Director – Security Industry Engagement’ within the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) at the UK Home Office; a development which demonstrates how the public–private interactions which feature as part of the UK's ‘CONTEST’ strategy have become an increasingly important priority for the Government. To stimulate a new debate on this subject, the paper proposes both a revised approach towards ‘industrial engagement’ and a programme of key priorities which could form the basis of the new appointee's strategy. Whatever function the new Director fulfils, the private sector's role in countering terrorism should be bounded by strong principles and receive more effective oversight than at present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper engages with the security dynamics underlying the use of drones and their impact on security subjects – individuals and groups that are the ultimate recipients of specific security policies, regardless of whether these have beneficial effects on them. Using Mark Duffield’s distinction between the insured Global North and the non-insured Global South, this paper discusses how drones generate a radical dissociation between the intervener and the intervened that ultimately produces new security environments at the margins of the international system. These new security environments are defined by the articulation between space, technologies and bodies: bodies of invisible subjects; bodies that are uninsurable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Discusses the history of the civil defense program of the U.S., from 1944 to 1984. Reason given by the government on the establishment of a civil defense program; Studies conducted on the potential impact on a typical American city of the hydrogen bomb; Creation of the U.S. Federal Civil Defense Administration; Ways used to educate the public on civil defense; Implementation of the Interstate Highway Act of 1956.

The paper argues that a significant change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy has occurred, as compared to its Cold War security policy. Instead of relying solely on power-based realist variables, this paper argues that a significant change is taking place because of the shift in Japan's security identity from a 'peace state' to an 'international state'. What this refers to is that Japan sees itself as playing a more active role in military-strategic affairs in the post-Cold War period due to the normative structure shift within Japan in relation to the practices and role(s) in the regional and international security environment. To show change in Japan's security identity and its resultant security behaviour, norms in three areas that define and shape its security policy are contrasted - Japan's definition of national security; its contribution, in military terms, to regional and international security affairs; and the level of agency (control) Japan has in its security policy. The international-state security identity is increasingly recognised by the members of Japan's security policy-making elite and is used to formulate Japan's security policy in the post-Cold War period. It is also gradually being accepted by the larger Japanese society and has become a permanent feature of Japan's security discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the defense policy literature, it is widely believed that there is a pronounced bias towards the procurement of a less than optimal number of excessively sophisticated weapons. In this paper, we consider the possibility that this perceived bias is the result of the timing and informational structure of defense procurement decisions, and the interrelationship of this structure with overall fiscal policy. Specifically, this paper presents a model that suggests that tax smoothing considerations of the type first articulated in Barro (1979) could lead social welfare maximizing decision makers to choose a higher level of weapon quality than would be optimal if government revenue could be raised without resort to distortionary taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the application of the historiographical method to the study of British military doctrine writing in the 1980s and 1990s. Definition of historiography; Information on several army doctrine writers; Analysis of some of the papers presented at the British Military Doctrine Group meetings.

TheSouth African Defence Review 2014is the country's new defence policy. TheReview, which is expected to steer South African defence policymaking for the next few decades, discusses in detail the role of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in peace missions in Africa and proposes the direct involvement of the country's soldiers in both military and civilian tasks, from peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and development. This paper contains a critical review of theReviewwith regard to South Africa's envisaged contribution to regional and continental peace and stability. It is argued that humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction should not be securitised and that the SANDF should only be tasked with peacekeeping and the establishment of stability and security in fragile in-conflict and post-conflict settings. The humanitarian work should be left to humanitarian and aid agencies, while reconstruction and development should be left to organisations such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development, continental and international development organisations, and local actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws on data that formed part of a major three-year longitudinal study (2008–2011), which set out to investigate basic skills (BS) provision and needs in the British army and its relationship to operational effectiveness. Using mixed methods, the findings draw on qualitative data from 60 semi-structured interviews with 26 young recruits and interviews and survey data with 1518 recruits, with an average age of 19.6 years. The research also uses testimony from their line managers and trainers. The first part of the paper looks at educational BS provision that the army provides. While the benefits of this provision are discussed, there is a debate about the extent to which BS programmes provide recruits with qualifications rather than enduring and transferable skills, which would make them more operationally effective and useful to the army organisation. The second part deconstructs the concept of what is meant by being ‘operationally effective’ and the role BS play in reaching this ultimate military objective. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Studies on the democratic control and legitimacy of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have thus far mostly focused on formal institutions. However, a comprehensive analysis requires including the ‘sociocultural infrastructure’ in which such formal institutions are embedded. Students of democracy have argued that the public sphere is a crucial dimension, if not a precondition for all mechanisms of democratic control in general. This paper investigates whether and in which ways Europeans participated in transnational European communication on humanitarian military interventions (1990–2005/2006). The paper analyzes a full sample of 108,677 newspaper articles published in leading newspapers of six EU member states, and the US as a comparative case. It demonstrates that the ‘national’ arenas of political communication are intertwined and allow ordinary citizens to make up their minds about common European issues in the highly controversial and normatively sensitive realm of humanitarian military interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper identifies and classifies middle power nations through the use of broad political science definitions, the demand for military expenditures models and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The latter is used as a simple quantifiable measure of relative and potential military power. The paper also develops and utilizes a threat variable that is applicable to middle power nations. The panel data analysis shows that the middle power nations react to threat variables that proxy global instability utilize foreign aid as a complementary policy tool along with military expenditures, and face significant trade-offs between military and non-military government spending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we assess the drivers of, and prospects for, further security cooperation in the Australia–Japan bilateral relationship. We argue that while balance of threat and capability gaps may restrain the pace of deepening Australian-Japan security relations, these gaps are diminishing and are, in any case, secondary to the specific shared interests we posit as the primary drivers of Australia–Japan security cooperation. These specific interests, however, are shaped not only by a commitment in both countries to liberal-based principles and freedoms at home and in inter-state relations, but also by a common awareness of the importance of continued US primacy to the ongoing maintenance of those interests. Thus, in the absence of any fundamental change in how Australia and Japan understand their respective interests and the US role in the region, Donald Trump's recent and unexpected election as US president notwithstanding, we conclude that the case for further security cooperation – via additional cross-bracing of their respective US alliance relationships – will almost certainly remain compelling for both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper shows that the focus of Australia's 'declared' defence policy has oscillated between local and regional defence, whereas its 'operational' policy—the views contained in internal planning and guidance documents—has taken a mid-course, focusing on defending Australia's northern approaches. Australia's two policy domains coincided briefly in the mid-1980s but have since diverged as we have again begun to emphasise regional defence. This shift could signal the end of 'defence self-reliance'. While representing a setback for the Hawke government, such a result is necessary as Australia's 'operational' policy is flawed and in need of replacement. The danger is that, as in the past. Australian governments and their advisers will continue to adjust their rhetoric rather than their real policies to our changing circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on an analytical framework that combines strategic culture theory with narrative analysis, this paper explores the recent evolution of Iran's ballistic missile programme (BMP) (2015–2019). Iran's strategic culture attributes a key role to the BMP but nevertheless allows room for manoeuvre in Iran's security policy, which explains multiple and sometimes contradicting visions of the BMP. We demonstrate that Iran's approach towards the programme is enveloped by political discourses, which shift with the direction of Iran's international relations and domestic politics. We distinguish two competing narratives – 'revolutionary' and 'moderation' – and demonstrate how they define the opportunities and constraints of Iran's military behaviour in different ways. Finally, we demonstrate a move towards a more confrontational approach, reflected in the consolidation of the 'revolutionary' narrative. This article contributes to a more fine-grained understanding of Iran's policy towards its BMP, which remains central to Iran's strategic culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States have different strategic cultures when it comes to legitimating the use of military force and its relation with other foreign policy instruments. However, increasingly, military operations are conducted in multilateral forums; EU military operations are one of the most notable examples of this development. While some claim that these operations reflect power relations between nations with different strategic cultures, others argue that these common missions involve states in a process of collective learning and convergence of interests. Drawing upon an advocacy coalition approach, this paper confronts the competing hypotheses in the case of European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), as the EU’s longest running military operation (since 2004). On the basis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews with policymakers and politicians, this paper concludes that the evolution of EUFOR Althea has been primarily the result of the power politics of different coalitions, but there have also been a few instances of learning. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Duncan Sandys' tenure at the Ministry of Defence has usually been seen as one of the major turning points in post-war British defence policy. The consensus is that Sandys was a prime mover in bringing about a contraction of Britain's military capabilities in an era when economic constraints, coupled with the need for Britain to play a full part in maintaining the Western deterrent against Soviet expansion in Europe, dictated that Britain's ability to project military power beyond Europe had to shrink. Sandys' task was “radically pruning Britain's military capacity and adopting a defence posture more in keeping with a medium-size power.” This shift in policy was brought about by the April 1957 Defence White Paper. It amounted to “the biggest change in military policy ever made in normal times.” But emphasising that the Sandys White Paper was part of the wider process of decolonisation and nuclearisation overlooks the fact that in the seven years after it was published the British used conventional forces to mount no fewer than three expeditionary operations outside Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How does manpower affect counterinsurgency? Important debates about counterinsurgency theory, military doctrine, force planning, and ongoing military operations revolve around assumptions about the role manpower plays in determining counterinsurgency outcomes. But these assumptions have not, by and large, been subjected to large-n analysis. This paper helps serve that role by examining new data on counterinsurgents’ deployments across 171 campaigns since World War I. These data provide insight into a range of important issues, such as how force size should be measured, whether it is related to counterinsurgent success, whether troop nationality matters, and whether the role of manpower varies across contexts. Of these findings, the most notable is that conventional rules of thumb for force sizing, including the recommendation put forth in official US military doctrine, receive no empirical support. These findings therefore challenge the prevailing wisdom, while laying the groundwork for a range of future scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]