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Over 50 years after 1960's 'Year of Africa', most of Francophone Africa continues to be embedded in a set of associations that fit very well with Kwame Nkrumah's description of neocolonialism, where postcolonial states are de jure independent but in reality constrained through their economic systems so that policy is directed from outside. This article scrutinises the functioning of the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA), considering the role the currency has in persistent underdevelopment in most of Francophone Africa. In doing so, the article identifies the CFA as the most blatant example of functioning neocolonialism in Africa today and a critical device that promotes dependency in large parts of the continent. Mainstream analyses of the technical aspects of the CFA have generally focused on the exchange rate and other related matters. However, while important, the real importance of the CFA franc should not be seen as purely economic, but also political. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the key tenets of French foreign and security policy during the Cold War, and illustrates the deep challenges to the French consensus raised by the emergence of a unipolar system. There is a growing gap between the rhetoric of French security policy, emphasizing ‘autonomy’ and ‘sovereignty’ out of habit from the Cold War, and the actual security practices showing a gradual embedding within the transatlantic security structures. In the absence of a new transpartisan grand narrative relevant for the contemporary international system, such embedding is easily portrayed in France as a ‘treason’ from a romanticized Gaullist foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Durant la Première Guerre Mondiale, la presse parisienne de l'arrière évoque abondamment le génocide des Arméniens, tant pour dénoncer les massacres que pour alimenter un discours propagandiste visant à la mobilisation de guerre de la société civile. Les journaux voient en l'Allemagne l'instigatrice du génocide, plaçant la souffrance arménienne dans la continuité des exactions commises à l'encontre des Belges. Certains journaux parisiens se servent également du génocide des Arméniens pour opposer musulmans et chrétiens dans un discours aux accents de guerre de religion tandis que la presse de droite fait occasionnellement preuve de xénophobie à l'encontre des réfugiés et des victimes. La situation s'inverse même à la fin du conflit; le génocide des Arméniens étant dénoncé comme « bourrage de crâne » dans le but de promouvoir le rapprochement Franco-Turc. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Turkish foreign policy toward the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62) was construed as persistent Turkish endorsement of official French positions generating abiding resentment among the states of the Third World, especially Arab states, and understandably in Algeria, which was to elicit backlashes from the Third World states thereafter consequently causing substantial complications in Turkish foreign policy. Stressing the importance of incorporating nonmaterial and ideational factors in analyses of foreign policy, two arguments are put forward in this article for an accurate explanation of Turkish foreign policy toward Algerian War of Independence. First, it was the conception of the West, defined not only in strategic or military terms, but also in ideational and civilizational terms that induced Turkish policy-makers to adopt insular policies regarding Algeria. Second, a “temporal contextualization” of Turkish foreign policy during the Algerian War of Independence is required for a proper understanding of Turkish foreign policy toward the Algerian War of Independence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This contribution explores notions of sovereignty in the three French territories of the South Pacific: French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna. It also analyses the key nuances and challenges of the transition from aspirations of ‘independence’ to those of ‘shared sovereignty’. From protectorates or colonies to overseas territories (Territoires d'Outre-Mer), these three territories have experienced specific and customised statuses with various degrees of autonomy, all underscoring a fine line between autonomy and sovereignty. Indeed, ‘sovereignty’ has today become much more synonymous with the concept of ‘self-government’ or ‘large autonomy’, as the current situation in French Polynesia demonstrates. Meanwhile, New Caledonia is one step closer to ‘full sovereignty’, since its actual status includes provisions for a referendum on self-determination between 2014 and 2018. The claim for independence, a characteristic of Kanak and Maohi movements, has become more pragmatically focused, to the extent that considering sovereignty ‘in free-association’ with France is now a perfectly conceivable option. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines how official and unofficial early film footage intersects in the representation of France's mission civilisatrice in films taken in West Congo in the early twentieth century. We study uncut, and largely unseen footage of the French soldier General Henri Gouraud in Syria and Lebanon, filmed during the French acquisition of these territories following the First World War. This footage taken by Albert Kahn's photographer Lucien Le Saint, and now in the Archives de la Planète in Paris, reveals twin images of the General: one a powerful military commander of France's ‘civilizing mission’ and the other a relaxed, modern man of the kind not usually seen in public film footage. This article then, examines various contradictions at the heart of imperialistic discourse that characterised French cultural self-confidence in the last decades of the Third Republic. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Anglo-French relations in the late 1580s were seriously affected by an increasing mistrust between Elizabeth I and Henry IV, who found it difficult to agree on a common policy against Spain. The upper stages of power viewed Elizabeth's support to the French cause as the only means of protecting the English coasts from Spanish attacks and so they tried to persuade the English sovereign to keep in good terms with France. Theatre became a useful instrument to suggest new policies in this regard. This paper examines the French debate in the anonymous play The True Chronicle History of King Leir , successfully performed by the Queen's Men in 1594. Through an analysis of its structure, characters and motifs, the paper explores the play's debt to the romance tradition and the use of this mode to offer an optimistic view of the Anglo-French alliance while making a good box office. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

From 1956 to 1960, the French Army developed a force of Muslim auxiliaries (supplétifs) as a major component of its strategy to combat the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency in Algeria. Aside from their military utility in hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, the supplétifs were instrumental in undermining FLN legitimacy in the countryside. The rapid growth and employment of the supplétif force dismantled FLN political control in the villages, undermined the enemy's unity, and critically weakened the revolutionaries' claim to represent all of Algeria's Muslims. The military and political activities of France's Muslim soldiers also projected an image of Muslim–European unity behind the French cause, and portrayed the French Army as the only legitimate political force in numerous villages. These political successes, however, were limited to the local, tactical level of revolutionary warfare, and the Army was never able to convert the supplétifs into a force of decisive, strategic political significance. They thus had little ultimate impact on the outcome of the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the history surrounding the 1858 petition from the governors and chiefs of Raiatea, French Polynesia and Tahaa, French Polynesia requesting to be an American protectorate. An overview of the French and British involvement in the Society Islands, including Tahiti becoming a French protectorate in 1842 and Great Britain and France's recognition of the autonomy of the Leeward Islands, West Indies, is provided. The relationship between the political disputes among native rulers in the Society Islands and the foreign intervention of the U.S., Great Britain and France is discussed.

France is considered a strong state, but French governments have always fiercely defended the interests of French farmers in European and global negotiations. Why would a ‘strong state’ be unable to resist farm lobby pressure? Is agriculture an exception to the French ‘strong state’ rule? This article offers a structural model of varying state sensitivity to interest group pressure, and argues that farm lobby pressure cannot fully explain French foreign policy on agriculture, as governments often go against farmers' preferences and as the level of pressure varies more than the continuity of governmental preferences. From an analysis of the negotiations on the CAP and the GATT in the 1960s and in the 1990s it emerges that ideational constraints played a major role in French obstinacy. The defence of French identity as La Grande Nation, necessitating a presence in world agricultural markets, and the defence of a strong Europe under French leadership as a counterweight to the United States, have guided French preferences without regard to the farmers' positions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article looks at an episode which though it happened in Tunisia had a direct link to the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), and thus propelled the war to an international conflict that pitted the Western powers, namely; France, Britain and America against each other. By the time the incident occurred the Algerian War had been going on for just over three years with the French seemingly gaining the upper hand. This article endeavours to show how this incident complicated the Algerian conflict and how the episode was viewed internationally, especially from the British Government and media perspectives both had keen interest on the Algerian conflict as a result of their own empire in other parts of Africa. The article is based largely on archival research at the Public Record Office at Kew, (England) and Newspaper archives at Colindale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the relationship between France and Algeria in the immediate aftermath of Algerian independence. In 1963, Algeria repeatedly breached the Evian Accords, and continuously threatened France's national interests. Yet, French policymakers accommodated Algeria's reassertion and even rewarded it with a generous coopération package. I will argue that this remarkable discrepancy was due to Gaullist France's belief that association with its former colony would benefit its image and influence in the Third World. Algeria at the time enjoyed significant prestige in Asia and Africa, and this was precisely the arena where France was keen to deploy its leadership in order to enhance its independence from the two superpowers. This perception detracted Paris from the cool-blooded pursuit of ‘realist’ state interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 1971, two Canadian unionists travelled to New Caledonia on a technical mission of assistance to the territory's unions. At the airport in Nouméa, however, the territorial authorities refused the unionists entry. For the French government, the interest of the United Steelworkers of America in New Caledonia represented a threat to the stability and competitiveness of the territory's nickel industry. The visit was also seen as a manifestation of growing American influence on New Caledonia's economic and political development at a time when the French were increasingly concerned about the territory's attachment to France. Yet efforts by the territorial authorities in Nouméa to prevent the visit were complicated by other French and Canadian concerns. Neither Canada nor the metropolitan government of France wanted an international incident that might jeopardise France–Canada relations, which were improving slowly after several years of acrimony. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An essay is presented on how France retained possession of Morocco during World War I. It discusses the ways in which France was able to fight foreign wars in the Middle East, North Africa, and Italy in addition to engaging in military operations on the Western Front of World War I. The article argues that France had developed a conventional army and two colonial armies, the Armée d’Afrique and the Chasseurs d'Afrique.

This article investigates France's policy towards the Arab world and the Middle East at a critical juncture: the first oil crisis. Based on largely untapped archival records, it demonstrates that concerns over declining power spurred Georges Pompidou's government to Europeanise this policy, taking advantage of the anxieties unleashed by the Arab use of oil as a political weapon. It also sheds light on the intricate links between the transatlantic relationship, relations between the superpowers, the Middle East conflict and Franco-/Euro-Arab ties. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Jean-Paul Sartre has been called 'the most prominent anti-American' in France, and his critiques of US society and foreign policy have been attributed to his ingrained anti-Americanism. This article questions the utility of this concept in understanding Sartre's political engagements, for he does not fit into standard definitions of anti-Americanism that emphasize special hostility and general resentment toward the United States. Instead, Sartre's writings about the United States reveal an enthusiastic embrace of contemporary American culture, while his sharpest critiques focused on two issues that were lifelong concerns of his, regardless of national context: racial discrimination and the arbitrary exercise of power. Despite his period of fellow traveling that made him sympathetic to the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, Sartre's political biography shows that he was much more interested in the deficiencies of French society and foreign policy than he was in America's failings. The article concludes that Sartre can be better understood as a member of a multiracial, transatlantic community of engaged intellectuals who struggled, and sometimes failed, to find an activist Marxism that was compatible with individual integrity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Community Games [Jeux de la Communaute] took place in Antananarivo between 13 and 19 April 1960. This international sporting event was based on the model of the Olympic Games and was the first one to bring together all French-speaking African nations, i.e. the states which were part of the Community, as well as the French overseas departments and territories. How did these games turn out as African athletes were in the spotlight for the first time when competing against French sporting teams? It is important to focus on the role of sporting events within the framework of international politics. This competition, which was totally imbalanced as far as the respective strengths went, was a relevant indicator of how political and diplomatic relations were shifting between France and its African colonies and Madagascar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1958, Armand Gatti, on the brink of becoming a famous dramatist, took a trip to North Korea in the company of Claude Lanzmann, Chris Marker and Jean-Claude Bonnardot. This was the first visit to this country by French intellectuals. There, in the midst of a political crisis gripping the country, Gatti wrote the screenplay for the film Moranbong, directed by Bonnardot. In proposing to link a love story in North Korea through the eyes of a French journalist with the rehearsals for the Korean opera Chunhyang, Gatti created a unique film. In this film, which disappeared for many years because it was censored on its release, we find Gatti’s reflections on political regimes and human destinies, his will to invent a new role for the artist and for art, the influence of Sartrian and Camusian existentialism and his fascination for Asian arts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As many unused sources in the Service Historique de la Defense in Vincennes and the Quai d'Orsay in Paris reveal the French Deuxieme Bureau, and also naval intelligence, monitored events during the home rule crisis, the Easter Rising, the First World War, the Peace Conference in Paris and the Civil War. Also worthy of note are the elaboration of Franco-Irish invasion plans during the Boer War and the secret mission of an Irish general in Paris shortly after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 December 1921. The aims of this article will be to give an overview of French military intelligence activities regarding Ireland and to give an assessment of its interest in the country during the period under consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article has two main theses: first, that from 1958 to 1967—Charles de Gaulle's presidency—there was a typical patron-client relationship between France and Israel that lasted until the Six Day War. It challenges the frequent claim in the literature that relations between Israel and France did not essentially change after de Gaulle's rise to power. Second, it argues that the basis on which this relationship was founded was rocky from the start since as a client, Israel was not ready to accede to French demands that it restrain its security policy to conform to key French interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the role of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey—the Diyanet—in the French Council for Muslim Religion (Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman or CFCM). The Diyanet-linked Cordination Committee of Muslim Turks in France (Comite de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France, or CCMTF) was one of the constitutive federations of the CFCM, confirming its status as 'the' interlocutor for the French state in its relations with the Turkish Muslim community. I argue in this paper that this is mainly for two reasons. First, the Turkish government uses the Diyanet as a foreign-policy instrument, promoting 'Turkish Islam' as a moderate and rational religion, compatible with modernity and as a model for 'European' or 'French Islam'. The Diyanet presents itself as the legitimate representative of Muslims of Turkish origin in France, excluding other organisations as radicals. Secondly, the Turkish Muslim community in France still displays loyalty to Turkey in terms of social organisation. The paternalistic attitude of the Turkish state, the immigrants' search for protection of the country of origin, nationality divisions within the CFCM and the long-standing habit of the French state to deal with its Muslim community through foreign governments help to explain the continuing importance of the Diyanet for the Turkish Muslim community and in the CFCM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on documents recently discovered in French archives, the article sheds new light on the role of France, especially of its Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, in providing arms and ammunition to the Etzel - the pre-state underground Zionist movement in Israel. The ship Altalena, which was sunk by the newly-formed Israel Defence Forces in the midst of the 1948 War of Independence, remains a centre of historiographical and political controversy in Israel. France's role in this affair is examined in the wider context of its clandestine intelligence, military and diplomatic assistance to Israel, as well as its rivalry with Britain in the Middle East. The article argues that Bidault's decision was intended to undermine Britain's secret support during the war in Palestine for King Abdallah of Jordan's occupation of Jerusalem. Documents, including a report of a committee of inquiry of the French Ministry of Defence into the Altalena affair, are annexed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century and Napoleon Bonaparte's conquest of Egypt, France has tended to maintain a complex relationship with countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. In this context, fascination, admiration for the culture, but also sufficiency and search for power and domination go hand-in-hand. From the imposition of its presence by force, either through colonisation, protectorates or military adventures, France has seen her policy/policies towards the region shift to more intricate strategies, the ultimate aim of which being its desire to retain a lasting link, meant to remain an 'exceptional' one. In this article, the author attempts to examine these strategies and the dynamics behind them—strategies that are often looked at as being a mixture of absolute sincerity and political cynicism. Obviously, this also includes the Union for the Mediterranean, France's initiative that President Nicolas Sarkozy put forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The defeat of Prussia by Napoleon in 1806 and the resulting insurrection in Prussian Poland re-opened the complex 'Polish Question'. The former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been wiped off the map only eleven years earlier. The large size and the civic traditions of the Polish 'political nation' meant that the three partitioning powers (Austria, Prussia, Russia) were bound to be alarmed by the developments in Prussian Poland. Napoleon's attitude to the Poles was cautious, but, as the campaign against Russia (Prussia's new ally) continued into 1807, he authorized the creation of a Polish army and of a quasi-government in Warsaw. The article examines the negotiations over the future of Prussia's Polish lands held between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I at Tilsit in June–July 1807. Hard geopolitical considerations influenced the negotiations which eventually produced a compromise solution in the form of a so-called 'Duchy of Warsaw' under the King of Saxony. Although the Poles had no direct influence on the negotiations, the Polish military effort on the side of France was an important factor in the outcome of the settlement. The Russians remained deeply wary of the new duchy, especially after its enlargement in 1809. With the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire in 1814–15, Tsar Alexander acquired most of the duchy which was to survive for many years under Russian rule as the so-called 'Congress' Kingdom of Poland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few foreign diplomats have a more tainted reputation than the French ambassador Charles Faye, Lord of Espesses. His mission in The Hague (16241628) had a promising start but soon developed conflicts, misunderstandings and even violent confrontations. Many have blamed D'Espesses for damaging the alliance between France and the United Provinces. However, most of his actions can be explained in the light of international relations and the shifting politics of Cardinal Richelieu, chief minister of Louis XlII. Obstacles in Franco-Dutch relations, like the French war with England, drove the two countries temporarily apart. Yet, the ambassador continued to defend the French crown and obtained the desired maritime goods. Although he was a zealous Catholic, D'Espesses learned to restrain himself in religious matters. Only when he and his entourage were in personal danger, did the ambassador exceed diplomatic conventions. Before these events occurred, he merely acted upon instructions from Paris. His successor, De Baugy, arrived under better circumstances and concluded a new alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses French cultural diplomacy in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, a country created after the First World War as a result of the Franco-Serbian military alliance during the war. Cultural diplomacy is examined as part of broader French political and economical action in Eastern Europe to organise the small newly created countries into the French field of interest and oppose Germany. French cultural diplomacy in the Kingdom of SCS had two aspects: the symbolical and the concrete. Its aim was to spread positive feelings towards France in the ex-Austria-Hungarian regions of the Kingdom, where France was unknown or seen as an enemy, and to maintain the pro-French attitude of the majority of Serbs. The aim was to contribute to the 'internal equalisation and strengthening' of the new ethnically and religiously heterogeneous country, by using culture as a 'soft power'. French cultural diplomacy in the Kingdom of SCS is analysed in its local, regional and European context and in a short- and long-term perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers whether a specifically French 'appeasement' developed among policymakers of the inter-war years and, if so, how various appeasement strategies changed over time. It does so firstly, by attempting to define this French version of appeasement partly by reference to the historiography of French inter-war foreign policy and strategic planning. The article then considers the various impersonal forces that led to changes of course in foreign policy. These include domestic social and political pressures, economic conditions, and the changing strategic balance of power in Europe. The article suggests that French appeasement was neither a constant feature of France's international strategy in the 1930s nor simply a mirror image of its British counterpart. The foundations of French diplomacy, military thinking and strategic outlook were altogether different. By the late 1930s the limitations of actual allies, the recalcitrance of some potential friends, the elusiveness of others, had all provided a powerful fillip to proponents of appeasement, although substantial minorities continued to oppose it. Ultimately, France without a great power ally was a nation compelled to appease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the opinions of France regarding the formation of Israel. Changes which have occurred in France's opinions after a vote by the United Nations regarding the formation of Israel are discussed. The way in which France's involvement with the Arab world impacted the country's opinions regarding the formation of a Jewish state is mentioned. Conflicting opinions which existed of whether or not France should play a role in the formation of a Jewish state or stay out of it to protect the relationship they had with the Arab world are discussed. The possibility of dividing Israel amongst the Jews and Palestinians is mentioned.

This essay provides a sociological perspective of the role of sport as a potential factor in French foreign policy after the Second World War. It notes that while sportspersons and events can serve important political functions, their actual diplomatic value is not self-evident. Granting that sport is an 'autonomous social field', we nevertheless maintain that, at least until the end of the Cold War, it became subservient to politics where and whenever the political 'field' saw fit to utilize sport as a means to further 'higher' diplomatic interests. In other words, the sporting realm was only independent inasmuch as it had no significant bearing on political affairs. When sport became useful, it was co-opted by politics. In contemporary France, however, the dynamics of that relationship appear to be changing. Using the 2012 Paris Olympic bid to illustrate our argument, we suggest that the organs of the French state are perhaps weakening relative to the organs of sport; and concomitantly, that both a 'sportization' of politics, and a politicization of sports, is now underway. This is not to say that any sort of parity between the two fields has been achieved; rather, that they increasingly co-constitute one another, with no inevitable dominance on one side. That the terms and timing of the Paris bid were controlled more by the IOC than by the French state, is indicative of this new reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using previously unpublished material to further socio-historic research into the migration of top footballers, this contribution studies changing national contexts in France and Algeria resulting in the dramatic fall in migration by Algerian footballers - the third largest 'foreign' population (since 1962) to play in the French Championship after professionalization. It also questions whether acculturation persisted in Algeria after independence. A quantitative analysis of 25 interviews carried out mainly in Algeria with ex-champions who had played for French clubs (colonial and postcolonial), shows that between 1956 and 1982 there did exist a 'desire for France'. Despite changes to the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) sports policies nationalizing Algerian football, this desire for France remained founded on socio-economic advancement and a fascination for life in the ex-homeland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Ping-Pong diplomacy of the early 1970s and the readmission of the People's Republic of China to the IOC in 1979 at a time when the Chinese Government was moving towards economic reform, Europe has watched closely the growth of China and its economic challenge to the USA and indeed other powerful economies. The European perceptions of, and reactions to Chinese successes have been contradictory. On one hand, much has been done by Europe to be included in the economic great match, for instance the strategic partnership between China and France forged on the initiative of President Jacques Chirac in 1997. On the other hand, concerns have been often expressed about other aspects of the Chinese society. Consequently, contradictions have been apparent in responses to Chinese sport successes and bids for the Olympic Games. Criticism had nowhere been stronger than in France, the self-proclaimed country of Human Rights. The Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 had an immense impact in France, where the bicentenary of the French Revolution had just been celebrated. This criticism culminated recently in Segolene Royal's official demand for a Boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games during her campaign for the French Presidency, in 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the implications of the ideological shift prompted by the Fifth French Republic on the country's national identity. It cites studies that examined the genesis of the Fifth Republic that highlighted the need to clearly define nationality and citizenship. Moreover, it discusses the country's issues on national identity by citing its post-independence relations with sub-Saharan African states and the prevailing attitudes of the French North African minority population.

The article discusses the political and social development in the Fifth French Republic during the regime of Charles de Gaulle. It explores de Gaulle's views that led him to oppose the European Defense Community (EDC), particularly his views regarding France's independence from external control. Moreover, it examines the legacy left by de Gaulle in European policy, which according to the author is simply a set of behaviors and belief designed to create the illusion of control.

The French experience of the First World War has aroused significant interest within and outside academic circles since the 1990s. A heated controversy over the role and significance of the 1914-1918 'war culture' has, in the last ten years, pitted two schools of interpretation, emphasizing 'consent' on the one hand and 'coercion' on the other. This paper first presents the main lines of the argument between two groups of historians anxious to contribute to a European history of the First World War. It then suggests avenues of further investigation that urgently require an international and collaborative effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will attempt to draw attention to the Anglo-French nuclear weapons negotiations that ran alongside the British applications to join the EEC during the years 1960-1974. It suggests that the prospect of an entente nucléaire was an issue that played a unique role in the UK's negotiating strategy. It will argue that three successive Prime Minister's - Macmillan, Wilson and Heath - attempted to forge an agreement in the hope of overcoming French objections to Britain's entry, albeit for different reasons. All three were hampered by the "special nuclear relationship" with the Americans and this eventually precluded a mutually beneficial resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the first part of a series article on the role of Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French movement during the World War II in the crises in Syria and Lebanon during the war. According to the author, de Gaulle blames the British government for the crisis over his visit to the Levant. It is said that de Gaulle intentionally instigated crises in Syria and Lebanon after learning the plans of Great Britain and U.S. for a cross-channel invasion of France.

The period 1806-1815 in Franco-Polish relations was marked by more French influence on Polish soil than ever before or since. Nonetheless, French attitudes toward Poland and the Poles during the Napoleonic period were molded not by personal experience but rather by stereotypes established earlier by a discourse created during the Enlightenment, positing Poland as Other. Despite the resulting negative view of Poles held by most French generals and statesmen, Napoleon was not captured by this treatment of Poland for he had need of the Poles and would not allow any construct to impede his path. Napoleon's views were decided by events and the Poles—despite French apprehensions— and fulfilled Napoleon's expectations. Napoleon looked to the Poles as a means to an end: the extension of French power and the Napoleonic Empire. Napoleon's relationship with the Poles was thus based on an imperial discourse, based on the unequal status of French and Poles. French influence and power in Poland became a self-justifying argument for continuing control of Polish affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the relationship of France and Rome. It notes that Rome has improved its relationship with France in order to regain the Latin origin for redefinition of their culture. It cites that Latinity is one of the reason why Romanians had shifted to French culture. It discusses how the relationship directly affected the cultural and national identity of Romanians. It cites that Romanians have increased their effort to learn more about France through traveling and publications.

Sir Ronald H. Campbell was the first British ambassador during the Second World War to manage a key bilateral relationship with a wartime ally. When the Germans invaded France in May 1940, Campbell's Embassy was transformed from a diplomatic reporting post into a frontline base that had to brief London not only on the political situation in France but also on strategic military matters. However, the British ambassador would constantly struggle to register his authority in the overall management of the Franco-British relationship, and more often than not, was bypassed by Whitehall departments, special advisors and senior ministers. Campbell only found himself in a more pivotal role as communications between the British and French Governments disintegrated and the latter moved to Bordeaux. It then fell upon Campbell to make some of the most dramatic decisions in twentieth century Franco-British history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France is frequently identified as the country whose official development assistance (ODA) aid program is most oriented toward the promotion of its foreign policy goals. We examine whether France reoriented the allocation of its aid in Africa to reflect changing priorities in the 1990s. Using panel data, we compare the patterns in French aid allocation to African recipients during the period 1980-1989 with that during the period 1990-2000. We find that nearly all the same political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural variables that explain French ODA allocation during the Cold War apply in the second period as well, though to a slightly lesser degree. The predictive strength of the prior years' ODA commitments did increase in magnitude, suggesting that bureaucratic inertia increasingly exerts a formidable force in such decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

L'échec du projet britannique de pacte tripartite franco–anglo–soviétique révèle quelques traits majeurs des relations entre la France et le Royaume-Uni au XXème siècle. Le premier est l'existence de divergences qui concernent davantage l'accessoire que l'essentiel. Si les deux pays sont d'accord pour considérer qu'une alliance entre Paris, Londres et Moscou est essentielle à l'équilibre européen, ils divergent sur la forme à lui donner, les Français préférant un système de pactes bilatéraux à la formule tripartite proposée par les Britanniques. En outre cet épisode se caractérise par une absence de consultation entre les deux diplomaties. Les incidents qui en découlent pourraient prêter à sourire s'ils n'étaient pas le signe d'un climat de suspicion réciproque. Celui-ci est d'ailleurs plus marqué à Paris qu'à Londres. Tous ces éléments participent aux difficiles relations franco–britanniques et expliquent qu'il ait fallu attendre le 4 mars 1947 pour voir l'alliance franco–britannique se matérialiser par le traité de Dunkerque. Abstract: The failure of the British project of a tripartite pact between France, Britain and the USSR exemplifies some of the main features of the Franco–British relationship in the twentieth century. The first is the existence of divergences, which concern more incidental details than essential matters. If the two countries agreed to consider that an alliance between Paris, London and Moscow was essential for European balance, they differed on the form it should take. The French preferred a bilateral pact system to the tripartite pact formula proposed by the British. Moreover, this episode was distinguished by an absence of consultation between the two diplomacies. The incidents that followed could be risible if there were not signs of a climate of mutual suspicion which was, incidentally, more distinct in Paris than in London. All these elements contributed to the difficult Franco–British relationship and explain why one had to wait until 4 March 1947 to see a Franco–British alliance realized by the Dunkirk Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to explain the evolution of French Levant policy from crusade to diplomacy. Traditionally French policy towards the Levant was dominated by the hope of the Most Christian Kings to re-conquer the Holy Land from the “infidels” until the early sixteenth century. In the course of the sixteenth century this changed and a new approach of treating Muslim powers in the same way as Christian neighbours emerged. The reason why the latter concept became predominant shall be explained by showing the examples of two French attacks on Beirut in the years 1403 and 1520. Although both were initially undertaken in the spirit of the crusades, France reversed its policy in the aftermath of the 1520 failure and sought co-operation with a Muslim state. Severely threatened on several borders by Habsburg Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, France henceforth looked to the Ottomans as allies and gave up on further crusading projects. This reconsideration of its foreign policy aims culminated in the French–Ottoman treaty of 1536. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses French-American relations in context of the war of the U.S. against Iraq. Americans living in Paris claimed that last spring's demonstrations were directed at the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, not at the American people. French supporters of U.S. foreign policy argued that France, from its government to its people, was suffering once again from an acute case of irrational, hypocritical and highly predictable anti-Americanism. What has been returning in France, for the past ten or fifteen years by most accounts, is religion.

The article discusses the portrayal of Franco-American relations in Diane Johnson's novel "L'Affaire." The novel, set in France concludes with the imminent departure of its heroine, Amy Hawkins. Human and geological shifts combine in the novel to produce a series of cataclysms, at once natural and cultural, comic and tragic, and literal as well as figurative. America's apparent eagerness to make Francophobia the same essential trait of American national identity that it has always been for the British paradoxically marks the U.S. as every bit as European as France.

In addition to the longstanding ties between Algeria and France, the recent and ongoing 'civil war' has given rise to or revealed a large number of formal arrangements, associations, NGOs and exchange networks. However, it is important to know that the 'events of 1988' and all that grew out of them were not the social system's final implosion, but the aborted 15-year struggle aimed at acquiring basic liberties. Above all, Algeria most needs to share symbolic resources, of all segments of its disarticulated society. The great majority of the actors in these struggles have left the country, and it is on this exodus, its forms and effects, that we must meditate now. What becomes of the exiles? What are their ties with their country of origin? What sort of proximity do they make for themselves with those compatriots who left long before they did and for different reasons? And above all, what has become of the task of breaking free from 'unanimism', both inside and outside Algeria? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Franco-British relations have always been central to the fortunes both of the transatlantic partnership and of the European security and defence project (ESDP). Although fraught with ambivalence in the years after the 1998 Saint-Malo summit, the Franco-British partnership pushed ESDP forward. In 2003, however, France and the UK defined two extremes in their approaches both to war in Iraq and to relations with the US. Neither approach makes strategic sense. France's apparent principled opposition will only serve to divide the EU into largely artificial pro- and anti- American camps. The UK's apparent unconditional alignment will only serve to confine it to the margins of European 15olicymaking in an area -- diplomacy and security -- where Britain can and must play a leading role. Only if both countries agree to adopt, along with all their partners, a new and more subtle policy of quiet, unified and critical dialogue with Washington can the EU have the kind of transatlantic impact that both profess to seek. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reassesses the foreign policy of the French government towards the Arab League of Countries. Opposition of the French government towards the military campaign against Iraq led by the United States; Background on French policy towards the Arab states; French-Arab interests in Africa and the Middle East.

Discusses the tension between the U.S. and France during the Fourth Republic from 1946 to 1958. Notion of the Right as a valid political concept; Factors that prevented several political groups from uniting into a broad-based political movement; Reluctance of France to forfeit national sovereignty to collective security.

This article offers an overview of the history of sporting relations between France and Algeria from the colonial period to the present, with particular reference to association football or 'soccer'. Simultaneously local and global, this most 'mediatised' of modern games is discussed as a privileged site for cultural and political exchanges between the two nations. Attention is focused on the contribution made by football to Algeria's struggle for independence, and the subsequent efforts by the new Algerian state to exploit the game's potential for internal legitimisation and external recognition. Central to the discussion are a number of iconic Algerian footballers, including Rachid Mekloufi and Rabah Madjer, together with the outstanding French player of Algerian descent, Zinedine Zidane. In conclusion, the social and political lessons of the home side's victory in the France '98 World Cup are considered, as are those of the problematic France–Algeria 'friendly' match of 6 October 2001. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The feeling of belonging to a diaspora is relatively weak among Algerians for at least four main reasons. First, during the Algerian war of independence Algerian migrants were divided between rival nationalist movements and traces of these divisions can still be felt. Second, the period of immigrant settlement is still relatively recent. The 40 years that have elapsed since independence do not constitute a sufficiently long time period for the development of a strong diasporic consciousness in France. Third, the Algerian minority in France is divided in numerous ways, such as between Arabic-speakers and Berber-speakers and between migrant workers living apart from their families and the young generation of 'Beurs' born in France of immigrant parents. Fourth, the deterioration of the political situation in Algeria since the late 1980s has blow n apart the relationship between the Algerian state and ordinary Algerians both within and outside Algeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]