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French policy towards Israel in the 1950s and 1960s depended on a number of variables. Above all, French diplomacy never considered Israel apart from broader Middle Eastern and international considerations. The collusion of the Sinai Campaign of 1956 transformed this situation only to a certain extent; parallel evaluation of the merits and limits of Franco-Israeli relations predated the establishment of the French Fifth Republic. A process of readjustment undertaken by de Gaulle's administration came to the fore in 1960. It combined elements of practical assistance with reserved association in public. The nature of transition defied simple classification. While Israel was concerned about allegedly waning support, the official French narrative denied the existence of a major shift in the substance of bilateral ties. In a way, each party misinterpreted the actions of the other: for Israel, ongoing French assistance did not fully outweigh the decline in overt expressions of 'friendship'; viewed from Paris, the reactions to every minor French 'no' seemed exaggerated. The limitations accompanying bilateral trade confirmed these diverging perspectives even further. Yet, seen in its proper historical context, the outcome of this process was not set in stone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article has two main theses: first, that from 1958 to 1967—Charles de Gaulle's presidency—there was a typical patron-client relationship between France and Israel that lasted until the Six Day War. It challenges the frequent claim in the literature that relations between Israel and France did not essentially change after de Gaulle's rise to power. Second, it argues that the basis on which this relationship was founded was rocky from the start since as a client, Israel was not ready to accede to French demands that it restrain its security policy to conform to key French interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on documents recently discovered in French archives, the article sheds new light on the role of France, especially of its Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, in providing arms and ammunition to the Etzel - the pre-state underground Zionist movement in Israel. The ship Altalena, which was sunk by the newly-formed Israel Defence Forces in the midst of the 1948 War of Independence, remains a centre of historiographical and political controversy in Israel. France's role in this affair is examined in the wider context of its clandestine intelligence, military and diplomatic assistance to Israel, as well as its rivalry with Britain in the Middle East. The article argues that Bidault's decision was intended to undermine Britain's secret support during the war in Palestine for King Abdallah of Jordan's occupation of Jerusalem. Documents, including a report of a committee of inquiry of the French Ministry of Defence into the Altalena affair, are annexed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the opinions of France regarding the formation of Israel. Changes which have occurred in France's opinions after a vote by the United Nations regarding the formation of Israel are discussed. The way in which France's involvement with the Arab world impacted the country's opinions regarding the formation of a Jewish state is mentioned. Conflicting opinions which existed of whether or not France should play a role in the formation of a Jewish state or stay out of it to protect the relationship they had with the Arab world are discussed. The possibility of dividing Israel amongst the Jews and Palestinians is mentioned.