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The article responds to sociologist Andy Pickering's comments, partly because of the inherent intellectual stimulation of exchanging ideas with such a distinguished colleague, but partly also because of the need for much greater interchange between the two fields, the sociology of environment and technology, on the one hand and the sociology of science on the other. Pickering's comments raise three important points about the analysis of Iron Mountain, Michigan. First, he praises what he calls papers symmetry in noting the importance of physical⁄environmental as well as social factors in understanding social outcomes. Second, he argues that people have not taken this point far enough, in large part because, he believes, the social is not sufficiently at stake in papers. Third, he argues that a fruitful antidote would be to trace the evolution of actual practices, in detail, over time.

The article traces the career of the concept scientific community through three discernible stages. The formative stages is presented by Ludwik Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. It was learned that one of the early expositions of the theme that scientific knowledge is socially conditioned, Fleck's work revolves around the correlative concepts of thought collective and thought style. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was discussed. Stage three in the career of the concept scientific community is marked by criticism and the development of alternative models. During the 1960s and 70s, the view prevailed among metascientists that scientific knowledge is produced by communities of specialists. In the works of leading contemporary philosophers of science, as in many historical studies, the existence of scientific communities was assumed without question or argument. Kuhn's paper represents a watershed in the histories of both the concept itself and the entire discipline of sociology of science. Social integration in science was considered a result of a consensus about strategic norms or standards. Findings on the examination of the concept scientific community through the related works of Kuhn and Fleck, the Polish scientist and scientist knowledge, was presented.

This article is an attempt to evaluate the contribution of the late Erving Goffman to the field of Sociology. In doing so I have attempted to document some of the main commentaries upon Coffman's work — especially those of A. Dawe and A.W. Gouldner — and to evaluate their validity. This paper is presented within the framework of a general overview of Goffman's work and an elaboration of some of the salient themes within it. The intention of the author is to free Goffman from some of the crude overgeneralizations that his colleagues have used in evaluating his writings. In particular, I have attempted to show, in general terms, how Goffman's work is sensitive to ‘structural’ as well as ‘situational’ concerns and also to class, hierarchy and power. It is argued that Goffman's importance has been underestimated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Upon his death in 1920, at the age of 56, sociologist Max Weber left behind a huge and untidy mass of personal papers and scholarly manuscripts, some of the latter in the process of being edited for publication by Weber himself, others intended for intensive reworking, others yet superseded drafts. The intended characteristics of the book "Max Weber Gesamtausgabe," in the first of the publications listed below: they are those of a critical-historical edition, intended not to replace the several collections of Weber's writings currently available for the use of students, but rather to serve the needs of scholars, including the editors of such future collections. The edition is to include three sections: Writings and Speeches; Manuscripts of and notes from lecture courses. In the first section, the arrangement of material will embody a compromise between chronological and thematic grouping; that is, the numbering of volumes will reflect the shifts in the prevailing concerns of Weber's scholarly and publicistic activity, but each volume may contain again, in chronological sequence writings and speeches. From a number of years in so far as they bear on its chief theme. Each volume will contain editorial material which elucidates the circumstances of each piece of writing or speech, indicates the state of the relative sources and eventual discrepancies among them, and clarifies or corrects such parts or points in the text as might baffle or mislead even a relatively informed contemporary reader.

The author tries to show how sociology's failure to make the kind of progress characteristic of natural sciences, such as physics, is a result in part of differences in the type of phenomena studied and the fact that sociologists are more likely than physicists to use noncognitive criteria in selecting both their research problems and the solutions to those problems. In this article, the author says sociologists are more likely to use noncognitive criteria in selecting both problems and solutions to the problems, in part because they participate in the phenomena that they study. He sees one of the reasons why sociologists can not develop general laws as the rapid change in the social phenomena they study. A theory of gender inequality that may have been correct in the 1960s is not correct today because the phenomenon has changed. According to the author, another social scientist misportrays the natural sciences as having more consensus on terms and concepts than they actually do at the research frontier.

Recent discussions in the philosophy of the social sciences exhibit a remarkable agreement about what has become one of the most urgent problems for sociological methodology. The situation may be summarized thus: ethnomethodological developments in interpretative sociology have shown that there can be no firm and certain basis on which to ground truth claims for our propositions. The conclusion drawn from this is that the traditional aspirations of conventional sociology — to be objective and scientific — cannot be attained. However, the programme of work promised by those who have developed ethnomethodology as a critique of ‘conventional sociology’ itself contains certain difficulties. Thus, the problem addressed by those writing in the philosophy of social science is this: given the contradictions in sociology as traditionally practiced, and given the problems in the programme offered by those largely responsible for discrediting it, whither sociology now? The purpose of my paper is to show that the question may be unnecessary. This is not so much because interpretative sociologists are mistaken in their understanding of the conditions in which research is undertaken, but rather because the positivist epistemological assumptions taken to be necessary for an objective scientific sociology, are not required for this and indeed are erroneous. I shall argue specifically that a Popperian account of (objective) science is wholly compatible with the understanding contemporary interpretative sociologists have of the research context, and indeed that there are striking similarities between this and Popper's ideas, most especially those developed in recent years. Thus, I shall go on to suggest that, by adopting a Popperian epistemology we may thereby recognize the validity of the fundamentals of the ethnomethodological position without being forced to abandon the effort to be objective and scientific; we may also sidestep the particular dif... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sociologist has for a number of decades been called upon to render practical service in fields of social maladjustment, especially in the fields of crime and poverty, and has for many years conducted researches and written books in the fields of normal social behavior and conditions, but by and large it has been only during the last eight years, beginning with the Hoover Commissions, and greatly increasing during the New Deal, that he has been called upon to render actual counsel and service in studying and guiding large public activity programs. Concerning the criticism and censure of sociology and the sociologist by other social scientists, there are probably two broad generalizations which will cover the situation. In the first place, sociology is always dealing with phenomena, which are also at least partially the phenomena of other social sciences, and sometimes with biological phenomena. The sociologist must therefore expect and should welcome the critical judgment on his work of these other scientists.

The determinants of and variations in processes of cultural valorization are of increasing interest to sociologists. In the case of high-culture literary texts, the central evaluation process takes place through canon formation. We explore the mechanisms of canon formation and of cultural valorization processes more generally by analyzing the critical history of Zora Neale Hurston's novel Their Eyes Were Watching God. Published in 1937 to lukewarm reviews, the novel is currently considered a core canonical text. We specify three processes involved in the reconstruction of Hurston's novel and in the establishment of the African American literary canon: (1) the application of new evaluative criteria, (2) the reconstruction of textual meaning through newly available interpretative strategies, and (3) changes in the institutional and organizational environment that allowed new claims on high-status critical positions to be made by those previously outside the literary hierarchy. The implications of this study for theoretical models of cultural valorization in sociology are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the book "Visions of the Sociological Tradition" by the author of the book himself. The first public discussions of the book showed that many critics found it difficult to grasp its overall structure. Although the author found this disappointing, one must admit that the book poses exceptional demands. It is dense; it weaves a maze of complex arguments; it leaves a fair amount of work to the attentive reader. So he is grateful to the book review editor of the journal "Sociological Forum" for this chance to clarify some of its less apparent features as well as to reflect on its personal and public meanings. The author feels that it has more integrity and offers a more complete expression of his thought than any of his other productions. Given the core impulse behind the book, it should be evident that to his mind the most important objective of the work is to enhance connections. This is true for students, sociologists, national publics and the international community alike. He has in mind connections of three sorts; between past and present authors, among the diverse units of disciplines or nations and across the international community.

This article focuses on the author's view on the non cumulation of social science literature. He says that when he was a graduate sociology student many years ago, he visualized the literature as an ever growing mountain of sociological findings that would continue to grow until, someday, the discipline had obtained reasonably complete and perfect knowledge about the workings of society. He says that others held more sensible versions of this image, but the hope that scientific research could be cumulative was for-ever destroyed by Thomas Kuhns, a sociologist, finding that the paradigmatic atoms that underlie everyday normal science are overthrown and replaced periodically. He says that empirical researchers regularly carry out research that repeats findings already reported by earlier sociologists. Moreover, they do so not to replicate previous findings. He further says that only social theory seems to be exempt from this rule, for theoretical writings often build on the ideas of past major theorists.

Calling attention to the relatively few contributions made by sociologists to the study of nuclear issues, a political scientist suggests a number of areas and questions that sociology may be particularly well equipped to deal with. The study is divided into a canvas of questions that come from the first 45 years of the nuclear age, and then assesses the questions that may emerge in an evolving "post-Cold War" era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The original young Turks, political reformers and ardent nationalists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, gave a term that for some time has had a wide and varied usage. In America, voices of young Turks have often been heard and sometimes heeded, in political parties, Congress, labor unions, professional and scholarly organizations. Frequently young Turks are taken to be merely youthful dissenters or youngsters on the rise. In the 1970s, Marxism and neo-Marxism flourished in history and the social sciences, especially among graduate students and young academics. Marxist sociologists are young Turks only in a restricted sense. The main target of their revolt lies in the area of scholarship, not in the organizational status quo. In research and theoretical writings they are bent to demonstrate the scientific validity of a Marxist approach and to challenge opposing conceptions and findings.

The article presents the author's opinions on the relation between entrepreneurs and the field of social sciences. While Great Britain has lagged behind countries like the U.S. and Japan in giving explicit recognition to the subject of business history, professors in business schools have made important contributions to business history. There has, indeed, been a rich variety of traditions of analysis in the study of business institutions, ranging from the general theories of the economist to the case studies of the historian. The kind of questions on which I would expect business historians to be able to throw some light overlap quite naturally with questions to which industrial economists or industrial sociologists address themselves. In the case of historians, their isolation from the mainstream of social scientific study is, at least partly, self-imposed. Business historians have not been proof against this. Like their historical colleagues in other fields of specialization, they remain inveterate empiricists, obsessed with setting the record straight, telling the story as it really was, but eschewing general theories. The logical consequence of granting entrepreneurs the creative role in transforming production and consumption functions is, in fact, to reduce the determinacy of their actions, and hence to increase the difficulty of modeling them in a way that captures their essence.

This article attempts to understand the relationship between sociology and history by examining of material relating to the position and development of sociology in Yugoslavia with the hope the distinctive nature of the position of sociology in society will be thrown into comparative relief. It must be made clear that in discussions of the relationship between history and sociology, one is dealing with highly organized professional groups, with a high level of articulate self-awareness. These groups tend to be relatively self-sufficient intellectually, and there is little cross-recruitment between them. One makes a career, in other words, as either a historian or as a sociologist. Under these circumstances the discussion about the relationship between sociology and history reads like a kind of academic diplomacy. But, like all diplomacy, it is dependent upon a highly specific set of political circumstances. One does not negotiate treaties to cover all circumstances, but only certain foreseen circumstances. A brief consideration of the position of sociology in Yugoslavia will serve to highlight just how specific and peculiar are the circumstances which govern our current understanding of the relationship between sociology and history.