1,252 results
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2. Causal theories of the moving spotlight.
- Author
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Jhou, Nihel H.
- Subjects
CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,METAPHYSICS ,BUDDHISM ,DILEMMA - Abstract
This paper brings together the Sarvāstivāda (a major school of Abhidharma Buddhism) and Miller's (2019) moving spotlight theory to see how presentness is explained in terms of causation. The paper argues that a causal theory of presentness like Miller's encounters a dilemma: causation is either synchronic or diachronic, but neither is safe in the presence of the challenges. On the one hand, if causation is synchronic, how does a causal chain extend over time so that the wave of causation (and hence the spotlight) can move at all? On the other, if causation is diachronic, then a present moment has a temporal extension enough to accommodate a cause and its proximate effect. The paper proposes a synchronic notion of causation that counters the first challenge. This can be done by bringing together the Sarvāstivādin grasp‐production model of causation, some Stoic ideas about causation, and some Armstrong's metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
3. Future‐like‐ours as a metaphysical reductio ad absurdum argument of personal identity.
- Author
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Chaffer, Tomer Jordi
- Subjects
ETHICS ,ATTITUDE (Psychology) ,OVUM ,ABORTION ,GROUP identity ,ATTITUDES toward abortion ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
Don Marquis' future‐like‐ours account is regarded as the best secular anti‐abortion position because he frames abortion as a wrongful killing via deprivation of a valuable future. Marquis objects to the reductio ad absurdum of contraception as being immoral because it is too difficult to identify an individual that is deprived of a future. To demonstrate why Marquis' treatment of the contraception reductio is flawed by his own future‐like‐ours line of reasoning, I offer an argument for why there is indeed a candidate for harm—the ovum—for it can be viewed as providing the functional foundation for a new life through (1) mitochondrial DNA inheritance, (2) paternal histone restructuring during fertilization, and (3) ability to initiate parthenogenesis. As evidenced by these distinct and natural features of ova, candidate (2) "some ovum or other" should be morally prioritized as the direct candidate for harm in the contraception reductio. By assessing the philosophical inconsistencies in Marquis' future‐like‐ours argument, this paper provides strong metaphysical grounds for rejecting the best secular anti‐abortion position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. The normativity of gender.
- Author
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Cosker‐Rowland, Rach
- Subjects
- *
GENDER , *NORMATIVITY (Ethics) , *METAPHYSICS , *ETHICS , *MORAL judgment - Abstract
There are important similarities between moral thought and talk and thought and talk about gender: disagreements about gender, like disagreements about morality, seem to be intractable and to outstrip descriptive agreement; and it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be a woman in terms of particular social, biological, or other descriptive features, just as it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be good or right in terms of any set of descriptive properties. These similarities give us reason to investigate the idea that, like moral thought and talk, gender thought and talk is inherently normative. This paper proposes a normative account of gender thought and talk in terms of fitting treatment. On this fitting treatment account, to judge that A is gender G is just to judge that it is fitting to treat A as a G. This account is a descriptive or hermeneutical account of our gender thought and talk rather than an ameliorative account of our gender concepts or a metaphysical account of gender properties in social metaphysics. This paper argues that other descriptive accounts of gender thought and talk face problems that the fitting treatment account overcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
5. Thin Mereological Sums, Abstraction, and Interpretational Modalities.
- Author
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Lando, Giorgio
- Subjects
WHOLE & parts (Philosophy) ,METAPHYSICS ,MODAL logic ,SET theory ,MATHEMATICS theorems - Abstract
Some tools introduced by Linnebo to show that mathematical entities are thin objects can also be applied to non‐mathematical entities, which have been thought to be thin as well for a variety of reasons. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties and opportunities concerning the application of abstraction and interpretational modalities to mereological sums. In particular, I show that on one hand some prima facie attractive candidates for the role of an explanatory plural abstraction principle for mereological sums (in terms of pluralities of summed entities) are not really explanatory; on the other hand, singular abstraction principles (in terms of single summed entities) are materially inadequate. Nonetheless, explanatory criteria of identity and conditions of existence for mereological sums are provided by classical extensional mereology independent of abstraction principles. Thus, given classical extensional mereology, the reasons why, according to Linnebo, mathematical abstracted entities are thin also hold for mereological sums. Finally, I contend that interpretational modalities can be used to characterise the process by which a subject adds sums of previously admitted entities to the domain of quantification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
6. Addressing fragmented human–nonhuman interactions through an ubuntu 'mixed' ethics.
- Author
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Samuel, Olusegun Steven
- Subjects
SCHOLARS ,HUMILITY ,METAPHYSICS ,SOCIAL reality ,SOCIAL institutions - Abstract
In this paper, I address human‐induced environmental ills we face using an ubuntu‐inspired ethical lens. I follow ubuntu scholars to stress the significance for moral agents to embody virtues. Virtue development is essential to carry out obligations and address human impacts on the environment. Thaddeus Metz, in particular, has drawn attention to how embodying ubuntu virtues of humility and friendliness can prompt moral agents to be other‐regarding. The view I developed in this paper differs from his ubuntu‐inspired account in at least two significant ways. First, humans cannot be in harmonious relationships with some species such as Black Mambas, Hyenas and sea urchins even if they can interact. Second, we must acknowledge the consequentialist dimension of ubuntu ethics and prioritise the different aspects of ubuntu 'mixed' ethics, ranking them to offer possibilities for a more realistic recommendation to change our moral life. This paper demonstrates that the three dimensions of ubuntu 'mixed' ethics are fundamental because we need to think about moral consequences, right action and our virtue in accounting for our actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
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7. Metaphysical explanations: The case of singleton sets revisited.
- Author
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Büttner, Kai Michael
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,PHILOSOPHY ,ONTOLOGY ,VOCABULARY - Abstract
Many contemporary metaphysicians believe that the existence of a contingent object such as Socrates metaphysically explains the existence of the corresponding set {Socrates}. This paper argues that this belief is mistaken. The argument proposed takes the form of a dilemma. The expression "{Socrates}" is a shorthand either for the expression "the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates" or for the expression "the set that contains Socrates and nothing else". However, Socrates' existence does not explain the existence of the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates, because there is such a set no matter whether or not Socrates exists. And although Socrates' existence does explain that of the set that contains Socrates and nothing else, this explanation is a conceptual rather than a metaphysical one. Both these claims rely on a deflationary account of the use of set theoretic vocabulary that is explained, though not properly justified, in the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
8. Faith, values, and metaphysical positionality in qualitative research.
- Author
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Johnsen, Sarah and Fitzpatrick, Suzanne
- Subjects
RESEARCHER positionality ,QUALITATIVE research ,IRRELIGION ,HOMELESSNESS ,PROOF of God ,HOMELESS persons ,GEOGRAPHY - Abstract
Positionality has long been a preoccupation for qualitative researchers within and beyond geography. Reflexive assessments of positionality typically examine the ways in which a researcher's sociodemographic identifiers such as gender, age, ethnicity, dis/ability, sexuality, and/or the intersections between these affect research encounters, processes, and outcomes. Religion rarely features in such interrogations, and then usually only in relation to participants' ethnic or racial affiliations. Drawing on experiences conducting a study exploring the role of faith‐based organisations in welfare provision for homeless people in the UK, this paper focuses on the related (but not synonymous) issue of metaphysical stance, that is, belief or non‐belief in the existence of God(s). It argues that metaphysical stance should be regarded as a sui generis aspect of positionality, which fits into none of the identity categories typically considered but is deserving of separate analysis with respect to its ethical and practical implications. Further to this, it contends that extreme diplomacy and discretion are required when exploring issues as inherently value‐laden as the moral frameworks underpinning welfare approaches. This is especially true when participants' views divide in part along theist/atheist lines, such that religious and policy "literacy" are valuable attributes for researchers negotiating these sensitive terrains in the field. Building on and critiquing existing scholarship on researcher reflexivity within and beyond geography, this paper argues that metaphysical stance should be regarded as a sui generis aspect of positionality that fits into none of the sociodemographic identity categories typically considered but is deserving of separate analysis with respect to its ethical and practical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
9. Existence and the existential quantifier.
- Author
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Rabin, Gabriel Oak
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,ARGUMENT ,MAGNETISM - Abstract
This paper draws a distinction between the existential quantifier and the symbol '∃' used to express it, on the one hand, and existence and 'exists', on the other. It argues that some popular arguments in metaphysics, including arguments against vague existence and arguments against deflationary metaontology (which views ontological disputes as lacking substance), are guilty of fudging this distinction. The paper draws some lessons for metaphysical debate about existence and highlights some heretofore ignored and attractive positions in logical space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
10. A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics.
- Author
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Jaksland, Rasmus
- Subjects
NATURALISM ,METAPHYSICS ,PHILOSOPHY of science - Abstract
Radical naturalized metaphysics wants to argue (1) that metaphysics without sufficient epistemic warrant should not be pursued, (2) that the traditional methods of metaphysics cannot provide epistemic warrant, (3) that metaphysics using these methods must therefore be discontinued, and (4) that naturalized metaphysics should be pursued instead since (5) such science‐based metaphysics succeeds in establishing justified conclusions about ultimate reality. This paper argues that to defend (5), naturalized metaphysics must rely on methods similar to those criticized in (2). If naturalized metaphysics instead opts for the weaker claim that science‐based metaphysics is only superior to other metaphysics, then this is insufficient to establish (4). In this case, (4) might therefore be defeated by (1). An alternative is to replace (1) with the view that we should just approach metaphysical questions with the best means available. While this would recommend a science‐based approach whenever possible, it would also allow for the continuation of science‐independent metaphysics in domains that science has no bearing on and thus reject (3). The paper concludes that none of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory for naturalized metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
11. The Mystery of the Physical and the Matter of Qualities: A Paper for Professor Shaffer*.
- Author
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Unger, Peter
- Subjects
PHILOSOPHY ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
Focuses on the mystery of the physical and the matter of qualities. Russellian respect for the mystery of the physical; Exposition of the scientific metaphysic; Restriction of qualities to minds.
- Published
- 1999
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
12. On Galen Strawson's central approach to the self.
- Author
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Hamdo, Manhal
- Subjects
CRITICAL analysis ,PHENOMENOLOGY ,METAPHYSICS ,PHILOSOPHERS ,GENERALIZATION - Abstract
The crux of this paper is to provide a concentrated critical evaluation of Galen Strawson's innovative approach to the self. To that end, I will first attempt to concisely introduce his general thesis, which seems appropriate to be broken up into two major pieces: the phenomenology (experience) of the self, what the self would have to be; and the metaphysics of the self (i.e., a query refers to its metaphysics [its existence and nature]: whether there is any). Explaining and discussing Strawson's twofold account of the self is my first target in this paper. And it is with these two parts that I take issues. Accordingly, I shall determinedly try to develop a counterargument according to which Strawson's establishment of his entire enterprise of the self is based merely on unjustified intuitive generalisation. Next, I will put more effort into making some more argumentative points, mainly to show how his metaphysics does not give much thought to some vital matters of the self in comparison with the systems of metaphysics of his forebears of Western philosophers. What all this means is that Strawsonian metaphysical analysis of the self so conceived and so described appears philosophically to drive itself to justly be placed in an ahistorical context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
13. James and Carnap on philosophical systems and the role of temperaments.
- Author
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Simpson, Shawn
- Subjects
LOGICAL positivism ,TEMPERAMENT ,PRAGMATISM ,PHILOSOPHERS ,METAPHYSICS ,INTERWAR Period (1918-1939) - Abstract
The relationship between American pragmatism and logical empiricism is complicated at best. The received view is that by around the late 1930s or early 1940s pragmatism had been replaced, supplanted, or eclipsed by the younger and more logic‐oriented form of empiricism developed in interwar Vienna. Recently, however, this picture has been challenged, and this paper offers further reasons for thinking that the received view is inadequate. Through a critical examination of William James's Pragmatism and "The Sentiment of Rationality" and Rudolf Carnap's "Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language" and other works, the paper builds a case for the existence of a rather striking correspondence between the work of one of pragmatism's most vaunted figures and the thought of logical empiricism's most famous advocate. Not only were both philosophers interested in what might be called metaphilosophy or the psychology of philosophy, both held very similar deflationary views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
14. A new problem for rules.
- Author
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Kaplan, Jeffrey
- Subjects
- *
SOCIAL norms , *METAPHYSICS , *PLAUSIBILITY (Logic) , *STATE laws , *ETIQUETTE - Abstract
This paper presents a series of arguments aimed at showing that, for an important subclass of social rules—non‐summary rules—no adequate metaphysical account has been given, and it tentatively suggests that no such account can be given. The category of non‐summary rules is an important one, as it includes the rules of etiquette, fashion, chess, basketball, California state law, descriptive English grammar, and so on. This paper begins with behavioristic accounts of the conditions for the existence of such rules, and proceeds through progressively more complex accounts, all the way to what are labeled 'normative attitude accounts,' which are prima facie plausible and particularly popular. In each case it is argued that the type of account under consideration cannot explain the existence of the relevant type of social rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
15. On the definition of stigma.
- Author
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Andersen, Martin M., Varga, Somogy, and Folker, Anna P.
- Subjects
DISCRIMINATION (Sociology) ,SOCIAL stigma ,PUBLIC health ,PHILOSOPHY of medicine ,METAPHYSICS ,EMOTIONS ,CONCEPTS - Abstract
Background: There are thousands of papers about stigma, for instance about stigma's impact on wellbeing, mental or physical health. But the definition of stigma has received only modest attention. In "Conceptualizing stigma" from 2001, Link and Phelan offer a thorough and detailed definition of stigma. They suggest that there are six necessary conditions for stigma, namely labelled differences, stereotypes, separation, status loss and discrimination, power, and emotional reaction. This definition is widely applied in the literature but is left mainly uncriticized. Method: We submit the Link and Phelan definition of stigma to a systematic conceptual analysis. We first interpret, analyze and reconsider each of the six components in Link and Phelan's definition of stigma, and on the basis of these analyses, we secondly suggest a revised definition of stigma. Result: The Link and Phelan definition is thorough and detailed, but includes redundant components. These are status loss and discrimination, and emotional reaction. Conclusion: We suggest that groups, not individuals, are the target of stigma, though it is individuals who may be the victims of it. We suggest a revised definition of stigma that is more simple, precise, and consistent with the empirical literature on stigma; there is stigma if and only if there is labelling, negative stereotyping, linguistic separation, and power asymmetry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
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16. Higher‐order being and time.
- Author
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Skiba, Lukas
- Subjects
- *
ETHICAL absolutism , *REALISM , *METAPHYSICS , *LOGIC - Abstract
Higher‐order metaphysicians take facts to be higher‐order beings, i.e., entities in the range of irreducibly higher‐order quantifiers. In this paper, I investigate the impact of this conception of facts on the debate about the reality of tense. I identify two major repercussions. The first concerns the logical space of tense realism: on a higher‐order conception of facts, a prominent version of tense realism, dynamic absolutism, turns out to conflict with the laws of (higher‐order tense) logic. The second concerns our understanding of the positions occupying this logical space: on a higher‐order conception of facts, an attractive interpretation of the central tense realist notion of ‘facts constituting reality’ becomes unavailable. I discuss these results in the context of the more general project of higher‐order metaphysics and the (meta)metaphysics of time, drawing out their implications for the nature of the disputes both between realists and anti‐realists about tense and between different tense realist factions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
17. Causal Models and Metaphysics—Part 2: Interpreting Causal Models.
- Author
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McDonald, Jennifer
- Subjects
CAUSAL models ,METAPHYSICS ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,OPEN-ended questions ,WHOLE & parts (Philosophy) - Abstract
This paper addresses the question of what constitutes an apt interpreted model for the purpose of analyzing causation. I first collect universally adopted aptness principles into a basic account, flagging open questions and choice points along the way. I then explore various additional aptness principles that have been proposed in the literature but have not been widely adopted, the motivations behind their proposals, and the concerns with each that stand in the way of universal adoption. I conclude that the remaining work of articulating aptness for a SEM analysis of causation is tied up with issues to do with modality, ontology, and mereology. Continuing this work is therefore likely to shed light on the relationship between these areas and causation more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
18. Familiar properties and phenomenal properties.
- Author
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Raleigh, Thomas
- Subjects
- *
METAPHYSICS , *COLOR , *MOTIVATION (Psychology) - Abstract
Sometimes when we describe our own sensory experiences, we seem to attribute to experience itself the same sorts of familiar properties—such as shape or colour—as we attribute to everyday physical objects. But how literally should we understand such descriptions? Can there really be phenomenal elements or aspects to an experience which are, for example quite literally square? This paper examines how these questions connect to a wide range of different commitments and theories about the metaphysics of mind. In particular, I consider whether there may be phenomenological reasons to accept or reject the idea that there are elements or aspects of conscious experience itself which instantiate familiar spatial properties. I also explore how some general theses about the nature of empirical properties can motivate different answers to these questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
19. Defending (perceptual) attitudes.
- Author
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Martinis, Valentina
- Subjects
- *
METAPHYSICS , *PHILOSOPHY , *IMAGINATION , *ATTITUDE (Psychology) , *VALUES (Ethics) - Abstract
In this paper, I defend a tripartite metaphysics of intentional mental states, according to which mental states are divided into subject, content, and attitude, against recent attempts at eliminating the attitude component (e.g., Montague, Oxford studies in philosophy of mind, 2022, 2, Oxford University Press). I suggest that a metaphysics composed of only subject and content cannot account for (a) multisensory perceptual experiences and (b) phenomenological differences between episodes of perception and imagination. Finally, I suggest that some of the motivations behind the rejection of the attitude component can be accommodated within the tripartite framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
20. Transcendental arguments and metaphysical neutrality: A Wittgensteinian proposal.
- Author
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Shahid, Sidra
- Subjects
- *
METAPHYSICS , *TRANSCENDENTALISM (Philosophy) , *PHILOSOPHY , *EMPHASIS (Linguistics) - Abstract
Despite periods of resurgence over the last decades, it is safe to say that transcendental arguments no longer enjoy a prominent presence in the philosophical landscape. One reason for their declining prominence is the sustained suspicion that despite their self‐proclaimed metaphysical neutrality, transcendental arguments are, in fact, metaphysically committed. This paper aims to revive the discussion of transcendental considerations by offering a metaphysically neutral account of transcendental arguments. I argue that a metaphysically neutral conception of transcendental arguments requires a revision of two concepts constitutive of transcendental claims, namely, transcendental necessity and the a priori. I propose a transcendental reading of Wittgenstein's On Certainty, which, I maintain, provides us with an alternative, metaphysically neutral understanding of these concepts. Thus revised, transcendental claims are suitable for what Mark Sacks once described as the "post‐metaphysical" orientation of contemporary philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
21. The united shades of eliminative materialism.
- Subjects
ELIMINATIVISM ,NATURALISM ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
This paper aims to provide a rational reconstruction of the claim of eliminative materialism (EM), espoused by Paul and Patricia Churchland. It will identify and clarify alternative understandings of that view and assess the version that is the most plausible interpretation in the light of the Churchlands' writings and contemporary discussions. The result of the analysis is that eliminativism is best understood as a methodological thesis regarding the scope and depth of the possible revision of (scientific and folk) usage of FP terms and principles. The problem is important not only, and nor primarily, for exegetical purposes. EM functions in contemporary metaphysics of mind mainly as a point of negative reference: for this reason, it is important to carefully formulate the main claim of EM so that the theorists taking part in the debate know what they actually disagree with. The careful formulation provided by this paper could show other philosophers that their position is not, in fact, as far from EM as they might have thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
22. Recent Publications.
- Subjects
ABSURD (Philosophy) ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
The article presents the list of articles that are published on the journal which includes one on the philosophy of time, the other on metaphysics and absurdity and the third on puzzles and mysteries.
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
23. The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively) substantial.
- Author
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Richardson, Kevin
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,PLURALISM ,ONTOLOGY ,ELECTRONS ,PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
According to Sider, a question is metaphysically substantive just in case it has a single most natural answer. Recently, Barnes and Mikkola have argued that, given this notion of substantivity, many of the central questions in the metaphysics of gender are nonsubstantive. Specifically, it is plausible that gender pluralism—the view that there are multiple, equally natural gender kinds—is true, but this view seems incompatible with the substantivity of gender. The goal of this paper is to argue that the notion of substantivity can be understood in a way that accommodates gender pluralism. First, I claim that gender terms (at least as used in the ontology room) are referentially indeterminate, where referential indeterminacy holds in virtue of the way the world is. Second, I propose a degree‐theoretic (or scalar) account of metaphysical substantivity; genders are substantial to the degree that they are determinate. I conclude that gender is relatively, although not absolutely, substantial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
24. Sensible individuation.
- Author
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Sethi, Umrao
- Subjects
INDIVIDUATION (Philosophy) ,ONTOLOGY ,PHILOSOPHERS ,METAPHYSICS ,REALISM - Abstract
There is a straightforward view of perception that has not received adequate consideration because it requires us to rethink basic assumptions about the objects of perception. In this paper, I develop a novel account of these objects—the sensible qualities—which makes room for the straightforward view. I defend two primary claims. First, I argue that qualities like color and shape are "ontologically flexible" kinds. That is, their real definitions allow for both physical objects and mental entities to be colored or shaped. Second, a single instance of these qualities can be attributed to more than one entity. Just as we attribute the same instance of a material property to a statue and to the clay that constitutes it, single instances of sensible qualities should be attributed both to the physical objects perceived and to the perceptual states that have those instances as their objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
25. What Does it Mean to call God Good?
- Author
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Sivyer, Philip Peter
- Subjects
GOD ,SOVEREIGNTY ,PHILOSOPHY ,METAPHYSICS ,CHRISTIANS - Abstract
Contemporary expositions of God's goodness commonly err either (1) by subjecting God to moral laws, which is to question His sovereignty, or (2) by failing to establish that God will always act in accordance with moral principles, which removes the theist's ability to appeal to God's goodness in response to problems of evil. Current attempts at intermediate positions which avoid these two problems fall short. In this paper, I aim to construct a better intermediate position and account of God's goodness. I do this by claiming that God's ability to create is best explained in terms of God's self‐love. Since God, as the greatest possible being, must be able to create, He must love Himself. I argue that this in turn entails that God loves all things, since by loving Himself, God loves the pre‐existent ideas of everything that will come to exist, and by extension the things themselves. This, I argue, allows us to have confidence that God will act in accordance with moral principles, but without subjecting Him to moral laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
26. Minimalism, Trivialism, Aristotelianism.
- Author
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Sereni, Andrea and Zanetti, Luca
- Subjects
ARISTOTELIANISM (Philosophy) ,PLATONISTS ,METAPHYSICS ,MATHEMATICS theorems - Abstract
Minimalism and Trivialism are two recent forms of lightweight Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics: Minimalism is the view that mathematical objects are thin in the sense that "very little is required for their existence", whereas Trivialism is the view that mathematical statements have trivial truth‐conditions, that is, that "nothing is required of the world in order for those conditions to be satisfied". In order to clarify the relation between the mathematical and the non‐mathematical domain that these views envisage, it has recently been proposed that both Linnebo's notion of sufficiency and Rayo's "just is"‐operator can, or even should, be interpreted in terms of metaphysical grounding. This interpretation makes Minimalism and Trivialism akin to Aristotelianism in the philosophy of mathematics, according to which mathematical entities depend for their existence and their properties on non‐mathematical ones. In this paper we raise a general objection to this interpretation. We highlight a tension – a "Big Picture" Problem – between the metaphysical picture underlying both Minimalism and Trivialism, on the one side, and the metaphysics of Platonism and Aristotelianism on the other. We then consider various ways in which Linnebo and Rayo could respond. We finally argue that Minimalism and Trivialism are closer to Aristotelianism than to Platonism; however, even though these positions are not forms of traditional Platonism, they are not standard forms of Aristotelianism either. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
27. From thin objects to thin concepts?
- Author
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Carrara, Massimiliano, De Florio, Ciro, and Poggiolesi, Francesca
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,MATHEMATICS theorems ,PLATONISTS - Abstract
In this short paper we consider Linnebo's thin/thick dichotomy: first, we show that it does not overlap with the very common one between abstract/concrete objects; second, on the basis of some difficulties with the distinction, we propose, as a possible way out, to move from thin/thick objects to thin/thick concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
28. Toward a critical social ontology.
- Author
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Thompson, Michael J.
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,SOCIAL reality ,METAPHYSICS ,SOCIAL institutions ,SOCIAL practice (Art) - Abstract
I argue in this paper for a critical social ontology, or an approach to theorizing social reality and social institutions that is more than descriptive of social reality, but is also able to provide practical reasoning with an ontological dimension for judgment. At the heart of this idea is a different take on social metaphysics from most standard current accounts in that it begins with empirical, phylogenetic capacities of human beings for social practices (realizing abstract thought in the world) as well as relationality (the need for attachments to others). The combination of these two essential human capacities, what I call the practical‐relational nexus, is generative of more complex social reality. The ontogeny of any social reality is the result of the ways that this practical‐relational nexus has been organized and shaped by external social structures and systems, themselves the product of certain kinds of social power. I then explore the metaphysics of social power before considering the ways that this approach to social metaphysics can inform practical reasoning with the capacity for social and political criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
29. Pure experience revisited: A critical reassessment of Nishida Kitaro's radicalization of William James' empiricism.
- Author
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Stone, Richard and Altobrando, Andrea
- Subjects
RADICALISM ,EMPIRICISM ,PHILOSOPHY ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
In this paper, we will revisit the relation between the respective conceptions of pure experience of Nishida Kitaro and William James. As various authors have previously shown, comparing Nishida and James can not only help us better understand both of their specific understandings of pure experience, and consequently its position within their respective enterprises, but also give a platform with which to see how these two authors could contribute to contemporary discussions on philosophical methodology. However, despite the long history of comparative research on these two thinkers, there is still no consensus about the extent to which Nishida's philosophy actually resembles James' work at all. Was Nishida's interest in James' work found only in superficial similarities between two authors interested in overcoming the subject–object distinction? Or did Nishida attempt to somehow develop or radicalize James' work, taking his notion of pure experience into the realm of religion and metaphysics? In this contribution, we will agree with previous authors who have argued that Nishida is best understood as trying to go beyond or develop James' work. However, we will make this claim with the caveat that James had good reason not to take the avenues Nishida pursued, and that Nishida's attempt to radicalize some ideas in James may have led to some difficult points within his early philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
30. "What on Earth Is Smenkhkare?" WH‐Questions, Truth‐Makers, and Causal‐Informational Account of Reference.
- Subjects
NECESSITY (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHY of language ,METAPHYSICS ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) - Abstract
Although the historical‐causal picture of reference Kripke sketches in Naming and Necessity is highly influential, Kripke in fact says very little about what reference is and how it comes about. In this paper I point out that the possibility of asking WH‐questions (i.e. 'what?', 'who?', 'which?') about a sound or inscription pattern (e.g., what does that refer to?) shows that in case of names especially, their reference, if there is one, will be preserved by a causal‐historical chain constituted by transmissions of the (physical) patterns themselves, even in absence of language users or any linguistic intentions. I sketch out a causal‐informational theory of reference, that holds that the causal aspect of refence transmission is due to two‐factors. On the other hand there are informational chains constituted by data transmissions, on the other, also communicational rules by which speakers can interpret the data as information of something are needed. In most part the causal‐informational theory sketched in the paper can be viewed as complementing Kripke's original causal picture. However, I will argue that Kripke's account of fixing the reference of proper names in 'initial baptisms' is inadequate. I will argue that most cases of seemingly fixing the reference via use of a definite description (e.g., the naming of Neptune) in fact presuppose a prior causal‐informational connection to the named object, thus essentially fixing the reference in the same way as in cases of baptism by ostension. I will further argue that in the cases that do not fall into the previous category, the baptism by definite description simply fail to fix any reference. I thus conclude that there is no such thing as fixing the reference of a proper name by definite description. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
31. Back to the Golden Age: Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity and Twenty‐First Century Philosophy.
- Subjects
NECESSITY (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHY of language ,METAPHYSICS ,NATURALISM ,SEMANTICS (Philosophy) - Abstract
In this paper, I try to outline what I take to be Naming and Necessity's fundamental legacy to my generation and those that follow, and the new perspectives it has opened up for twenty‐first century philosophy. The discussion is subdivided into three sections, concerning respectively philosophy of language, metaphysics, and metaphilosophy. The general unifying theme is that Naming and Necessity is helping philosophy to recover a Golden Age, by freeing it from the strictures coming from the empiricist and Kantian traditions and reconnecting it to the world and the objects that populate it. Because of this, in the concluding paragraph I tentatively suggest that Kripke's philosophy may be seen as a sui generis form of naturalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
32. On the continuity of metaphysics with science: Some scepticism and some suggestions.
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,SCIENTIFIC knowledge ,CONTINUITY ,SKEPTICISM - Abstract
Many think a respectable metaphysics ought to be in some way continuous with science. This paper identifies three broad and overlapping ways this idea has been developed: first, that science and metaphysics are methodologically continuous; second, that metaphysics is an attempt to synthesise scientific and non‐scientific knowledge; and, third, that metaphysics is the project of interpreting our best scientific theories. The paper argues that all three projects, understood as attempts to uncover the truth, fail. It ends by sketching some alternative ways to think of metaphysical theorising once it is liberated from the goal of truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
33. Grounding interventionism: Conceptual and epistemological challenges.
- Subjects
STRUCTURAL equation modeling ,IMAGINATION ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHERS ,INTUITION ,THEORY of knowledge ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
Philosophers have recently highlighted substantial affinities between causation and grounding, which have inclined some to import the conceptual and formal resources of causal interventionism into the metaphysics of grounding. The prospect of grounding interventionism raises two important questions: What exactly are grounding interventions, and why should we think they enable knowledge of grounding? This paper approaches these questions by examining how causal interventionists have addressed (or might address) analogous questions and then comparing the available options for grounding interventionism. The paper argues that grounding interventions must be understood in worldly terms, as adding something to or deleting something from the roster of entities, or making some fact obtain or fail to obtain. It considers three bases for counterfactual assessment: imagination, structural equation models, and background theory. The paper concludes that grounding interventionism requires firmer epistemological foundations, without which the interventionist's epistemology of grounding is incomplete and ineffectually rationalist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
34. High‐Fidelity Metaphysics: Ideological Parsimony in Theory Choice.
- Subjects
PARSIMONIOUS models ,METAPHYSICS ,VIRTUE epistemology - Abstract
Many metaphysicians utilize the virtue‐driven methodology. According to this methodology, one theory is more worthy of endorsement than another insofar as it is more virtuous. In this paper, I show how a theory's overall virtue is shaped by its ideological parsimony – parsimony with respect to the terminology employed in stating the theory. I distinguish between a theory's truth and its fidelity ('joint‐carvingness') and the corresponding epistemic and fidelic virtues. I argue that ideological parsimony is not an epistemic virtue but is a fidelic virtue. Insofar as metaphysicians value fidelity, then, ideological parsimony has an important role in theory choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
35. How to be a perspectival pluralist.
- Author
-
Solomyak, Olla
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,SELF ,MOTIVATION (Psychology) ,REALISM - Abstract
The temporal, first‐personal, and modal domains in metaphysics involve a range of perspectives on reality: the perspective of the present as opposed to those of other times, the perspective of one's own self as opposed to those of other subjects, and the perspective of the actual world as opposed to those of other possible worlds. In each case, we can ask about the metaphysical standing of these various perspectives with respect to one another: Is one perspective privileged above the rest? There is a tension at the heart of our intuitive conception of the phenomena in these domains, motivating (at least in some of these cases) a pluralist conception of reality — a stance which attempts to take seriously the absoluteness of the present‐tensed, first‐personal, or actual‐worldly facts, while also embracing the equal standing in reality of all perspectives of the relevant kind. My purpose in this paper is, first, to present an overview of recently popular forms of pluralism — or, what Fine (2005) calls non‐standard realism — with a particular focus on fragmentalism. I'll then raise a worry for fragmentalist views, and finally, present an alternative form of pluralism about the perspectival. We'll see that, while in some ways more radical, the alternative form of pluralism I present has some conceptual advantages over more familiar non‐standard realist views, and — more generally — can help illuminate the space of possible pluralist views about the perspectival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
36. Naturalized metaphysics in the image of Roy Wood Sellars and not Willard Van Orman Quine.
- Author
-
Jaksland, Rasmus
- Subjects
- *
NATURALISM , *REALISM , *METAPHYSICS - Abstract
The naturalized metaphysics promoted by Ladyman and Ross, among others, is often described as (neo)‐Quinean metaphysics. This association with Quine's naturalism can, however, give a misleading impression of the aims and commitments of this kind of naturalized metaphysics. Contrary to Quine, these naturalized metaphysicians endorse metaphysical realism and offer wholesale arguments in favor of the epistemic standing of science‐based metaphysics. Accordingly, this naturalized metaphysics comes closer to Roy Wood Sellars's evolutionary naturalism, especially since the theory of evolution is central to the criticism that naturalized metaphysics levels at nonnaturalized metaphysics. The paper argues that Sellars's naturalism is furthermore helpful (1) for explicating the naturalism of naturalized metaphysics, (2) for theorizing a more general naturalist basis for naturalized metaphysics, and (3) for suggesting where naturalized metaphysics is perhaps not naturalist enough, especially when it comes to considering the implications of the theory of evolution for its positive program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
37. Causal Models and Metaphysics – Part 1: Using Causal Models.
- Author
-
McDonald, Jennifer
- Subjects
CAUSAL models ,STRUCTURAL equation modeling ,ACYCLIC model ,METAPHYSICS ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) - Abstract
This paper provides a general introduction to the use of causal models in the metaphysics of causation, specifically structural equation models and directed acyclic graphs. It reviews the formal framework, lays out a method of interpretation capable of representing different underlying metaphysical relations, and describes the use of these models in analyzing causation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
38. Two New Successive Addition Arguments.
- Author
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Dagher, Ibrahim
- Subjects
- *
METAPHYSICS , *PHILOSOPHY , *ONTOLOGY , *EXISTENTIALISM - Abstract
One of William Lane Craig's key arguments for the finitude of the past is the Successive Addition Argument (SAA). Malpass (2021) has recently developed a novel challenge to the SAA, utilising a thought experiment from the work of Fred Dretske, which is meant to show that it is possible to count to infinity, to argue that there is a counterexample to the SAA's second premise. In this paper, I contend that the Malpass‐Dretske counterexample should not worry advocates of the SAA. First, I argue that one objection Malpass considers—the Potential Infinite Objection—reveals an interesting fact: the SAA's second premise is unnecessarily strong and can be weakened whilst still yielding the same conclusion. Second, I show how another one of the objections considered by Malpass—the Accumulation Objection—is successful, provided some clarification to the SAA's premises. The upshot of both analyses is that we generate two 'new' Successive Addition arguments that not only move the dialectic forward, but shed light on deeper assumptions and motivating intuitions concerning the Kalām. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
39. On proper presupposition.
- Author
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Zakkou, Julia
- Subjects
- *
PRESUPPOSITION (Logic) , *SPEECH , *ASSERTIONS (Logic) , *THEORY of knowledge , *METAPHYSICS - Abstract
This paper investigates the norm of presupposition, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. It argues against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and proposes instead that they are much more similar to the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely, it suggests that the norm that governs presuppositions is not an epistemic or doxastic attitude such as knowledge, justified belief, or mere belief; it's a practical attitude, most plausibly the attitude of rational acceptance. This view has important ramifications well beyond debates in philosophy of language and linguistics. It affects not only our view of which speech act sequences are fine and which are off; it bears on whether presuppositions can function as testimony, whether they can be lies, and whether they are ontologically committal, thus addressing central topics in epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
40. Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching.
- Author
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Moretti, Luca and Wright, Crispin
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,EPISTEMICS ,CONCESSIONS (Administrative law) ,BAYESIAN analysis - Abstract
One type of argument to sceptical paradox proceeds by making a case that a certain kind of metaphysically "heavyweight" or "cornerstone" proposition is beyond all possible evidence and hence may not be known or justifiably believed. Crispin Wright has argued that we can concede that our rational acceptance of these propositions is evidentially risky though we still remain rationally entitled to those of our ordinary knowledge claims that are seemingly threatened by that concession. A problem for Wright's proposal is the so‐called Leaching Worry: if we are merely rationally entitled to accept the cornerstones without evidence, how can we achieve evidence‐based knowledge of the multitude of quotidian propositions that we think we know, which require the cornerstones to be true? This paper presents a rigorous, novel explication of this worry within a Bayesian framework, and offers the Epistemic Entitlement theorist two distinct responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
41. Biometrics and the metaphysics of personal identity.
- Author
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Kind, Amy
- Subjects
SELF ,BIOMETRY ,POLITICAL science ,METAPHYSICS ,DATA security ,ACQUISITION of data - Abstract
The vast advances in biometrics over the past several decades have brought with them a host of pressing concerns. Philosophical scrutiny has already been devoted to many of the relevant ethical and political issues, especially ones arising from matters of privacy, bias, and security in data collection. But philosophers have devoted surprisingly little attention to the relevant metaphysical issues, in particular, ones concerning matters of personal identity. This paper aims to take some initial steps to correct this oversight. After discussing the philosophical problem of personal identity, the ways in which the notion of biometric identity connects with, or fails to connect with, the philosophical notion of personal identity is explored. Though there may be some good reasons to use biometric identity to track personal identity, it is contended that biometric identity is not the same thing as personal identity and thus that biometrics researchers should stop talking as if it were. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
42. Metaphysics of the Bayesian mind.
- Author
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Tiehen, Justin
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,NORMATIVITY (Ethics) ,COGNITIVE science - Abstract
Recent years have seen a Bayesian revolution in cognitive science. In this paper, I work out the implications of this revolution for the metaphysics of mind. My central claim is that the Bayesian approach supports a novel empirical argument for normativism, the thesis that belief has a rational normative essence. The argument I develop draws in part on the causal powers subset account of realization, with the connection being that Bayesians often appeal to Marr's framework of levels of analysis, which carries with it multiple realizability claims that can be understood in terms of the subset model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
43. Humean nomic essentialism.
- Author
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Bhogal, Harjit and Perry, Zee R.
- Subjects
NATURAL law ,ESSENTIALISM (Philosophy) ,ACCOUNTING laws ,INTUITION ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
Humeanism – the idea that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences – and Nomic Essentialism – the idea that properties essentially play the nomic roles that they do – are two of the most important and influential positions in the metaphysics of science. Traditionally, it has been thought that these positions were incompatible competitors. We disagree. We argue that there is an attractive version of Humeanism that captures the idea that, for example, mass essentially plays the role that it actually does in the laws of nature. In this paper we consider the arguments that have lead many to conclude that Humeanism cannot be combined with Nomic Essentialism; we identify the weaknesses in these arguments; and we argue in detail that a version of Humeanism based on a variant of the Best System account of laws captures the key intuitions behind nomic essentialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
44. Pointing towards some superior metaphysics, ontology and epistemology<FNR></FNR><FN>As this author cannot help but read the two invisible subtitles below this title he only considers it fair to at least make them visible. They read: ‘Fragments of a non-classical philosophy of science’ and ‘Stop biting my finger and see where it is pointing’. </FN>
- Author
-
Tsagdis, Dimitrios
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,ONTOLOGY ,THEORY of knowledge ,RESEARCH - Abstract
Gerard de Zeeuw's conception of scientific research as an evolving organized activity that aims to improve upon observation is employed in this paper in an attempt to help contemporary users and producers of scientific research and its outcomes in ‘stepping out’ of some major generic metaphysical, ontological and epistemological difficulties and see for themselves (e.g. better) how (a migration to) the metaphysics, ontology and epistemology proposed in this paper can be of help in resolving such difficulties. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2002
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
45. Not every truth could have a truthmaker.
- Author
-
Stigall, John
- Subjects
THEORY of knowledge ,METAPHYSICS ,PROPOSITION (Logic) ,PHILOSOPHICAL analysis - Abstract
Mark Jago argues for truthmaker maximalism in some recent papers based on a key premise: that every truth could have a truthmaker. Jago contends that many would pretheoretically accept this principle and that counterexamples to it would be difficult to find. In this note, I show how truthmaker non‐maximalists can use a modified version of Peter Milne's argument against maximalism to provide a counterexample to this key premise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
46. A prolegomenon to the empirical cross‐linguistic study of truth.
- Author
-
Mizumoto, Masaharu
- Subjects
LINGUISTICS ,EXPERIMENTAL philosophy ,ANALYTIC philosophy ,STATISTICS ,SEMANTICS ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
In this paper, we propose and justify the cross‐linguistic study of the concept of truth through empirical studies of truth predicates, with results of such studies. We first conceptually explore the possibility of cross‐linguistic disagreement about truth purely due to linguistic norms governing truth predicates, which may imply a kind of pluralism about the concept of truth. We then consider the conditions under which we would be justified in inferring this sort of pluralism from the fact of such cross‐linguistic disagreement. Next, we report results of three studies on the use of English "is true" and Japanese two truth predicates, as well as "is correct" and its Japanese counterpart. We then report another set of studies using a different vignette, where the radical cross‐linguistic difference observed in earlier studies disappeared. These data together suggest that the moral‐political factor in the truth‐bearer (utterance) strongly affects the uses of Japanese truth predicates but not those of English. Finally, we will discuss the implications of the studies and results reported here, and the empirical possibility of what we call lexical alethic pluralism, for debates over relativism, theories of meaning, and the deflationary and inflationary theories of truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
47. Getting a grip: On causation, agency, and the meaning of "manipulation".
- Author
-
van Aken, Erik
- Subjects
MANIPULATIVE behavior ,REASONING ,METAPHYSICS ,RELATIVITY ,UTILITY functions - Abstract
In the philosophy of causation, manipulationist literature is broadly divided into agency and interventionist accounts. The division between these accounts is partially due to a dispute regarding the meaning of "manipulation", which specifically questions, "Must one analyse manipulation by appealing to human agency?" This paper attempts to clarify the notion of manipulation and defends the thesis that agency theorists and interventionists analyse manipulation by appealing to human agency. However, following Collingwood's work, I argue that there are two ways to interpret "human agency". With an extended notion of agency in place, I reveal a pathway towards a consensus between the agency and interventionist accounts. Further, I highlight the alleged discrepancies between agency and interventionist accounts, including the issues of scope and objectivity, and suggest additional pathways towards a consensus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
48. Haecceitism and counterpart theory.
- Author
-
De, Michael
- Subjects
SUPERVENIENCE (Philosophy) ,PLAUSIBILITY (Logic) ,METAPHYSICS ,PHILOSOPHICAL analysis - Abstract
David Lewis argues at length against haecceitism and goes as far as claiming that, on a certain counterpart‐theoretic construal, the doctrine is unintelligible or inconsistent. I argue, contra Lewis, that both qualitative and non‐qualitative counterpart theory are in fact committed to haecceitism, but that this commitment is harmless since what is really at stake for a counterpart theorist such as Lewis are more general supervenience claims that are independent of haecceitism. I further argue that Lewis's formulation of the doctrine suffers from two important defects that, once remedied, free counterpart theory of its haecceitistic commitments. Along the way I discuss an objection to the effect that the cheap substitute is inconsistent in the presence of an 'actually' operator. This paper therefore brings together important critical discussion on haecceitism and counterpart theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
49. Lawful Persistence.
- Author
-
Builes, David and Teitel, Trevor
- Subjects
NATURAL law ,MONISM ,METAPHYSICS ,MOTIVATION (Psychology) - Abstract
The central aim of this paper is to use a particular view about how the laws of nature govern the evolution of our universe in order to develop and evaluate the two main competing options in the metaphysics of persistence, namely endurantism and perdurantism. We begin by motivating the view that our laws of nature dictate not only qualitative facts about the future, but also which objects will instantiate which qualitative properties. We then show that both traditional doctrines in the metaphysics of persistence must take on surprising further commitments in order to vindicate our universe being law‐governed in this strong sense. For example, we argue that endurantists should adopt a particular version of monism, and that perdurantists should adopt a qualitativist doctrine that dispenses with all individuals at the fundamental level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
50. Acquiring reason.
- Author
-
Ionel, Lucian
- Subjects
ARISTOTELIANISM (Philosophy) ,RATIONAL-legal authority ,INTELLIGIBILITY of speech ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
In the last decades, there has been a far‐reaching debate about whether reason is a natural power of the human animal or a socio‐historical achievement. This paper brings out and criticizes two paradigmatic views of reason entangled in that dilemma: the substantive view which construes reason as a primitive power possessing the basic forms of intelligibility; and the derivative view which traces back reason to non‐rational, natural‐historic processes. I approach the issue by discussing how Aristotle addresses the underlying predicament in Metaphysics Theta. The predicament persuades us to overdetermine or underdetermine our natural potentiality for reason because it ignores what I call Aristotle's main insight: the understanding from which rational capacities are exercised is acquired by undertaking appropriate activities. The measure of rational capacities is neither merely naturally determined nor merely socio‐historically inherited but relies on the engagement with the things falling under the purview of the pertaining activities. We must recover this Aristotelian insight, I argue, to avoid succumbing to either the substantive or the derivative view of reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
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