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The data paper is an emerging academic genre that focuses on the description of research data objects. However, there is a lack of empirical knowledge about this rising genre in quantitative science studies, particularly from the perspective of its linguistic features. To fill this gap, this research aims to offer a first quantitative examination of which rhetorical moves—rhetorical units performing a coherent narrative function—are used in data paper abstracts, as well as how these moves are used. To this end, we developed a new classification scheme for rhetorical moves in data paper abstracts by expanding a well‐received system that focuses on English‐language research article abstracts. We used this expanded scheme to classify and analyze rhetorical moves used in two flagship data journals, Scientific Data and Data in Brief. We found that data papers exhibit a combination of introduction, method, results, and discussion‐ and data‐oriented moves and that the usage differences between the journals can be largely explained by journal policies concerning abstract and paper structure. This research offers a novel examination of how the data paper, a data‐oriented knowledge representation, is composed, which greatly contributes to a deeper understanding of research data and its publication in the scholarly communication system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the relationships between instrument epistemology, failure, and textual authority with reference to the place of scientific instruments in published narratives of 19th‐century exploration. The paper draws on Baird's work on instrument epistemology and "semantic ascent" and Gooday's work on failure and on the morality of measurement. Its empirical focus comes from examination of RGS manuscript AP 52, a list of instruments provided by the RGS for 31 explorers in the period c.1877 to c.1883. Instruments are shown to (do) work in the field, even as explorers admitted to failure, in the devices and in themselves. Narrative accounts, often compiled elsewhere, obscure the contingent nature of instruments' use. The findings have implications for assessing the agency of instruments in exploration, instrument epistemology, and narrative inscription, and for understanding failure in geographical work. The paper examines the work of instruments in 19th‐century exploration with reference to RGS MS AP 52, a list of 31 explorers at work between c.1877 and c.1883. Analysis shows that instruments failed to do the work expected and the paper explains why this was so and what authors did about it in producing printed narratives of exploration. The paper has implications for how instruments have active agency in doing geography and for how failure is considered in geography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes irrelevant influences worrying and I come up with two candidate principles. I then argue that one principle should be rejected because it is inconsistent with permissivism. The principle we should accept implies that it is sometimes rational to maintain our beliefs, even upon learning that they were caused by irrelevant influences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reviews several papers written by Gloria Origgi, Jonathan Adler, and Ann Stoler about epistemology. Gloria Origgi's "What's in My Commonsense?" reveals skepticism about the common sense beliefs of George Edward Moore. In "Conversations in the Folks' Epistemology," by Jonathan Adler, he argues that there are specific exemptions from rigorist standards that can themselves be justified by reference to the overall aims of talk. Ann Stoler's "Epistemic Politics: Ontologies of Colonial Common Sense," states that the players in the colonial game include the colonizing apparatus including its police, magistrates, and teachers.

Commentary on the papers of the special issue identifies and discusses four themes: 1) strategies to bridge the gap between science and practice, 2) sources of community science questions of interest, 3) choice and quality of methods, and 4) epistemology and useful language for community science. The commentary identifies some limitations in the models proposed by the special issue authors, and proposes renewed attention to ecology, context and process in community change initiatives, calling for a common set of community level measures as one strategy to advance a community centered science agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an overview of the process of entanglement at the 25th International Philosophy of Nursing Conference (IPNC) at University of California at Irvine held on August 18, 2022. Representing collective work from the US, Canada, UK and Germany, our panel entitled 'What can critical posthuman philosophies do for nursing?' examined critical posthumanism and its operations and potential in nursing. Critical posthumanism offers an antifascist, feminist, material, affective, and ecologically entangled approach to nursing and healthcare. Rather than focusing on the arguments of each of the three distinct but interrelated panel presentation pieces, this paper instead focuses on process and performance (per/formance) and performativity as relational, connected and situated, with connections to nursing philosophy. Building upon critical feminist and new materialist philosophies, we describe intra‐activity and performativity as ways to dehierarchise knowledge making practices within traditional academic conference spaces. Creating critical cartographies of thinking and being are actions of possibility for building more just and equitable futures for nursing, nurses, and those they accompany—including all humans, nonhumans, and more than human matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As philosophers we should have as one of our aims to produce as much philosophical knowledge as possible. A lot of potential philosophical knowledge is lost because of the flaws of the peer review system, and so a lot of philosophical knowledge would be gained were the system improved. Accordingly, as authors we should write papers about how to fix peer review, and as editors we should accept such papers if they are good. This paper presents some familiar problems with peer review, elaborates on and motivates the argument just given, and replies to some objections to it, making the case that fixing peer review is both a philosophical problem and one that admits of a solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses value of cross-cultural research in social psychology. The author states that he agrees with many points presented by researcher Claude Faucheux's, in his paper titled "Cross-Cultural Research in Social Psychology." The author however has an epistemological disagreement with Faucheux. It is addressed to the central theme of Faucheux's paper, which is the question regarding what constitutes a valid scientific approach to social sciences and more particularly to social psychology.

This paper makes a theoretical contribution to the discussion of interdisciplinary knowledge in curriculum and research. As a challenge to much of the Mode 2 thesis concerned only with the importance of knowledge being socially relevant, this paper demonstrates how a Bernsteinian approach to interdisciplinarity relates to the internal configurations underpinning interdisciplinary knowledge. Inspired by explorations of Bernsteinian communities, this paper sets out to conceptualize the socio‐epistemic constraints under which powerful disciplinary boundary crossing occurs. The major claim is that the boundaries between disciplines and between them and the field of practice, are essential for boundary crossing. The interdisciplinary efforts do not necessarily involve diminishing disciplinary boundaries, but they are vulnerable to external weakening when there is little connection to the disciplinary core that provides stable internal norms. This paper adds to the discussion by suggesting alternatives to interdisciplinary integration, which do not require a background intellectual consilience between disciplines. It presents an appeal for a form of interdisciplinarity that is pursued to a practical end within refining disciplinary conceptual models, without invoking exaggerated claims for 'relevance', and with no need for a more complex edifice for crossing the established borders between disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an introduction to and a synthesis of three papers in this issue written by scholars deeply committed to partnering with communities to understand and enact what it means to realize transformational ends in and through science education. Partnering for justice must be a conversation, a work in progress, and a critical examination that leads to intentional and careful forward movement. It is a beautiful effort at flattening power hierarchies so diverse voices and expertise can be interwoven in service of youth and communities who have been invisibilized and marginalized. Committed to realizing new, hope‐filled futures, the three pairs of authors use their experiences and expertise to shed light on the work of partnering using a temporal lens: considerations related to the beginnings, middles, and endings of partnering, each of which requires special intentionality and care. Together the authors share core overlapping tenets with other critical scholars that could be considered a partnering for justice epistemology. This epistemology underscores how importantly different learning through partnering for justice is from traditional notions of academic research. I close the paper by sharing lessons learned from my own 20‐plus years of partnering for justice, using the tenets of partnering for justice epistemology as a lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Evidence‐based practice is the principle governing a range of healthcare practices and beyond. However, it has suffered from a lack of philosophical rigour. This paper sets out to analyse the epistemological basis of evidence‐based practice. Method: The paper uses a conceptual analysis. First, it describes the implicit epistemology at work in evidence‐based practice. Second, it evaluates the implicit epistemological basis. Results: The analysis indicates that evidence‐based practice lacks an explicit epistemological basis. It shows, moreover, that the implicit epistemological basis is untenable. Conclusion: There is a need to re‐think the epistemological basis for evidence‐based practice. Evidence‐based practice is out of touch with developments within philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author focuses on the importance of writing review papers. He states that review papers helps in clarification of the state of knowledge, explain contradictions and identify the needed research. He mentions that the most important aspect of review development is topic selection. He adds that reviews must provide original insights and useful syntheses.

The paper attempts to develop a non-reductionistic and transdisciplinary view on human knowing in the light of the growing development of transdisciplinary practices and sciences. Medicine is one of the oldest; ecology and information science are some of the newer examples of radical transdisciplinarity. I discuss the lack of a recognized place and value of phenomenological knowledge in relation to the general mechanistic scientific ontology that still seems to be the only generally accepted background for the transdisciplinary areas to build on. Ontologically we cannot say much about reality except that it is very complex and dynamic, but still has structures and causal relations of a certain stability, which can be modelled mathematically. We further have to admit that there are aspects of reality that are beyond measuring. I suggest that the dualistic idea of transcendental and eternal mathematical natural laws and an algorithmic programme behind intelligence and language is rejected for its lack of ability to include the phenomenological and existential perspective of science and the practical knowledge beyond words. Instead I am promoting an epistemology, which sees science as only one aspect of our knowledge and sees human knowledge as going beyond language. An opening for the phenomenological aspect is then created in our modern scientistic and mechanistic metaphysics. I suggest a view of knowledge seen as self-organized signification systems based on metaphysical frameworks in social practice. The interpretation of sign in a systematized knowledge framework is actually where the medical sciences started in the classical Greek tradition of Hippocrates. This non-reductionistic framework promises to open towards a non-Cartesian transdisciplinary understanding of the basis for the generation and communication of knowledge in society without giving up what we have gained through the rigour and the methods of the sciences and the logic of philosophical analysis. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If you were to take a time machine and travel back to the 1980s, Catholic epistemology would look drastically different than it does today, at least in analytic circles. One of those drastic changes relates to whether Catholic epistemology is consistent with Reformed epistemology. Another issue relates to whether St. Thomas Aquinas was a classical evidentialist. In this paper, I survey recent developments in Catholic epistemology. I do this by first looking at Gregory Stacey's recent work arguing the Catholic Church's teaching on faith is best situated in a Reformed epistemological framework. I then engage decades old objections to Reformed epistemology from a Catholic perspective. I respond to these objections partly by surveying recent work by Catholic epistemologists. The paper then takes a turn to look at the recent scholarship on Aquinas' epistemology. I show that there is now an emerging consensus that Aquinas belongs not to a hard evidentialist camp as it was previously thought, but rather an externalist friendly tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Someone acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit for doing the morally right thing. But when and why do agents deserve credit for the success involved in doing the right thing? It is tempting to seek an answer to that question by drawing an analogy with creditworthy success in other domains of human agency, especially in sports, arts, and crafts. Accordingly, some authors have recently argued that, just like creditworthy success in, say, chess, playing the piano, or archery, creditworthy moral success is a matter of getting things right by way of manifesting a relevant skill. My main aim in this paper is to bring out an important structural difference between moral creditworthiness and creditworthiness in sports, arts, and craft, undermining attempts to use examples of the latter as a model for understanding the former. As an alternative, I propose an account of morally creditworthy action, according to which such action is a matter of manifesting virtue, not skill—a claim that's based on an important, but underappreciated, difference between the sorts of excellences constituting virtues and skills. The paper thus contributes to a more nuanced picture of normative achievements across different domains of human agency, highlighting largely overlooked structural dissimilarities among them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a conceptual framework for the intellectual virtues in the context of online search. Intellectual virtues are dispositions and skills that enable good thinking and wise reasoning, such as intellectual humility and attentiveness. Despite their importance, today the intellectual virtues tend to be underdeveloped across society. In light of the institutional role that online search plays in life today, there is an opportunity (perhaps an obligation) for online search to facilitate the development of intellectual virtue. The framework presented in this paper locates this development in three areas: the Searcher, the System, and Society. Major issues in information ethics and virtue epistemology are discussed for each of these areas, leading to recommendations for education, design, and research. This paper provides specific suggestions in this regard along with an agenda for future research at the intersection of ethics, epistemology, and online search. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A great deal of attention in systemic family therapy has been given to the process and technique of developing ‘therapeutic’ rituals for families. In this paper we address the process of the therapist developing the ritual of practising respect. By practising respect the therapist shifts to a position similar to that of an anthropologist who is attempting to understand another culture and its epistemology. The ritual of practising respect has the potential of changing the therapist's tendency to move toward social control and moralist judgements. A case example is presented in this paper which illustrates the therapeutic ritual of practising respect for the client/family. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed characterisation of some ways in which our preferences reflect our reasons. I will argue that practical reasons can be characterised along two dimensions that influence our preferences: their balance and their weight. This is analogous to a similar characterisation of the way in which probabilities reflect the balance and weight of evidence in epistemology. In this paper, I will illustrate the distinction between the balance and weight of reasons, and show how this is crucial for an adequate account of preference and choice. The upshot is a more complete picture of a particular kind of decision, labelled by Isaac Levi and, more recently, Ruth Chang as 'hard choices'. These are choices in which one option is better than another in some ways, the other is better than the first in some ways, but neither seems better overall. The distinction between the balance and weight of reasons presents a new way of understanding how hard choices vary by degree and what it is that makes them so hard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I outline and defend a traditional yet controversial view of conceptual analysis, particularly as it is used in epistemology. I will defend the view against a number of objections, all of which focus on the idea that conceptual analysis relies upon linguistic intuitions. Rather than trying to deny this claim, I will seek to vindicate the use of conceptual analysis within epistemology even given its reliance on linguistic intuitions. To do so, I first outline the view of conceptual analysis I have in mind and then respond to three broad objections from Quill Kukla, Allan Hazlett and Stephen Stich. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Australia, there are more than 46 000 children in out‐of‐home care (OOHC). Most of these children have been in OOHC for more than 2 years. Similarly, there are more than 407 000 children in the United States and over 80 800 in England who are 'looked after' with approximately one third of these children being in OOHC for more than 2 years. This paper concerns 'looked after' children's rights to contact with their birth parents. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) requires child protection systems to recognize the rights of children to maintain contact with their families except where this is not in the child's 'best interests'. In this paper, we report on a qualitative study conducted in Australia exploring legal and family support practitioners' perceptions of barriers to contact between children in OOHC and their birth parents. The thematic analysis identified four themes: These were as follows: a focus on systems driven responses; lack of cultural recognition and responsiveness; carers' disconnection from birth parents; and parents' exclusion. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding and recognizing children's right to contact with birth parents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'The knowledge question', addressing what students need to know and learn, becomes particularly relevant during the process of a new school reform. This paper examines the political messages and the role of knowledge in the current curriculum reform initiative for primary and secondary education in Norway (2020). The study is based on a document analysis of four key policy documents and one subject curriculum. Analysis reveals that, although the messages in the policy documents express expectations of strengthening the knowledge dimension in the school subjects, analysis of a new subject curriculum framework indicates that it more clearly prescribes skills, methods and strategies than the specialised knowledge content to teach. We conclude that the continuation of a competency‐oriented curriculum model, wherein the competence aims are the governing category, explicit content is difficult to prescribe because of the contrasting assumptions that underline a content‐oriented versus a competence‐oriented curriculum. The two curriculum models demand different approaches to 'the knowledge question', and raises questions about whether combining these two orientations in one curriculum model is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global challenges call for timely social--ecological transformation. There is a substantial amount of literature on social--ecological transformation, increasingly replacing and going beyond 'sustainability'. However, the concept itself is used very inconsistently. This paper aims at identifying and systematizing the strains of argumentation that encompass the social--ecological transformation. Adding German-speaking literature to the Anglophone debate, we systematize as we follow the concept's genesis to its varieties of use within context-based (spatial, temporal, and societal) disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary debates. Building on the various strands of contemporary use, this paper aims at contouring the epistemologies of the concept. Lastly, we illustrate the roles of geographical research approaches and the assigned methodology. We argue that the strands tend to drift apart and cannot be seen nor used as a singular uniform approach. We identify the key dimensions of how scholars use social--ecological transformation, unearthing underlying epistemologies. To conclude, we delineate key elements that geographical research on social--ecological transformation must address, laying the foundation for further scholarly debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual‐process virtue, consisting of imagination1 (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination2 (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual‐process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology, providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General Reliability (GR) and Functional System Reliability (FSR), for example in relation to Kengo Miyazono and Uko Tooming's (2023) argument for epistemic generativity. Furthermore, the paper claims that the dual‐process virtue account enables us to integrate a wide range of findings from the literature on epistemology and imagination. Moreover, it suggests a novel way to distinguish the virtues of creativity and imagination and presents a case for viewing imagination as a virtue rather than a skill. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until recently, accounting theorists gave little thought to what makes a particular instance of an asset or liability a single object and the very object it is—what individuates assets and liabilities. This paper offers an analysis of this individuation in the IASB's Conceptual Framework. It can be read at two levels: as an exploration of the coherence of the framework in its own terms, or, at a deeper level, as a philosophical analysis, located within philosophical pragmatism. I argue that the IASB framework's individuation is radically incoherent. I set out the case for a pragmatist approach and offer pragmatist principles of individuation. Standard setters have recently given some attention to individuation via a new kind of accounting object, the unit of account, and this is taken further in the IASB framework. This thinking is a good deal more convincing than the attempt to individuate assets and liabilities and is consistent with pragmatist principles. I propose reconceptualizing assets and liabilities using the principles developed for the unit of account. The paper extends our understanding of the way assets and liabilities are conceptualized in financial accounting; my proposal would improve the coherence of the conceptual framework in its own terms, provide a philosophically sound underpinning for its individuations, and open up the possibility of reconnecting the framework to the pragmatist epistemology encountered in classical accounting theory, extending the underpinning to the framework as a whole and, perhaps, reviving scholarly interest in the accounting theory of the framework project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Skepticism about ethical expertise has grown common, raising concerns that bioethicists' roles are inappropriate or depend on something other than expertise in ethics. While these roles may depend on skills other than those of expertise, overlooking the role of expertise in ethics distorts our conception of moral advising. This paper argues that motivations to reject ethical expertise often stem from concerns about elitism: either an intellectualist elitism, where some privileged elite have supposedly special access in virtue of expertise in moral theory; or an authoritarian elitism, where our reliance on experts in ethics risks violation of autonomy and democracy. The paper sketches an anti‐elitist conception of ethics expertise in bioethics as continuous with an anti‐elitist conception of ethics expertise in common moral practice, undercutting the intellectualism, and then uses this anti‐elitist conception to reject arguments that ethical expertise violates autonomy or democracy. An anti‐elitist picture of ethical expertise both renders it consistent with our general moral practice and allows us to resist skeptical concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the potential of the perspective of epistemic injustice to reconcile medical sociology's attention to the micro level of experience and interpersonal exchange, and disability studies' focus on the macro level of oppressive structures. The first part of the paper provides an overview of the concept of epistemic injustice and its key instances—testimonial, hermeneutical, and contributory injustice. We also consider previous applications of the concept in the fields of health care and disability, and we contextualise our investigation by discussing key features of postsocialism from the perspective of epistemic injustice. In the second part, we explore specific epistemic injustices experienced by people who use disability support by drawing on interviews and focus groups conducted with parents of disabled children in present‐day Bulgaria. In our conclusion, we revisit our methodological and theoretical points about the potential of epistemic injustice to facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges between medical sociology and disability studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Milan approach, pioneered by Selvini‐Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin, and Prata, has significantly contributed to the field of psychotherapy, particularly in the realm of systemic and family psychotherapy. While rooted in systemic principles and concepts, over time the original Milan group demonstrated differences in their clinical orientations and practices which led to their regrouping into two teams. The paper explores the divergences in their views and directions on family dynamics and the role of symptoms within the system. It delves into the influence of Boscolo and Cecchin, two of the 'Milan Four' on the Centro Padovano di Terapia della Famiglia. Drawing from a conversation with Andrea Mosconi, a mentee and collaborator of Boscolo and Cecchin, the paper examines the reconfiguration of the original 'Milan Four' team and its impact on their clinical approach. Key Milan principles and concepts such as hypothesising, circularity, and neutrality are examined with particular emphasis on the work of Boscolo and Cecchin's systemic work. These principles, intertwined and interconnected, provide a fertile ground for the construction of multiple hypotheses and circular questioning. The paper also highlights the concept of reflexivity, which originates from Bateson's work and plays a crucial role in family relations and communication while explaining the birthplace of paradox taking place when two levels of meaning are 'confused.' The Milan approach continues to be highly regarded, as its early concepts and ideas have evolved and left a lasting impact on the field of family therapy. By reflecting on the distinct contributions of Boscolo and Cecchin, and using examples, Mosconi offers valuable insights into the rich legacy and ongoing relevance of the Milan approach to contemporary therapeutic practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this short paper, we analyse whether assuming that mathematical objects are "thin" in Linnebo's sense simplifies the epistemology of mathematics. Towards this end, we introduce the notion of transparency and show that not all thin objects are transparent. We end by arguing that, far from being a weakness of thin objects, the lack of transparency of some thin objects is a fruitful characteristic mark of abstract mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an epilogue to the Special Issue. The paper examines the interplay among ontology, epistemology, methodology, politics and geography by elaborating on Esbjörn-Hargen's framework of the 'who', 'what' and 'how' of knowledge making. It uses this discussion to relate the different papers in the Special Issue, traces the engagement of the authors with concepts of assemblage and considers the further work to which the concept of assemblage might be put by exploring potential new research directions emerging from the Biological Economies research project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the potential for stakeholder theory to illuminate what F.A. Hayek called "the knowledge problem", pertaining to how a society manages to utilize "knowledge not given to anyone in its totality". According to Hayek, this problem is addressed by the price system, which induces economic actors to harness local and dispersed pieces of knowledge that would not be available to a central planner. The present paper argues that the growing turbulence in the business environment, as pointed out by stakeholder theorists, poses a challenge to the ability of corporate managers to harness local knowledge. Stakeholder theory is shown to imply that, in a turbulent environment, managers' ability to do so is increasingly dependent on their access to the knowledge held by corporate stakeholders. This argument suggests that the building of stakeholder relationships is a crucial institutional solution to the knowledge problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the unmarked forms of discipline and punishment employed against Palestinian researchers in Israeli academia, attempting to decolonize it through critical knowledge production. Based on interviews with 15 researchers from a cross‐section of academic institutions in Israel, the paper identifies subtle mechanisms of discipline and punishment, directed toward normalizing the epistemology of the colonized. The findings suggest that the gatekeepers of Israeli academia not only seek to maintain the existing racial hierarchy between Israeli and Palestinian researchers but also seek to "eliminate" the indigenous epistemology of the latter through mechanisms of hidden surveillance, used to control them as colonized subjects unable to challenge the Zionist ideology that is an essential aspect of Israeli academia. The current paper aims to unpack these invisible mechanisms of surveillance, which are part of a broader colonial apparatus aiming to maintain not only territorial sovereignty but also epistemologic sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Yet behind these obvious and immediate hopes and fears there lies a deeper meaning, known only to the mountain itself. Only the mountain has lived long enough to listen objectively to the howl of a wolf' (Aldo Leopold. (1949/1989). A Sand county almanac, p. 129). How do we think about rivers and waterways? In this paper I meditate on the notion of 'thinking like a river', to ask questions about how rivers and other waterways are conceptualised in the human imaginary, and in relation to peoples, place and ecology. The paper speculates on an ontology and phenomenology of watery places; to explore alternative ways of seeing and thinking. It poses the possibility that alternative epistemologies of nature can facilitate a deeper thinking that embraces connectivity ‐ the idea that rivers and waterways are intrinsically connected with place, peoples and landscape. I draw on three rivers and bodies of water, two in Australia and one in Aotearoa, New Zealand, to explore how these are being re‐imagined in more holistic ways, embracing Indigenous First Law, cosmologies and epistemologies, and framing them in discourses of Earth laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been suggested that philosophers should adopt a methodology largely inspired by mathematics and that the "mathematical" virtues of rigor, clarity, and precision are also fundamental philosophical virtues. In reply, this paper argues that some excellent philosophy lacks these virtues and that too much emphasis on the mathematical virtues excludes potentially valuable forms of philosophical discourse and makes the profession less diverse than it should be. Unduly restrictive conceptions of philosophical argumentation should be avoided. On a contributory conception, philosophy should try to make a positive contribution to human emancipation where possible. The paper argues that it is possible and desirable for epistemology to contribute in this way and that the mathematical virtues are less significant in this context than the emancipatory virtues of what one might call "liberation philosophy." These include irony, reflectiveness, imagination, contrarianism, and worldliness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is there a distinctively epistemic kind of blame? It has become commonplace for epistemologists to talk about epistemic blame, and to rely on this notion for theoretical purposes. But not everyone is convinced. Some of the most compelling reasons for skepticism about epistemic blame focus on disanologies, or asymmetries, between the moral and epistemic domains. In this paper, I defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. I do so primarily by developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame. My account draws on a prominent line of theorizing in moral philosophy that ties blame to our relationships with one another. I argue that with my account of epistemic blame on hand, the most compelling worries about epistemic blame can be deflated. There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Enterprise risk management (ERM) promises to improve decision‐making and help organizations avoid wicked problems. Consequently, risk artefacts may play a significant role in managers' decision‐making processes, but little is known about the relationship between ERM and managerial judgement in decision‐making (MJDM). The purpose of this paper is to present a systematic literature review of ERM, thereby filling this knowledge gap and providing an evidence‐based foundation for improving practice and advancing knowledge and theory development. Based on an analysis and synthesis of 33 articles published between 2009 and 2021, we identify four contextual, five technical, three social and five cognitive factors that interact with MJDM. We find that regulation and corporate governance, ERM artefact design reconfiguration and use, social capital interactions and spaces and perceptions have the most support. We distinguish between three different modes of judgement: risk measurement, risk envisionment and risk qualculation. We find that risk qualculation, which employs quantitative and qualitative data and social interpretations of risks and uncertainties, is more likely to be useful in managerial decision‐making, particularly when attempting to address wicked problems. We also find that human cognition significantly impacts ERM design, implementation and use, and how those change over time. This paper also develops a new narrative and conceptualization of the relationship between ERM and MJDM, which is presented in an integrative framework. Finally, we encourage researchers to adopt cognitive theories and related concepts that are better suited for examining the ERM–MJDM relationship and to take a cognitive turn in future ERM research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting‐for‐a‐reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims seem especially untenable regarding believing for a reason. And extending the scope of control in this way also faces the threat of regress. In the face of this orthodoxy, the present paper argues that we do in fact have control over both believing and acting for a particular reason. It also starts to develop an account of the way in which this would be possible. Given the broad importance of understanding control and agency, this paper bears on a number of topics in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper depicts a Covid science case, that of the AstraZeneca Vaxzevria vaccine, with specific focus on what happened in Italy. Given that we believe acknowledging the role of non‐evidential factors in medicine is an important insight into the recent philosophy of science, we illustrate how in the case of Vaxzevria, the interplay between facts, values (both epistemic and non‐epistemic) and cognitive biases may have possibly led to different institutional decisions based on the same evidence. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we provide a glossary of the relevant terms involved, that is to say, epistemic values, non‐epistemic values and cognitive biases. Second, we sketch a timeline of Vaxzevria's approvals and suspensions by relevant institutional healthcare authorities with special focus on Italy and the Italian Medicines Agency. Then we show the interplay between the evidence base, epistemic as well as non‐epistemic values and cognitive biases using a narrative review of political decisions along with newspaper and social media content pertaining to Vaxzevria. We briefly compare Italy with other European countries to show that different political decisions were made on the basis of the same evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although certainty is a fundamental notion in epistemology, it is less studied in contemporary analytic epistemology than other important notions such as knowledge or justification. This paper focuses on Wittgensteinian certainty, according to which the very basic dimension of our epistemic practices, the elements of our world-pictures, are objectively certain, in that we cannot legitimately doubt them. The aim of the paper is to offer the best philosophical way to clarify Wittgensteinian certainty, in a way that is consonant with Wittgenstein's fundamental insights. The paper critiques two alternative proposals for clarifying Wittgensteinian certainty that are philosophically unsatisfying: the rule view and the proposition view. Finally, it instead shows how viewing world-pictures as pictures, in the sense of unclear conceptions, is a more philosophically fruitful approach to understanding world-pictures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge and its acquisition are central to the field of curriculum studies, but the ways in which empirical studies of pedagogical approaches relate to theories of knowledge acquisition are under researched. This paper reports the outcomes of a rapid evidence assessment about the impacts of experiential learning (EL), regarded by some as progressive pedagogy, on the school attainment of children aged 4–14. Database searches of the Education Resources Information Center, the British Education Index, the Teacher Reference Center, the Education Database and APA PsycINFO were carried out to review peer‐reviewed research studies published between 2013 and 2023. In total, 465 studies were screened for their relevance, and the Mixed methods appraisal tool was used to assess the methodological quality of relevant studies; 44 studies were included in the final analysis. The findings of the research showed the overall positive impact of EL pedagogies on children's academic achievement. Key examples of positive impact included evidence for the beneficial effects of EL on the achievement of children with lower academic achievement; strong links between EL and science achievement; and the positive impact that EL has on domain‐general academic skills including memory and vocabulary development. Some links between EL and children's motivation, engagement, agency, and wellbeing, factors which underpin academic achievement, are also noted. The findings indicate that EL can be a highly valuable approach to enhancing children's acquisition of knowledge, skills and understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I provide a characterisation of a neglected form of humility: magnanimous humility. Unlike most contemporary analyses of humility, magnanimous humility is not about limitations but instead presupposes that one possesses some entitlement in a context. I suggest that magnanimous intellectual humility (IH) consists in a disposition to appropriately refrain from exercising one's legitimate epistemic entitlements because one is appropriately motivated to pursue some epistemic good. I then shown that Magnanimous IH has an important role to play in contexts of disagreement and oppression. It calls on knowing parties to refrain from pressing their epistemic entitlements to facilitate mutual understanding. And it is a virtue that oppressed persons have good reason to cultivate in order to develop meta‐lucidity in themselves and others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT According to the Theory of the Second Best, in non‐ideal circumstances, approximating ideals might be suboptimal (with respect to a specific interpretation of what “approximating an ideal” means). In this paper, I argue that the formal model underlying the Theory can apply to problems in epistemology. Two applications are discussed: First, in some circumstances, second‐best problems arise in Bayesian settings. Second, the division of epistemic labor can be subject to second‐best problems. These results matter. They allow us to evaluate the claim, made by many philosophers, that second‐best problems have import in epistemology (and the specific conditions under which the Theory finds applications). They also allow us to see that talk of “approximating an ideal” is ambiguous, and to clarify the conditions in which approximating an epistemic ideal might be beneficial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I show that selection for action in this conception captures how we, the folk, experience it and how the cognitive scientist studies it. That is, selection for action pulls empirical and folk‐psychology together. Accordingly, philosophers who take seriously either source have reason to work with selection for action as their starting conception of attention. This conception provides a way to bridge empirical and philosophical concerns where attention is central. The theoretical advantages of selection for action have been obscured by the common opinion that it is easily refuted. I defend the position against many of the published objections and then deploy it to provide a foundation for the intuitive, but inchoate, idea of attention being gradable, something of which there can be more or less. An analysis of the gradability of attention is then applied to consider recent work on the harms due to a surplus of attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When one is intentionally doing something, one represents that thing as a goal to be accomplished. One represents it practically. How should we characterize this practical representation further? In this paper, I argue that when one is intentionally doing something, one's representation of it as a goal to be accomplished must also be knowledge that one is intentionally doing that thing. And I argue that this knowledge must itself be one's intentionally doing that thing. I aim to show, then, that insofar as representing practically just is knowing practically, it is equally acting intentionally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bertrand Russell's epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge ("S knows that p") asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance. On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that p for any p. This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate a sympathetic reconsideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies key insights from constitutive penology to advance the practice framework literature in correctional rehabilitation. First, I provide some brief commentary on the origins and subsequent development of constitutive thought in studies of governance, crime and justice. Second, I outline the central ontological convictions and epistemological commitments of constitutive penology. Third, I explain where and how the ontic and epistemic 'lessons' of constitutive penology contribute to the conversation about practice framework theory and therapeutic practice in correctional rehabilitation. These comments especially emphasize the importance of (a) rethinking the responsibility of theory in therapeutic practice; (b) reframing the method of study in the practice of therapy and (c) repurposing the practice guidelines for undertaking therapeutic work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to fill an epistemological gap in our theorizing about love with a sketch of an epistemology of love that unfolds by addressing Whitney Houston's famous epistemological questions pertaining to how we can know whether another loves us. After arguing for three possible sources of the knowledge of love, it offers initial answers to how the knowledge of the presence or absence of another's love can be acquired from the relevant possible sources previously established. These initial answers, though, are unsatisfying because they invite more difficult questions that are then addressed, such as those pertaining to the kinds of things that constitute love's expressions along with how to detect these expressions given the possibility of false‐positives. Addressing these questions ultimately leads to a sharpened, Aristotle‐inspired account of how to acquire the knowledge of the presence or absence of another's love by inferring it, respectively, from the successful or failed detection of love's expressions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]