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This article shows how companies can circumvent competition legislation by developing new informal ways of cooperation. We focus on the case of the Nordic pulp and paper industry which was particularly eager to set up cartels. Scholars analysing this sector can utilise exceptionally rich sources that reveal how industrialists reacted to the introduction and development of European competition policies. The article shows that companies defended their collusive practices by making them less transparent and more informal than before, a change that did not automatically lessen their effectiveness. Tougher competition policies also encouraged industrialists to create new giant companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Catalana de Dret Públic is the property of Revista Catalana de Dret Public and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper not only discusses the issue of the approach used, the issue of ex-post and ex-ante merger control regulation usage, issues of conflict of norms, overlapping legal rules, and the existence of legal vacuum which complicates the enforcement of rules regarding merger control in Indonesia. The legal issues examined in this paper concern the characteristics of merger control based on the ratio decidendi of KPPU decisions during the 20 years of enforcing business competition law in Indonesia and the ius constituendum of the ex-ante and ex-post approach. This research is based on normative legal research using a statute approach, conceptual approach, case approach, and comparative approach method. These methods lead to the conclusion of the research, which is, that in the past 20 years, Indonesia has experienced a change in the ex-post merger control approach, resulting in partiality in the articles applied that are not entirely used in KPPU decisions. Furthermore, the idealized rules (ius constituendum) on the control of mergers in Indonesia, outlined in Law No. 5 of 1999, will be examined based on the principles and objectives of competition law enforcement in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically evaluates the draft version of the US Merger Guidelines from 2023 (D23), which departs from the consumer welfare standard, sparking intense debates within the academic, professional, and business communities. D23, released by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, introduces a shift toward a more structuralist approach in horizontal merger assessment. The paper examines the diverse perspectives of D23, with some perceiving it as a populist move sidelining economic rationale and others viewing it as an attempt to base decisions on factual grounds and enhance antitrust activism. The discussion emphasises the importance of precision in defining relevant markets within D23, a crucial element in merger assessment. This analysis sheds light on the evolving landscape of merger policy, prompting critical inquiries into the future trajectory of competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the planned damages actions for breaches of EC antitrust law in order to assess their impact on consumer welfare. It first examines the current legal situation and concurs that the European Union needs to regulate damages actions for breaches of EC antitrust law so that a higher number of consumers could be compensated for their losses. This paper then discusses the main legal provisions proposed by the Commission in the Green and in the White paper on damages actions for breaches of EC antitrust law. The analysis of these proposed legal provisions is done using arguments specific to the economic analysis of law. It is demonstrated that most of these proposed legal provisions will enhance consumer welfare but that there are also proposed legal provisions which will damage consumer welfare. The paper concludes that the planned damages actions for breaches of the EC law will be an improvement compared to the current situation. However, the Commission should amend some of the proposed legal provisions in order to help consumers further.

While the role of lobbying in the US public accounting profession has been the subject of several studies, what has not been addressed is the profession's historic reluctance to lobby and the impact this may have had on the profession. This paper provides a case study of public accounting's interaction with government and the need for the profession to articulate the impact of government policies on the practice of accounting. It reviews and assesses the antitrust investigations by the US Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission that led to the repeal of the profession's anticompetitive ethics rules, rules that had governed American public accounting for most of the 20th century. These investigations are often blamed for an increased competitive atmosphere in public accounting that prioritized growth and profitability over quality in attest services. Using records obtained from Freedom of Information Act requests and archival sources, I attempt to reconstruct the US Government's motivations and the efforts of the American Institute of CPAs. I find a troubling lack of understanding of the audit profession by executive branch regulators and Congress and a reticence by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to advocate for the profession that led to what many observers see as a profound misapplication of the antitrust laws. While this study deals only with the US, similar regulatory changes took place in Canada, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Economia Contemporânea is the property of Revista de Economia Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article presents legal developments in marketing relating to the regulation of monopolistic methods. Regarding market control, a merger report from W. T. Grimm & Co. is discussed, including details of the United States Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) annual report on the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act pertaining to corporate mergers. Regarding collusive practices, the case of Continental Cablevision of Ohio v. American Electric Power Co. is discussed, involving the exchange of price information between competitors. Regarding market exclusion tactics, the case Pacific Stationery v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers is discussed, in which the expulsion of a member of an office suppliers' co-operative was deemed an illegal boycott under the Sherman Act.

Current research on the long-term influence of ordoliberal and neoliberal ideas is hampered by an overly static and generalised picture of the Freiburg School. To address this gap, the paper analyses all articles published in ORDO, the flagship journal of the Freiburg School, between 1948 and 2014. This makes it possible to distinguish three phases of post-war ordoliberalism, to identify personal continuities and breaks, and to summarise thematic, methodological, and conceptual developments. Since the analysis utilises text mining methods, such as keyword identification and Topic Modeling, and validates the results of distant reading with close reading and external data, the paper also highlights some general methodological insights for using Digital Humanities in the historical sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to evaluate, if competition-like efficiencies of European-style rule of reason shall apply also in the context of the ex-ante regulation by the DMA. The rationale of such consideration lies in the concept of proportionality of the EU regulation and the assumption that EU law cannot proscribe behaviour with beneficial outcomes and effects that does not have negative consequences on the internal market outweighing the positive effects. The analysis is divided into three parts in this paper: position of the rule of law and the per se prohibition in the legal development of the EU competition law, the relationship between the DMA and competition law, including competition-based efficiencies brought in digital market cases and finally the per se prohibition included in the DMA. The analysis of the development of the case law showed that in the EU competition law the principle of per se prohibitions was never accepted and the CJEU accepted justifications outside the text of the statutory exemptions. Even though the aim of the DMA may be the introduction of a per se prohibition in order to facilitate the Commission's enforcement, it cannot be surprising if the CJ EU will, in some case in the future, follow the path of the EU-style rule of reason in the framework of the DMA as well on the basis of proportionality principle. The lesson learned from application of rule of reason in the context of agreements restricting competition or as a specific form of objective justification in the context of abuse of dominant position does not undermine effectiveness of competition law. The quasi per se concept can satisfy both: it shows that it is not probable that such a behaviour will be allowed and at the same time it dodges proportionality objections because the prohibition is not, at least theoretically, absolutely, per se. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2022 Guidelines of the European Commission on the application of EU competition law to collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons apparently introduced a fresh approach towards collective agreements in a gig economy era. The main aim of this paper is to discuss whether the 2022 Guidelines are an appropriate tool to address the problems of solo self-employed persons (i.e. persons who are not in a formal employment relationship and who rely primarily on their own personal labour to provide services) from the perspective of EU competition law. To this end, we first present key competition problems related to collective agreements (section 1). Second, we analyse the regulatory framework for exemptions from competition law, with a view for a potential exemption relevant for collective agreements, as well as an approach to collective agreements in EU case law (sections 2 and 3). Third, the background for adopting the Guidelines, and their goals, is analysed (sections 4 and 5). Fourth, the Guidelines are discussed in more detail in sections 6 and 7 from the perspective of exemptions from Art. 101(1) TFEU. Finally, we examine the relationship between the Guidelines and a proposal for a platform work directive. The article attempts to verify the hypothesis that the Guidelines may be considered a pseudo-development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

An enduring idea in economics and management sciences is that successful business strategies exploit complementarities across management practices within a firm. From this complementarity perspective, the success of business strategy requires utilizing a variety of interdependencies across management practices. Navigating large arrays of possible interdependencies implies that strategic decision-making is often conducted under high complexity and uncertainty. This paper provides an introduction to the conceptual foundations of complementarities in business strategy, and its implications for strategic decision-making and managerial learning. Against this backdrop, I outline issues of measurement and data collection for strategy practices, drawing on recent measurement efforts by academic researchers as well as national statistical agencies. The last part of the paper discusses how increased large-scale data collection on firm activity complementarities and strategy practices can inform a variety of policy areas, such as antitrust policy and merger review, industrial and innovation policy, tax policy, and public–private partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following a long stream of literature on the drivers of Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) activities, this study examines the effect of corporate leverage on several decisions of M&A deals in the context of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Using M&A data from the Thomson One database for the period between 2005 and 2022, we find that corporate leverage significantly influences the type of M&A target. This study further adds to the prior literature on the contradictory behaviours of high and low leverage firms by examining whether acquisition decisions differ amongst them in M&A deals in the UAE context. Results indicate that high (low) leverage firms are less (more) likely to acquire private targets and more (less) inclined to acquire a target from a different (same) industry. Furthermore, our results show that the relationship between the method of payment used in M&A deals and corporate leverage is insignificant. We control for endogeneity using Heckman's two-stage method. In brief, this paper extends the literature with conclusive evidence that considerations of capital structure can significantly anticipate and explain firms' behaviour toward M&A choices. The implication of findings may include a call to reform some aspects of the Competition Law in the UAE by requiring private firms to enhance their disclosure practices similar to their public counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Direito e Práxis is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Thanks to the rapid advance in technology, the arrival of artificial intelligence, and easy digital connectivity across nations, the ground beneath the global economy is shifting. This has given rise to new social and political problems and challenges for market capitalism. The paper argues the need for original work in economic theory to capture and understand the essence of markets in this new, digital age; and goes on to speculate about what shape this may take. The paper discusses the need to think out of the box in terms of economic policy, arguing that the reach of antitrust law is inadequate for our digital-platform-based economy, and we have to think of new forms of regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1989, the Court of Justice of the European Union has recognised a privilege against self-incrimination for undertakings subject to public enforcement procedures on the basis of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. That privilege forms part of the fundamental rights of the defence. Over time, the privilege has been read into Article 6 ECHR and has gained ground in other domains of EU law as well. Against that background, the question arises as to whether the CJEU's original case law in the field of EU competition law needs to be updated. This paper revisits that case law by comparing it with developments in the context of the ECHR and in other domains of EU law. It argues that, in light of those developments, a case law update may indeed prove necessary. However, such an update alone would not sufficiently address the practical difficulties currently surrounding the application of the privilege in practice. For that, more coordinated legislative action would be warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2008 is etched in human history as the year of the 'Global Financial Crises'. Post the crises, Historians and financial commentators alike rushed to impute blame. Some blamed securitizations, some the banks and some Lehman Brothers and AIG. However, in the midst of all of this humbug, a key epicentre of the crises escaped academic scrutiny; 'Automation Technology'. The paper therefore aims to present an alternative view of financial history; one which impleads 'automation technology in finance' i.e., Risk Modelling Algorithms and RegTech. However, the underlying aim of this paper is to make a case against systemic automation bias in finance and to achieve that end, the paper employs an inter-disciplinary approach and uses history, law and data science to show case the multifarious perils of using automation technology blindfold in finance whilst also proposing possible solutions such as the incorporating of design thinking and systems theory in finance. Expired data sets, human assumptions, turning code in law, and a lack of standardized financial semantics as but some of these 'perils'. On the law front; it presents a twofold challenge under constitutional and anti-trust law and aims to reconcile law and technology. Lastly the paper aims to guide regulators by categorizing multiple stages of technological complexity and recommends application of different regulatory approaches to regulating automation. Therefore, the paper shall maintain a 'solution' oriented approach throughout. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief overview of Looking Back at the Lawsuit That Transformed the Chiropractic Profession, which is a series of 8 research papers that explore the historical events surrounding the Wilk v American Medical Association lawsuit and how these events may have had an influence on the chiropractic profession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the derogation from the prohibition contained in Article 101 TFEU to agreements between legal entities forming part of an economic group. This feature, sometimes called "privilege", is ultimately founded on the "economic unit" perspective, whereby legally independent entities are treated as one where two requirements are met: that the entities at stake have a relationship of control (either one over the other or both by a common parent) and that they do not pursue independent action on the market. That second limb would arguably result in treating two entities as separate undertakings for the purposes of competition law despite the existence of control. However, the doctrine of the Courts and the practice of the Commission on this issue are unclear. In its judgment of 17 May 2018 in Ecoservice, the Court of Justice of the European Union appears to have disregarded that second element. That would make Article 101 TFEU inapplicable to agreements between two entities where one is controlled by the other or both are controlled by the same entity, irrespective of their eventual independent action on the market. The pronouncement has been made in the context of coordination among entities in public procurement, forcing the French competition agency to abandon its doctrine that applied the prohibition on cartels to coordination among affiliates in public bids. This decision raises the question whether agreements among affiliates that enjoy market independence should be excluded from Article 101 TFEU in areas other than procurement, substantially expanding the scope of the exemption. A case in point would be the coordination among entities controlled by a Member State or a third country, which are treated as separate undertakings for the purposes of merger control but, under this perspective, would benefit from the exemption. This paper questions whether that decision intended to change the law, arguing for a reading that keeps the prohibition to certain agreements among independent entities, despite the presence of control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term 'competition' is a core notion for social and economic thinking and the organisation of markets. Nevertheless, this paper shows that there is no single acceptable economic imaginary ascribed to the notion in Europe. The search for the meaning of competition is an ongoing journey, from the EU's very inception 60 years ago to the present day, which is inherently tied to the objectives, scope, and boundaries of EU (competition) law and to socio-economic transformations. The paper first reviews the history of the notion in both common-usage language and in legal-economic thinking. It exposes the emergence of three parallel, partly conflicting, imaginaries influencing the notion in EU competition law: Keynesian, ordoliberal, and neoliberal. After demonstrating that no single imaginary was adopted by EU primary, secondary, or soft laws, it applies Critical Discourse Analysis to the Commission's annual reports on competition (1971-2020) in search for the meaning of competition. The paper reveals that the notion of competition had acquired one meaning in 'hard' contexts of the enforcement (scope of the prohibition of competition; exceptions or justifications for allowing otherwise anti-competitive behaviour), and another meaning in 'softer' contexts (mandates of the competition rules, and to a lesser extent - selection of enforcement priorities). While the 'hard' contexts have experienced a transformation from Keynesian and ordoliberal imaginary of competition to a neoliberal notion; the 'soft' contexts still invoke a broader notion reflecting influences from all three theories. Finally, the paper argues that although the lack of a clear definition for competition undoubtedly raises challenges relating to the rule of law, legal certainty, and uniformity, its ambiguity also serves as a powerful tool in safeguarding the durability and legitimacy of competition as an economic imaginary. It allows tailoring the notion of competition to changing legal, economic, and social conditions without a Treaty amendment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the advent of the cloud computing era, big data technology has also developed rapidly. Due to the huge volume, variety, fast processing speed and low value density of big data, traditional data storage, extraction, transformation and analysis technologies are not suitable, so new solutions for big data application technologies are needed. However, with the development of economic theory and the practice of market economy, some links in the industrial chain of natural monopoly industries already have a certain degree of competitiveness. In this context, the article conducts a research on the anti-monopoly supervision mode of platform economy based on big data and sentiment analysis. This paper introduces the main idea of MapReduce, the current software implementation specifies a Map function that maps a set of key-value pairs into a new set of key-value pairs. It specifies a concurrent Reduce function that guarantees that each of all mapped key-value pairs share the same set of keys. establishes a vector space model, and basically realizes the extraction of text emotional elements. It introduces the theoretical controversy of antitrust regulation of predatory pricing behavior of third-party payment platforms, and conducted model experiments. The experimental results show that the throughput of 40 test users in 1 h of test is determined by two factors, QPS and the number of concurrent, where QPS = 40/(60*60) transactions/second. The time for each test user to log in to the system is 10 min, and the average response time is 10*60 s, then the number of concurrency = QPS*average response time = 40/(60*60)*10*60 = 6.66. This paper has successfully completed the research on the anti-monopoly supervision model of platform economy based on big data and sentiment analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

I would like to congratulate Professor Ellert on his paper. I think it is a significant and valuable contribution to economic analysis of mergers and anti-trust legislation. As with most examples of good empirical research, the paper not only clarifies the validity of some a priori hypotheses, it also stimulates interest in particular lines of future research. One such line that strikes me has to do with the behavior of the anti-trust enforcement agencies. The evidence presented by Professor Ellert certainly suggests that, at least in merger cases, the agencies do impose non-negligable costs on the firms they choose to prosecute. This ability to impose costs is, of course, a prerequisite for effective enforcement of the law. Another prerequisite that is at least as important, however, is that the agencies apply their punitive power in such a way that firms whose merger activity truly violates the law face a significantly higher probability of prosecution than do firms whose activity does not violate the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the third paper in a series that explores the historical events surrounding the Wilk v American Medical Association (AMA) lawsuit in which the plaintiffs argued that the AMA, the American Hospital Association, and other medical specialty societies violated antitrust law by restraining chiropractors' business practices. The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief review of the history of the growth of chiropractic, its public relations campaigns, and infighting that contributed to the events surrounding the Wilk v AMA lawsuit. This historical research study used a phenomenological approach to qualitative inquiry into the conflict between regular medicine and chiropractic and the events before, during, and after a legal dispute at the time of modernization of the chiropractic profession. Our methods included obtaining primary and secondary data sources. The final narrative recount was developed into 8 papers following a successive timeline. This paper is the third of the series that explores the growth the chiropractic profession. By the 1930s, the AMA was already under investigation for violation of antitrust laws and the National Chiropractic Association was suggesting that the AMA was establishing a health care monopoly. Chiropractic schools grew and the number of graduates rose quickly. Public relations campaigns and publications in the popular press attempted to educate the public about chiropractic. Factions within the profession polarized around differing views of how they thought that chiropractic should be practiced and portrayed to the public. The AMA leaders noted the infighting and used it to their advantage to subvert chiropractic. Chiropractic grew rapidly and established its presence with the American public through public relations campaigns and popular press. However, infighting would give the AMA material to further its efforts to contain and eliminate the chiropractic profession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the eighth in a series that explores the historical events surrounding the Wilk v American Medical Association (AMA) lawsuit in which the plaintiffs argued that the AMA, the American Hospital Association, and other medical specialty societies violated antitrust law by restraining chiropractors' business practices. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the possible impact that the final decision in favor of the plaintiffs may have had on the chiropractic profession. This historical research study used a phenomenological approach to qualitative inquiry into the conflict between regular medicine and chiropractic and the events before, during, and after a legal dispute at the time of modernization of the chiropractic profession. Our methods included obtaining primary and secondary data sources. The final narrative recount was developed into 8 papers following a successive timeline. This paper is the eighth of the series that discusses how the trial decision may have influenced the chiropractic that we know today in the United States. Chiropractic practice, education, and research have changed since before the lawsuit was filed. There are several areas in which we propose that the trial decision may have had an impact on the chiropractic profession. The lawsuit removed the barriers that were implemented by organized medicine against the chiropractic profession. The quality of chiropractic practice, education, and research continues to improve and the profession continues to meet its most fundamental mission: to improve the lives of patients. Chiropractors practicing in the United States today are allowed to collaborate freely with other health professionals. Today, patients have the option to access chiropractic care because of the dedicated efforts of many people to reduce the previous barriers. It is up to the present-day members of the medical and chiropractic professions to look back and to remember what happened. By recalling the events surrounding the lawsuit, we may have a better understanding about our professions today. This information may help to facilitate interactions between medicine and chiropractic and to develop more respectful partnerships focused on creating a better future for the health of the public. The future of the chiropractic profession rests in the heads, hearts, and hands of its current members to do what is right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Collected Papers of Zagreb Law Faculty / Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu is the property of Sveuciliste u Zagrebu, Pravni Fakultet and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Two recent papers by prominent antitrust scholars argue that a revived antitrust movement can help reverse the dramatic rise in economic inequality and the erosion of political democracy in the United States. Both papers rely on the legislative history of the key antitrust statutes to support their case. Not surprisingly, their recommendations have been met with alarm in some quarters, and with skepticism in others. Such proposals by antitrust reformers are often contrasted with the Consumer Welfare Standard that pervades antitrust policy today. The Consumer Welfare Standard suffers from several defects: (1) it employs a narrow, unworkable measure of welfare; (2) it excludes important sources of welfare based on the assumption that antitrust seeks only to maximize wealth; (3) it assumes a constant and equal individual marginal utility of money; and (4) it is often combined with extraneous ideological goals. Even with these defects, however, if applied consistent with its theoretical underpinnings, the consideration of the transfer of labor rents resulting from a merger or dominant firm conduct is supported by the Consumer Welfare Standard. Moreover, even when only consumers ( and not producers) are deemed relevant, the welfare oflabor still should consistently be considered part of consumer welfare. In contrast, fostering political democracy-a prominent traditional antitrust goal that was jettisoned by the Chicago School-falls outside the Consumer Welfare Standard in any of its constructs. To undergird such important broader goals requires that the Consumer Welfare Standard be replaced with the General Welfare Standard. The General Welfare Standard consists of modem welfare economics modified to accommodate objective analyses of human welfare and purged of inconsistencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]